We study a “reverse” ultimatum bargaining game
between a proposer and one or two responders, in which the proposer receives
essentially nothing at a subgame perfect equilibrium. Nevertheless, the results
are not too different from those of the standard ultimatum game, with proposers
generally receiving slightly less than half of the surplus. We then
consider a game played under the same rules, but with a three-minute deadline.
With the deadline, the robust subgame perfect equilibrium is the same as
in the conventional ultimatum game, with the proposer getting the entire
surplus. When bargainers are inexperienced, or when there is only one
responder, the results of this game are more favorable to the proposer, but
proposers still only get a bit more than half, as in the conventional ultimatum
game. But in the two responder case, when there is a deadline, proposers
receive steadily more of the surplus, and suffer very few disagreements.
InstructionsOne Responder No Deadline