I am interested in three auction-related topics:
1. Online consumer auctions
2. Business-to-business (procurement) auctions.
3. Competition between auctions Consumer auctions.
consumer auctions (like eBay) present many interesting new challenges
that have not been previously considered or explored in the pre-eBay
auction literature. Since the data is fairly easy to obtain (despite
the many new ways devised by eBay to make it difficult for
researchers to collect eBay data), researchers in many disciplines
have looked at this data from many interesting angles. One interesting
issue that has made it to the top of the research topics list is the
issue of reputation. Sellers on eBay have feedback ratings which buyers
presumably use to choose between sellers, and to assess risk, which
could affect their valuations for the items. With Ram Rao and Norris
Bruce, I have a paper on reputation and default on eBay. Bruce, N., E.
Haruvy and R. Rao (2004) “Seller Rating, Price, and Default in
Online Auctions.” J. of Interactive
issues of reputation (feedback ratings), buy now option, reserve prices
and secret reserve prices have all been extensively studied in the
literature. We study them too and also review the literature in Ernan Haruvy and Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc (2009), What does it take to make consumers search?
study reports field experiments using eBay. I like field
studies because they truly help control for a lot of factors that could
make interpreting the data difficult. There are many wonderful
opportunities for field studies in consumer auctions. I have
several finished (and several unfinished) papers with Peter T.L. Popkowski
Peter has his own auction website, CampusAuctionMarket.com
running out of Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. This is an established
auction website with thousands of registered and active users. So it is
unbelievably fun to run field experiments with Peter.
Here are some papers that came out as a result:1. Ernan Haruvy and Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc (2009), The Impact of Online Auction Duration2. Ernan Haruvy and Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc (2009), What does it take to make consumers search?
3. Ernan Haruvy and Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszcyck (2009), Bidder Motives in Cause Related AuctionsBusiness-to-Business Auctions
With Elena Katok
, I have two finished papers on procurement auctions formats.Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans,
Ernan Haruvy and Elena
Katok, A comparison of buyer-determined and price-based
multi-attribute mechanisms Marketing
Science, 2007, 26(5), pp.
With Sandy Jap
, I have two finished papers on procurement auctions bidding and relationships.
Jap, S. and E. Haruvy (2009), “Inter-organizational Relationships and Bidding
Behavior in Industrial Online Reverse Auctions,” forthcoming Journal of Marketing Research
Haruvy, E. and S. Jap (2009), "Bidding Strategies in buyer-determined online reverse auctions"
Competition between auctions
In some cases, it may not be reasonable or practical to think of an
auction as operating in a vacuum, without considering other auctions
that compete against it. To address approaches to remedy this oversight
in economics, I co-organized with Peter a session at the 2007 Seventh
Triennial Invitational Choice Symposium, Wharton, June 13-17, called “Competition Between Auctions.”
Some of the findings of this session are published in Marketing Letters. Haruvy,
Ernan E. and Peter T.L. Popkowski Leszczyc Octavian Carare, James C. Cox, Eric
A. Greenleaf, Wolfgang Jank, Sandy Jap, Young-Hoon Park and Michael H. Rothkopf
between Auctions,” forthcoming in Marketing
The abstract of that article states: "Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are
typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is,
an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as
a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of
the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of
competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and
competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the
newest experimental, statistical, and analytical methods in the analysis of
competition between auctions."
I think this abstract nicely summarizes my range of interests in competition between auctions.
some point in the past, I was trying to convince auction and matching
theorists and practitioners that the right way to deal with
business-to-business auctions, or any auctions that involve multiple
sellers and multiple buyers interacting repeatedly, is through a
matching framework. That did
not go very far, but resulted in one published paper and a couple of
working papers. The published paper is:Haruvy, E. and U. Unver (2007), “Equilibrium Selection and the Role of
Information in Repeated Matching Markets,” Economic Letters 94, 284-289.
that this paper does not involve the term 'auction'. We took it out because we did not have prices in the paper and audiences were often
unhappy with an auction story without prices in it.
The working papers are a review Paper with Ram Rao and Utku Unver and
paper with Sherry Li and Kutsal Dogan.