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Finance Reading Group

Fall 2012

Empirics of Asymmetric Information

 

Thursdays, 11am

SOM conference room, SOM 3.216

 

Contacts:

Malcolm Wardlaw

Bernhard Ganglmair

 

We discuss some recent literature on the empirical separation of adverse selection and moral hazard in contractual settings with asymmetric information. As introduction to the topic and motivation read Chiappori and Salanie (2012).

 

Date

Discussion lead by

Paper discussed

 

Sept 13

Malcolm Wardlaw

Chiappori et al. (2006)

Sept 20

Bernhard Ganglmair

Abbring et al. (2003a), Abbring et al. (2003b)

Sept 27

Han Xia

Bajari et al. (2012)

Oct 11

Alex Holcomb

Einav et al. (2010), Hackmann et al. (2012)

Nov 1

Paul Mason

Einav et al. (forthcoming)

Nov 8

Alessio Saretto

Karlan and Zinman (2009)

Nov 15

Jong Min Oh

Einav et al. (2012)

Dec 6

Seong Byun

Berger et al (2011a), Berger et al. (2011b)

Dec 13

Dupinder Kaur

Dam and Koetter (2012)

 

 

Reading List (pdf)

              

Abbring et al. (2003a): Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2-3), 512-521. Download paper here

Abbring et al. (2003b): Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4), 767-820. Download paper here

Bajari et al. (2012): Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis, send me an email for the working paper

Berger et al. (2011a): Why Do Borrowers Pledge Collateral? New Empirical Evidence on the Role of Asymmetric Information, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20(1), 55-70. Download paper here

Berger et al. (2011b): Tests of Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral Using Private and Public Information, Journal of Financial Economics, 100(1), 85-97. Download paper here

Chiappori et al. (2006): Asymmetric Information in Insurance: General Testable Implications, RAND Journal of Economics, 37(4), 783-798. Download paper here

Chiappori and Salanie (forthcoming): Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Empirical Assessments, in: Dionne (ed.): Handbook of Insurance, available here

Dam and Koetter (2012): Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany, Review of Financial Studies, 25(8), 2343-2380. Download paper here

Einav et al. (2010): Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3), 877-921. Download paper here

Einav et al. (2012): Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets, Econometrica, 80(4), 1387-1432, paper, data, Stata do-file, and online appendix available here

Einav et al. (forthcoming): Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance, American Economic Review, paper available here, online appendix available here

Hackmann et al. (2012): Health Reform, Health Insurance, and Selection: Estimating Selection into Health Insurance Using the Massachusetts Health Reform, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 102(3), 498-501; paper available here, data and Stata do-file available here, online appendix available here

Karlan and Zinman (2009): Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment, Econometrica, 77(6), 1993-2008; paper available here; data, Stata do-file, and online appendix available here

 

 

Previous reading groups

 

Spring 2012: Corporate Finance and Product Market Competition