Presidential Approval, Coattail, and Electoral Successes: An Analysis of Taiwan’s 2016 Legislative Election

T.Y. Wang
Department of Politics and Government
Illinois State University

Su-feng Cheng
Election Study Center
National Chengchi University

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T. Y. Wang & Su-feng Cheng

Voluminous studies have been conducted on the determinants of citizens’ voting calculus in legislative elections during the past several decades. Some studies focus on such voter-specific characteristics as party identification, gender, and ethnicity (Cook 1994; Dolan 1998; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Sigelman, Sigelman, Walkosz, and Nitz 1995; Terkildsen 1993). Others examine the effect of citizens’ evaluation of candidates, national economy and personal well-being (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007), and their positions on various issues (Carmines and Stimson 1989). A number of studies also assess the role of external cues in citizens’ electoral calculus. Because acquiring information on candidates is a costly endeavor, the arguments goes, voters must adapt to this limitation and rely on information short-cuts for their decisions. Two external sources of information have been identified as important cues to electoral decisions: voters’ support for a presidential candidate (Born, 1984; Campbell and Sumners, 1990; Flemming, 1995; Jacobson, 1976; 2009a; Kritzer and Eubank, 1979; Mattei and Glasgow, 2005; Mondak, 1990; 1993) and their appraisal of the sitting president’s performance (Gronke, Koch, and Wilson 2003; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1982, 1984; Newman and Ostrom 2002). The former is generally characterized as coattail effects, while the latter, effects of presidential approval. The two sources of information may be highly related if the sitting president is running for a re-election but each of the two sources may have independent and separate effects if neither candidate is an incumbent. In either scenario, voters’ appraisal of the incumbent president and/or their support for presidential candidates are transmitted to their choice of legislative candidates.

Taiwan’s 2016 combined presidential and legislative elections provide great opportunities to examine the effects of presidential coattail and presidential approval on citizens’ electoral decisions. Generally characterized as a semi-presidential system, the island country held its 2016 presidential race concurrently with the elections of its unicameral parliament, known as the Legislative Yuan (LY). The presidential election was an open-seat race due to presidential term limit. All three presidential candidates were heads of their respective political parties, while a total of 354 contenders of various political parties ran for 73 legislative seats in single member districts (SMDs). The backdrop of the election was a very unpopular sitting president, Ma Ying-jehou, and an internally divided ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT), while Tsai Ying-wen of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took a comfortable lead from the start. What are the effects of presidential candidates on citizens’ electoral choices in Taiwan’s 2016 legislative election? Has Ma’s low approval rating influenced the electoral fortune of the KMT’s legislative contenders? Employing survey data collected after the 2016 elections, this study intends to address these two questions.

Coattail Effects

While interest in coattail effects can trace back to Bean’s study (1950), Key’s observation on the electoral fortune of president’s congressional running mates probably best summarizes
what coattail is. “The simultaneous election of the President and of all House members,” as he says, “subjects most races for Representative to the influences that play upon presidential voting” (Key, 1964: 556). This means that coattail occurs when two elections are simultaneously held and the electoral race of the more salient position has a spillover effect on a lesser significant one. In such elections, attention paid to the race for a more prominent office, such as presidency or governorship, may bring voters to the polls and impact their electoral decisions to support candidates of the same party for lower-level offices, such as seats in the state or national legislatures. Thus, coattail voting is viewed as “an efficiency-oriented process” in which citizens base their electoral decisions for lower-level seats on the assessment of candidates of an upper-level office (Mondak and McCurley, 1994: 155). This is because information on legislative candidates during campaign is usually not available, costly or even confusing. Given this informational limitation, voters may have to rely on external sources for their electoral decisions. When there are two elections held concurrently, information related to the upper-level office may become the information short-cuts for voters’ decisions for the lower-level races.

Indeed, in a presidential system like the United State, voters generally regard the presidency as the most important electoral prize relative to other public offices. In on-year elections, presidential candidates naturally become the focal point of campaigns. Their policy positions, partisan affiliations, and even charisma are likely to become the external cues in citizens’ electoral calculus. By a simple transmission, voters’ support for a presidential candidate may be extended to his/her legislative running mates. The gravitational force of a more prominent presidential campaign thus affects the outcome of a less salient legislative election. More specifically, coattail effects may take two forms: mobilization and conversion. That is, coattail effect may occur by mobilizing previous nonvoters to the polls so that they will cast a straight ticket for candidates of the same party running for both upper- and lower-level offices. Alternatively, coattail effects can happen by altering voters’ support, who would otherwise vote for candidates of another party (Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983; Miller, 1955-56: 366). In both scenarios, voters support candidates carrying the same party label running for both offices that are held concurrently due to the attractiveness of candidates for a more prominent office.

Presidential approval

Citizens’ assessment of incumbent president’s performance is believed to be closely related to legislators’ electoral fortunes (Gronke, et al. 2003). In their attempt to refute the “surge and decline” explanation for the inexplicable outcomes of midterm elections of the United States Congress,¹ several scholars have identified popular approval of presidential performance

¹ The “surge and decline” thesis maintains that midterm losses of incumbent presidents’ party are due to the missing independents and marginal voters who were previously lured to the polls during on-year elections. Since there is no prominent presidential candidate on the ticket during off-year midterm elections, those who were previously attracted by the stimuli of a presidential campaign do not show up at the polls, which generally work against the president’s party (Campbell, 1986a; Campbell, 1991).
as an alternative explanation. It is argued that some voters may take out their dissatisfaction with the incumbent administration on the president’s congressional running mates (Piereson, 1975; Tufte, 1975; 1978). In a sense, the “vote cast in midterm congressional elections is a referendum on the performance of the President and his administration’s management of the economy” (Tufte, 1975: 824). Very much like the way coattail functions, such effects are extended to legislative contestants of the president’s party. Popular approval/disapproval of presidential performance, particularly in the area of the economy, thus has spill-over effects. Previous studies also find that the effect of presidential approval is not limited to congressional elections (Campbell, 1986b). Piereson (1975) shows that the approval rating of a sitting president affects electoral fortunes of the president’s party at all electoral levels during midterm elections. “This influence is thus not restricted to contests for the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, but also extends to state races for governor, as well as to contests for lower level state and local offices,” he concludes (p.690).

The above discussion thus yields the following hypotheses to be examined in the subsequent sections:

Hypothesis 1: citizens’ support for presidential candidates generate coattail effects on their voting decisions in legislative elections.

Hypothesis 2: citizens evaluations of the performance of the sitting president affect their electoral calculus in legislative elections.

The theoretical expectation of the above two hypotheses is that coattail and presidential approval generate spillover effects from a vote choice in a presidential election to that in a legislative election. While effects are contingent upon citizens’ support for presidential candidates and their evaluation of the sitting president’s performance, they may display divergent effects due to variant voter characteristics. First of all, the spillover effects of coattail and presidential popularity are most likely to occur to those who are less educated, or less informed of politics. These voters are either unable to or unwilling to process the information of legislative candidates. Support for presidential candidates and/or assessment of the sitting president’s performance become important cues in their voting calculus in the legislative election that is held simultaneously. They may then decide to cast a straight ticket in both presidential and legislative elections. However, both effects are least likely to occur to those who have strong partisan attachment. For these voters, partisan affiliation are the most important information short-cuts for their electoral decisions, which plays a vital role in their electoral calculus (Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983; Jacobson, 1976; Hogan, 2005; Mondak, 1990; Mondak and McCurley, 1994).

The 2016 Elections in Taiwan
Taiwan’s 2016 elections were the second time that the presidential race was held concurrently with the election of its LY.\(^2\) While the electoral rule of the presidency was governed by the plurality rule, contenders for legislative seats competed under the “parallel” mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral institution\(^3\) for the 113 legislative seats with 73 elected from SMDs and 34 from a proportional representation (PR) list in a nation-wide pool.\(^4\) The 2016 presidential election was a three-way race and the incumbent President Ma was not a candidate due to the term limit. As Table 1 shows, Tsai was the DPP’s presidential nominee and she won a landslide victory by beating her opponent, Eric Chu of the ruling KMT, with a substantial margin of 3 million or 25 percent of the votes. James Soong of the PFP running for the presidency for the fourth time, received about 13% of the popular votes, up 10% from four years ago. The rout of the KMT also extended to the legislative election as Tsai’s DPP won a landslide majority with 49 district seats and 18 from the PR list. The ruling KMT only garnered 20 and 11 seats from the SMD and the PR segment, respectively, a significant decline from four years ago. The New Power Party (NPP), a lately formed political group that is ideologically close to the DPP, won a total of 5 seats in the LY election when the PFP garnered 3 PR seats. It is worth noting that the 2016 elections were held against a backdrop of Ma’s extreme unpopularity with approval ratings in the teens,\(^5\) the public dissatisfaction of economy, the concern of Ma’s engagement policy with China and the KMT’s tattered image due to internal rivalry, along with a popular opposition leader.

Indeed, when the outgoing President Ma won the election for his first term in 2008 and re-election in 2012, he promised to bring peace and stability between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, as well as economic prosperity to the island’s residents. During his presidency between 2008 and 2015, Ma endorsed the “1992 Consensus” or the “one China with respective interpretations” and adopted an engagement policy toward China. Cross-Strait economic relationships have substantially expanded as a result. More than 20 agreements were reached between Taipei and Beijing during Ma’s presidency, including a landmark trade deal, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), in which the Chinese government made significant economic concessions.\(^6\) By reducing tariff and investment barriers with China, this

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\(^2\) The first time that the presidential race was held concurrently with the election of its LY was in 2012. See Huang and Wang (2014).

\(^3\) Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral system is a hybrid that combines both proportional representation (PR) and single member district (SMD). Depending on whether there is a linkage between votes acquired from the PR and from the SMD tier, the institutional designs can be further categorized as “non-parallel” mixed-member proportional (MMP) and “parallel” MMM systems (Bawn, 1993; 1999; Cox, 1997: 81-83; Cox and Schoppe, 2002; Gschwend, Johnston and Pattie, 2003; Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001: 13-14).

\(^4\) The remaining 6 seats are reserved for aborigines elected according to the single nontransferable vote system (SNTV).

\(^5\) For an analysis of Ma’s presidential popularity, see Wang and Cheng (2015).

\(^6\) For details about the ECFA, see the website of the Mainland Affairs Council <http://www.mac.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=5921&CtUnit=4142&BaseDSD=7&mp=3>.
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)-like accord is expected to boost Taiwan’s comparative economic advantage and increase the competitiveness of the island’s products.

Because Soong’s PFP is a spinoff of the KMT and its members generally support Ma’s engagement policies, he was not able to distinguish himself from Ma on the issue of cross-Strait relations. Ma’s engagement policies, however, encountered strong objections from the pro-independence Tsai and her DPP supporters. To their way of thinking, the “1992 Consensus” merely sugar coats Beijing’s version of the “one China principle” and masks its intention to annex Taiwan. They expressed concerns over the deepening cross-Strait interactions fearing that the island’s increasing dependence on the Chinese market would threaten Taiwan’s economic autonomy and erode the island country’s sovereignty. Ma’s and Tsai’s policy positions thus are the manifestations of the major political cleavage on the island, i.e., whether Taiwan should be unified with the Chinese mainland or whether it should pursue the island’s formal independence, dubbed as the issue of “unification vs. independence” (Wang, 2012). The two major political camps on the island, known as the pan-Green and pan-Blue alliances, represent each side of the political divide. In general, the pan-Green alliance, led by the DPP, backs Taiwan independence, whereas the pan-Blue alliance, led by the KMT, does not object unification as an option even though the majority of its supporters prefer the maintenance of status quo, at least for now.

Although Ma won the 2012 re-election bid, his approval ratings soon slid to the point of no return. Observers generally believed that the state of economy has played an important role in presidential popularity (Clarke, Rapkin, and Stewart 1994; Kinder 1981; Monroe 1984; Muller 1970, 1973; Norpoth 1985; Stimson 1976). While cross-Strait trade and tourism have indeed boomed during the Ma’s presidency, the economic reality has been far from his campaign promises. Even as big businesses make profits, wages are stagnant, economic inequality has worsened and homeownership is beyond the reach of most citizens. Although the unemployment rate has finally dropped below 4% since 2014, it is higher than those of neighboring countries. In particular, youth unemployment has been hovering around 12-13 percent between 2010 and 2015. The harsh economic realities have left many to feel that it is mainly businesses, not ordinary people, which have benefited from the expanded economic exchanges with China.

In addition, cross-Strait economic relations are not merely economic in nature but have enormous implications for the island’s national security, as it was previously indicated. Many in Taiwan, particular pan-Green identifiers, have expressed serious concerns about the island’s increasing close ties with China during the Ma administration. Along with their discontents about economic misfortunes, the anxieties about the island’s security have become the key impetus of the massive protest in Taiwan known as the Sunflower Movement in 2014.

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8 The “Sunflower Movement” lasted more than 20 days between March 18 and April 10, 2014, during which time student demonstrators occupied the Legislative Yuan and damaged the main government buildings of the Executive Yuan. The movement also led to a massive demonstration against the Ma administration’s cross-Strait policies in front of the presidential office on March 30 (J. R. 2014).
Opinion surveys conducted in Taiwan reflect this sentiment. As Figure 1 shows, since September 2012, the island citizens have consistently rated Ma poorly for his ability in handling matters related to the economy, as less than 20 percent of the public expressed satisfaction with his performance. Based on the results of the survey conducted only one week before the election, as Table 2 shows, 65 percent of the citizens felt that the economy was worse than it was a year ago and such a feeling was prevalent across all age groups.

[Figure 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]

The public dissatisfaction with Ma’s performance is not limited to the economy. Shortly after he won reelection in 2012, several policy reforms that the Ma administration initiated encountered fierce public opposition. These included permitting a rise in both gas and electricity prices, imposing a capital gains tax on securities transactions, and lifting restrictions on importing U.S. beef products. All of these policy initiatives were perceived as hurting the public’s livelihood, contradicting his campaign promises. He also reduced the benefits of teachers, civil servants, and military personnel, who traditionally are the core supporters of the KMT. A series of food safety scandals between 2013-14 also led many to lose confidence in the government’s ability of providing a safe and prosperous living environment for its citizens. Moreover, in June 2012, a bribery scandal involving a major cabinet member, who had been repeatedly promoted by Ma, erupted. The scandal dealt a serious blow to Ma’s image as “Mr. Clean,” and the public further questioned his ability to appoint the right persons to key cabinet positions.

A divided KMT further made a bad situation even worse. Indeed, the KMT is notoriously susceptible to internal division. It was a split KMT that delivered the slim victory to the opposition DPP in the 2000 presidential election and thereby passed political power at the national level to another political party for the first time in the country’s democratic history (Wang, 2001). The KMT during Ma’s presidency was no exception. In September of 2013, Ma accused parliament speaker Wang Jin-pyng of obstructing justice and attempted to expel Wang from the party (BBC News, 2013). Although Ma’s effort was not successful, it was perceived as a power struggle between factions, and severe strife within the party has since surfaced.

After the KMT’s disastrous loss in Taiwan’s 2014 local elections (Yeh, 2014), Eric Chu replaced Ma as the party’s chairman. Although Chu was considered as the KMT’s rising star, his steadfast refusal to be the party’s nominee of the 2016 presidential election at the beginning of

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the campaign season baffled pan-Blue supporters. Only four months before the election, the KMT decided to drop the party’s first female presidential nominee, Hung Hsiu-chu, due to her low support rating. While Hung was officially nominated through a party-sanctioned procedure, she was eventually replaced by Chu. The episode, again, left many KMT core supporters feeling betrayed.

Thus, Ma, as the president and the party leader, and his administration were perceived as incompetent, inefficient, and lacking intergovernmental coordination. As Figure 2 shows, Ma’s approval ratings suffered significantly, which dipped to as low as 11 percent between 2012 and 2015. 11

As a contrast to the unpopular Ma, Tsai has enjoyed substantial support, particularly among pan-Green identifiers. With a PhD from the London School of Economics, she was a law professor advising the Taiwan government on entry into the World Trade Organization and was appointed as the head of Mainland Affairs Council in 2000. She only joined the DPP in 2004 but assumed the party’s leadership in 2008 when the DPP suffered disastrous defeats in the 2008 elections. Although she narrowly lost a local election for a mayor position in 2010 and was defeated in 2012 presidential election, Tsai was able to unite the party and energized the core supporters of the DPP. As various public opinion polls showed, Tsai has had a commanding lead from the start in the 2016 presidential race. 12

Since all presidential candidates also served concurrently as leaders of their own parties at the time of Taiwan’s 2016 elections, contestants for legislative seats could not escape their associations with their parties’ presidential nominees. In particular, Ma’s low popularity as a sitting president cast a long shadow on the electoral fortunes of KMT contenders in the 2016 legislative election. Given this context, it begs the question whether the sitting president’s approval rating and presidential coattails have played any role in Taiwan’s 2016 legislative elections.

Data and Measurement

This study hypothesizes that popularity of the sitting president and citizens’ support for presidential candidates affect their electoral decisions in legislative elections. To examine these hypotheses, it is necessary to assess the relationship between the legislative and presidential votes at the individual level. Survey data were collected through telephone interviews conducted 3 days after the election between January 19 and 23, 2016.

11 For a systematic analysis of Ma’s popularity, see Wang and Cheng (2015).

Table 3 presents respondents’ self-claimed district votes for legislative candidates and votes for presidential candidates in the 2016 elections. It shows that 73% of the respondents are straight-ticket voters supporting the presidential and legislative candidates of the two major parties – the DPP and the KMT. While Soong of the PFP garnered almost 13% of the presidential votes, his legislative running mates received less than 1% of the votes, which mainly due to the fact that the party only nominated a handful of candidates in the SMDs. Since the overwhelming majority of respondents casted their district votes in the legislative election for candidates of the two majority political parties, respondents supporting minor parties’ legislative candidates are excluded in order to simplify the analysis.

Because the analytical focus of the current study is on the association between a presidential vote and a legislative district vote, a dummy variable, voter’s district vote for the DPP, is created. It is coded 1 for a respondent’s SMD vote for a DPP legislative candidate, and 0 otherwise. Note that such a measurement scheme effectively excludes respondents’ PR votes from the analysis. Because coattail effects refer to the association between a presidential vote and the vote choice of individual candidates in a legislative election that is held concurrently with the presidential race, respondents’ PR votes are inconsistent with the definition of coattail effects.

Several key independent variables are also created to assess coattail effects and the effects of presidential approval rating. First of all, coattails represent spillover effects from presidential votes to legislative votes. Such effects must be assessed by reference to respondents’ vote choices in the presidential election. A dummy variable, presidential vote for Tsai, is created to measure respondents’ presidential vote for the DPP’s presidential nominee. This is consistent with the coding of the dependent variable on respondents’ district vote for the party’s legislative candidates. To assess the effects of Ma’s presidential popularity, presidential approval, is coded dichotomously, with 1 indicating positive endorsement and 0 otherwise. Two other dummy variables are added to the analysis of 2016 election to gauge citizens’ approval of Ma’s efforts of boosting the economy and managing cross-Strait relations.

Previous discussions hypothesize that effects of coattail and presidential approval are most likely to occur to those who are less informed or less educated. Respondents’ attention to electoral information and college degree (and above), are created and both are coded dichotomously. A respondent’s partisan identification is also important in Taiwan because it generally reflects the individual’s position on the issue of unification versus independence, as previously indicated. A partisan dummy variable, Pan-Green affiliation, is created accordingly, with 1 for respondents in the relevant category and 0 otherwise. It is commonly believed that citizens who self-identify as mainlanders or as Chinese are more likely to support Ma and the KMT candidate because Ma is a mainlander and considers himself to have a Chinese origin. Respondents’ ethnicity is recoded into two dummy variables, Hakka and Mainlander, which are coded 1 for respondents in the relevant category and 0 otherwise, with Minnan as the baseline.

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13 Variables assessing respondents’ unification/independence positions were included in the analysis, and they were not statistically significant. For the sake of having a parsimonious model, this study excludes the variables of respondents’ unification/independence positions.
Two dummy variables, Chinese and both were created in the same way to assess respondents’ identification. Respondents with a Taiwanese identity serve as the base category. Finally, respondents’ gender and age are also included. Female is coded as a dummy variable according to respondents’ gender. The variable of age is a continuous variable and is measured by the number of years since birth.

Because the dependent variable in the analysis has two categories, a logit model with binary outcomes is employed. Specifically, the regression model takes the form of

$$\ln \Omega(x) = \ln \frac{Pr(y = 1|x)}{Pr(y = 0|x)} = x\beta$$

where $\ln \Omega(x)$ is the natural logarithm of the conditional odds of casting a district vote for a DPP legislative candidate, $x$ is a vector of independent variables, and $\beta$ is a vector of regression estimates.

The Analysis

Tables 4 present the statistical results. The findings confirm the coattail effects in Taiwan’s 2016 elections. Those who voted for Tsai are more likely to support the DPP candidates in the legislative elections. Indeed, the odds of those who supported Tsai to cast a ticket for her legislative running mates are 9.9 times larger than those who did not vote for Tsai. As for the effects of presidential popularity, the public attention was narrowly focused on Ma’s performance on cross-Strait relations and was not on his overall performance as the president of the country. The odds of supporting a DPP candidate are 78% lower for those who are not satisfied with Ma’s handling of cross-Strait relations. Or, in other words, those who are satisfied with Ma’s cross-Strait performance are almost five times higher in odds to support a KMT candidate ($\frac{4.76}{0.213}$).

Interestingly, the public’s assessments of the economy play no part in their electoral calculus. This is consistent with the previous finding that economic voting has not been present

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14 Minnan, Hakka, and Mainlander are the three major ethnic groups in Taiwan. Comprising about 77% of the island’s residents, Minnan are island residents whose ancestors migrated to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland several hundred years ago; they are the largest ethnic group on the island. Hakka refers to the 10% of island residents who are descendants of immigrants who migrated to Taiwan roughly at the same time as Minnan from areas in central China. With about 12% of the total population, Mainlanders are those Chinese migrants who fled to the island at the end of the Chinese civil war. While Mainlanders are not a homogeneous ethnic group due to their diverse origins from various Chinese provinces, the rocky start from the moment the forces of Chiang Kai-shek first arrived on Taiwan in 1945 and the subsequent historical development have imposed a distinct but common ethnic identity on those who are known as Mainlanders.
in Taiwan (Tsai, forthcoming).\textsuperscript{15} Not surprisingly, voters’ party identification continued to exert strong influences on their voting decisions. Those who identified with pan-Green political parties are 6 times more likely in odds to vote for DPP legislative candidates. This suggests that party identification provides a clear synopsis of the profound political cleavage in the Taiwanese society. The fact that those who consider themselves as both a Taiwanese and Chinese are less likely to support DPP candidates in the 2016 elections also reflects the political cleavage on the island.

Conclusions

This study hypothesizes that coattail and presidential popularity play a role in Taiwan citizens’ electoral calculus. The analysis of data collected from the island country’s 2016 combined elections of presidency and LY provides preliminary confirmation of these hypotheses. Precisely because both coattail and presidential approval affect citizens’ voting decisions, they explain why the ruling KMT suffers a humiliating defeat in the 2016 LY election. Images of both Chu, the KMT presidential nominee of the 2016 elections, and Ma, the sitting president of the KMT, were either tainted by a divided party or by the perceived poor governance.

These findings have important implications for the research on electoral behavior. Indeed, the perceived quality of presidential candidates and performance of the sitting president have significant effect on the electoral fortune of their legislative running mates. This evidence also suggests that, like midterm elections in the United States, Taiwan’s 2016 LY election was treated as a referendum on the performances of the Ma administration. Unlike the elections in the United States, the incumbent government’s perceived competence of boosting the economy is not a significant factor. Instead, it is Ma’s cross-Strait policy that divides the electorate, which manifests the profound political cleavage in the Taiwan society. As legislative elections have been traditionally viewed as “local” elections due to the distribution of parochial interests and factions, the effects of coattail and presidential popularity have injected national considerations into the races.

\textsuperscript{15} Four dummy variables were included in the analysis to measure the effects of economy and they are: retrospective sociotropic concern, prospective sociotropic concern, retrospective pocketbook concern, and prospective pocketbook concern. Because none of them are statistically significant, they are removed from the final analysis to keep the model parsimonious. Also note that data of the four economic dummy variables were collected in a separate panel survey conducted prior to the election, which effectively eliminates the issue of endogeneity.
Bibliography


Cheng, Su-feng. 2016. “Generational Differences of Taiwan Citizens’ Identity and the Political Implications.” Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.


## Table 1
Results of the 2016 Presidential and Legislative Elections in Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2016 Presidential Election</th>
<th>2016 Legislative Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Candidates</strong></td>
<td><strong>SMD</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Parties</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Votes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Seats</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsai Ing-wen (DPP)</td>
<td>6,894,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Chu (KMT)</td>
<td>3,813,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James C.Y. Soong (PFP)</td>
<td>1,576,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.52%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
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<td></td>
<td>12.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,999,084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Excluding 6 aboriginal seats elected under SNTV
Table 2
Taiwan Citizens’ Assessment of the Economy by Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of the Economy</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>60+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>4 (2.4%)</td>
<td>2 (.9%)</td>
<td>11 (3.0%)</td>
<td>12 (2.5%)</td>
<td>18 (2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the Same</td>
<td>70 (42.2%)</td>
<td>76 (35.0%)</td>
<td>104 (28.2%)</td>
<td>131 (27.8%)</td>
<td>184 (28.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>92 (55.4%)</td>
<td>139 (64.1%)</td>
<td>254 (68.8%)</td>
<td>329 (69.7%)</td>
<td>438 (68.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Frequencies on top and column percentages in parentheses
Data Source: Cheng (2016)
Figure 1. Taiwan Citizens’ View on President Ma’s Economic Performance

Data: Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study. Telephone Interview on Presidential Satisfaction, multiple waves
Figure 2. President Ma's Overall Approval Rating

Data: Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study. Telephone Interview on Presidential Satisfaction, multiple waves
### Table 3
Straight-and Split-Ticket Voting in Taiwan’s 2016 Legislative Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Votes</th>
<th>Presidential Votes</th>
<th>Tsai (DPP)</th>
<th>Chu (KMT)</th>
<th>Soong (PFP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(45.25%)</td>
<td>(2.48%)</td>
<td>(2.34%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.5%)</td>
<td>(27.1%)</td>
<td>(4.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.55%)</td>
<td>(0.55%)</td>
<td>(0.83%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.78%)</td>
<td>(1.93%)</td>
<td>(3.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Frequencies on top and total percentages in parentheses
Data Source: Cheng (2016)
Table 4. Logit Results of Coattails, Presidential Approval, and Taiwan’s 2016 Legislative Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef. (s.e.)</th>
<th>OR (% ch.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>presidential vote for Tsai</td>
<td>2.290 (5.69)**</td>
<td>9.88 (887.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>presidential approval rating</td>
<td>-0.090 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.914 (-8.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boosting the economy</td>
<td>0.052 (0.08)</td>
<td>1.053 (5.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>managing cross-Strait relations</td>
<td>-1.548 (3.60)**</td>
<td>0.213 (-78.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attention to electoral information</td>
<td>-0.132 (0.33)</td>
<td>0.876 (-12.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>college degree (and above)</td>
<td>-0.332 (0.80)</td>
<td>0.718 (-28.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pan-Green affiliation</td>
<td>1.851 (4.70)**</td>
<td>6.366 (536.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mainlander</td>
<td>0.109 (0.19)</td>
<td>1.116 (11.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakka</td>
<td>-0.354 (0.72)</td>
<td>0.702 (-29.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>-1.150 (0.96)</td>
<td>0.317 (-68.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both</td>
<td>-0.956 (2.49)*</td>
<td>0.385 (-61.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>-0.340 (0.91)</td>
<td>0.712 (-28.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-0.020 (1.39)</td>
<td>0.980 (-2.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 475

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; one-tailed