Deadlines in Bargaining: Evidence from the Reverse Ultimatum Game

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Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy and Alvin E. Roth

Abstract

We study a “reverse” ultimatum bargaining game between a proposer and one or two responders, in which the proposer receives essentially nothing at a subgame perfect equilibrium. Nevertheless, the results are not too different from those of the standard ultimatum game, with proposers generally receiving slightly less than half of the surplus.  We then consider a game played under the same rules, but with a three-minute deadline.  With the deadline, the robust subgame perfect equilibrium is the same as in the conventional ultimatum game, with the proposer getting the entire surplus.  When bargainers are inexperienced, or when there is only one responder, the results of this game are more favorable to the proposer, but proposers still only get a bit more than half, as in the conventional ultimatum game.  But in the two responder case, when there is a deadline, proposers receive steadily more of the surplus, and suffer very few disagreements.  
 


Instructions

One Responder No Deadline

One Responder One Minute Deadline

Two Responder No Deadline

Two Responder Three Minute Deadline



The data sets:

How to read the data sets

            One-responder-no-deadline (1RND)

            One-responder-one-minute-deadline (1RD)

            One-responder-three-minute-deadline (1RD)

            Two-responder-no-deadline (2RND)

            Two-responder-deadline (2RD)