Product Quality and the Economic Performance of Firms

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March 6, 2000
Introduction

Explaining the causes of corporate success is certainly the holy grail of business strategists, and is or should be the main goal of business school research. In this study I report findings comparing the economic performance of companies to the quality of their products.

In doing so I have been the beneficiary of work already performed under the guidance of McKinsey researchers to create a population of firms and industries chosen so as to provide maximum contrast in firm performance, and also to find firms with particular patterns of performance changes. In principle, this should allow very fine gradation and detail when examining the potential causes of economic performance.

The McKinsey researchers examined total stockholder return for many firms in two consecutive five-year periods. Firms that experienced returns above the norm for comparative firms in both periods were classified as "sharpbenders". Conversely, firms that were below the median of similarly situated firms for both periods were classified as "never-had-its". The contrast between never-had-its and sharpbenders provides the sharpest contrast and will be the major focus of this study.

Additionally, McKinsey also classified firms into found-it and lost-it categories. These are firms that move from generating above average stockholder returns the first period to generating below average returns in the second period, or vice-versa. By examining firms in these categories one should be able to determine the timing of the link between performance and other variables of interest.

The McKinsey data set contains firms in 40 markets (industries).

Unfortunately, the McKinsey data set, for all its useful attributes, was not created to ease the task of comparing the quality of products across firms. Data on product quality

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1 For most industries, these time periods were from December 1986 to December 1991 and December 1991 to December 1996.

2 The performance of comparative firms was either the median of peer firms in the industry or a benchmark index (such as Standard and Poors) for that industry.
are difficult to come by, and the industries chosen by the McKinsey researchers to maximize the variation in economic performance of firms, were less than ideal for measuring quality in many cases. I was able to generate useful data for slightly more than one fourth of the McKinsey markets. For that reason, I had to go outside the McKinsey population and examine some other industries and firms in order to generate a sufficient number of markets to have confidence that my results were quite general.

**Types of Quality**

The literature discusses several types of quality.

- **Conformance quality** measures the success a firm has at producing products that conform to a particular specification. This is most commonly used when talking about ‘defects’ but I am using the term in a much broader manner. There are at least two types of conformance measures that can be judged.

  - Some set of parameters can be specified that presumably ‘measures’ those aspects of a product that consumers find valuable. This can be thought of as an ‘ideal’ product for the price range, at least in the eyes of the creator of this standard. Characteristics of real products can then be compared to these ideal characteristics, and after appropriate weighting, an overall judgment can be made about the quality of the product. Price may be a separate parameter in these considerations. This is the type of analysis that is found in Consumer Reports, Car and Driver, PC Magazine, and so forth. These magazine reviewers set out to measure the performance of products along certain dimensions that the reviewers consider important. For an automobile, these characteristics might include acceleration, gas mileage, braking distance, seating comfort, ride, reliability, and so forth. But not every characteristic can be included in the list, so that different reviewers will have different ideals, which is one reason they can come to different opinions about
the product being reviewed. Such product reviews may give summary statistics or more detailed scores, allowing the reader to recalculate the results with more personal weights. This will be the primary source of data that I am using in my analysis.

A measure of the success that a firm has in producing products that meet the product specifications that it has set for itself. This is a measure of production success. It measures reliability in production, a characteristic that is certainly important. It is not generally the most important consideration, however. Perfect conformance in this regard might make quality engineers happy, but no matter how little variance there is in a product’s production, no matter how predictable its performance might be, if the specification is not one that consumers are interested in, the product will not succeed in the market.

Perceived quality is generally measured as the quality of products perceived by consumers. Historically, this has been measured in several different ways:

Industry executives are sometimes asked to rate the quality of products produced by their firm, or other firms in their industry. This technique has been used in the PIMS database and in the Fortune database. Both of these data sets suffer from the weakness that actual consumers are not asked about the product, but instead executives or industry experts (analysts) are asked for their opinion of product quality for an entire company or line of business. The advantage of these data, naturally, is that they are very convenient to use, allowing the analyst to ignore the tedious job of measuring quality of numerous individual products and instead allowing the analysis to jump right to the firm or line of business level, which is the level at which success, profits, or stock market returns are usually measured. The downside is that executives may not
be in a position to really know what it is that consumers want (certainly
executives from failing firms), and in addition, they may just assume
that successful firms are producing the highest quality product, leading
to a serious circularity in the analysis. In fact, I believe this is a serious
flaw in the Fortune data, and a likely flaw in the PIMS data.4

 Consumers might be asked to rate products that they consume, or stores
that they patronize. If they are asked the proper questions, and if the
respondents are representative of the consumers in that market, this type
of perceived quality should reflect the success that firms are having in
producing products or experiences that consumers find to have the
highest quality (perhaps per dollar of expenditure). I use this type of
data in several places, particularly in the retail segment where there
seems to be little other way of measuring retail quality.

 Value is generally measured as the quality of a product relative to its price
and the quality/price relationship of competing products. It would almost be
considered a violation of a law of nature, to economists at least, if
consumers did not choose a product that they thought provided the best
value to them. Economic models of consumer behavior require that a
consumer choose the product best suited to sate the consumer’s tastes,
relative to its cost. Yet, it is possible that producers of such products might
not do that well in the market if they are charging, say, too little for a
product and not earning the profits that their investors expect. Some of the
markets in this study have measures of value based on consumer surveys.

Data come from Fortune Magazine and are available in a database that they sell.
4 The PIMS data is supposed to be tested against consumer surveys, but I do not know the extent to which
this is done. See Page 105 in Buzzell and Gale.
**Quality and Economic Performance.**

It is not obvious that there should be a linkage between product quality and the economic performance of firms. After all, higher quality is likely to arise as the result of using superior raw materials, or superior effort, or superior talent. If increased quality also meant increased cost, there would presumably be some cost/quality combination that best fulfilled the tastes of consumers, and there is little reason to believe, *a priori*, that this would occur at the top of the quality scale.

If higher quality comes about as the result of superior foresight, talent, or effort, then the workers providing these superior skills might be expected to receive extra remuneration, again possibly leaving the firm with higher quality products in no better economic shape than its competitors. On the other hand, it is possible that it is difficult for the factors leading to superior quality to ratchet up their salaries to fully reflect their added value, perhaps because it is difficult to disentangle one person's influence from what might be a team effort. In this case, there might well be a relationship between quality and firm performance.

Nevertheless, our task here is empirical in nature--to determine whether there is a relationship between quality and economic performance. Why there is such a relationship is an intriguing question that will need to be answered in the future.

**Data: Types and Problems**

I have used various sources of data for this project, generated in large part by my RAs.\(^5\) Measures of quality are difficult enough to come by that I did not have the luxury of being able to use consistent measures from one industry to the next. Instead, different industries have different measures of quality.

Various types of data were examined in an effort to measure quality. Ideally, I had hoped to find data in trade journals that ranked the quality of the products and that also provided separate information on pricing. In prior work examining software markets, I need to thank Jeff Gurley and Tina Lane for providing diligent research assistance.
such data were common.\textsuperscript{6} Although converting reviews from disparate PC magazines into a comparable format was not totally transparent, it was simple compared to dealing with the quality data for some of the industries examined in this study.

Difficulties with the data can be classified into several major categories: (a) availability, (b) internal consistency, and (c) external consistency. I will explain these problems below.

For most of the Evergreen industries, generating any quality data at all proved to be quite a challenge. In many cases, there was no published information about product quality that my research assistants or I could find. We have scoured libraries, spoken to industry executives, contacted trade associations, and received help from McKinsey, but often to no avail.

In other cases, publicly available data exists for only a few years. In some instances, it was possible to unearth data for some products produced by firms, but not for the products that generated a preponderance of their revenues. In yet other cases, getting the data into a manageable form proved to be anything but a simple task. For example, in some industries (e.g. architectural paints) the number and variety of products within a market was practically overwhelming. When there are dozens of varieties of products from a single vendor, offered at different prices, it is difficult to assign a single quality level to the firm.

These limitations in data availability have reduced the number of markets that could be included in the analysis and the degree to which I was able to use the lost-it and found-it categories of firms to test the more data intensive hypotheses that were part of the Evergreen mandate.

\textbf{Internal consistency} would seem to be a prerequisite for any data set that we are to believe measures quality in any sort of meaningful way. I have encountered a few instances, however, where the results do not, at first blush, make sense. This can be due

to instances where manufacturers are catering to different tastes than that of the reviewers.

A theoretical example might be the following. Consumer Reports provides both survey data and conformance data for many of the products they review. The conformance data they provide compares a product with the ‘tastes’ of the testers at Consumer Reports, which may or may not represent tastes of ordinary consumers. A careful reading of Consumer Reports reveals that Consumers Union, the publisher of the magazine, has a clear political agenda, and these political tastes can influence the ratings. So, for example, when testing automobiles Consumer Reports will weight gasoline mileage more heavily than many individual consumers are likely to because Consumers Union is concerned about the world running out of resources, even when the world seems awash in oil. This will skew their rankings compared to the rankings that typical consumers might choose.

Here is an actual example of such inconsistency. This chart below represents prices and quality as measured by Consumer Reports for Sony portable CD players in 1996. Other brands were also examined, of course, but the focus here is on internal consistency, which for obvious reasons is better tested with but a single brand.

There are six different models: D-245, D-141, D-345, D-335, D-842K, D-143, and D-421SP. If we are to believe these results, Sony has two low quality players and five high quality players, and prices are unrelated to quality. The best player is $149, and far inferior to this player is one at $258. If these measures of quality accurately reflected consumer preferences, the $149 player with the highest score (80) would clearly dominate all other players except the $89 player scoring 79, and all consumers would choose one of these two. Since all these products have the same name, and all are supposed to be available to all users, it is difficult to imagine any form of price discrimination that could explain such behavior by Sony. Sony should charge the highest price for the unit now selling for $149 since it is the highest quality.

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7 This form of rational maximizing behavior is the explicit assumption underlying economic models of consumer behavior. Potential problems such as incomplete or erroneous information on the part of consumers might alter this result.
What is going on then? Detailed examination reveals that Consumer Reports does not value certain cost-increasing attributes even though the manufacturer believes that consumers value them (e.g., water resistance or a remote control on the headphone). Since water resistance would be of value to anyone jogging in the rain, it would appear that the Consumer Reports rating system is overly narrow. Consumer Reports’ rankings might be best for the typical consumer who will never take the player out into the rain, but this heterogeneity in uses, and therefore tastes, causes all sorts of possible distortions in rankings that don’t take account of these various tastes.

Note, however, that the next year, 1997, the ratings make much more sense. While there are some small anomalies (identical prices for different quality products) the general trend is that more expensive products are of higher quality, avoiding the major inconsistencies of the prior year.
**External inconsistency** occurs when data from two different sources do not agree. I tried, wherever possible, to use data from more than one source, and on those occasions where multiple sources were available, I tried to assess how similar the various sets of data were.

The industry with the greatest number of data sources is airlines (not an Evergreen industry). The primary sources are the Department of Transportation, and Consumer Reports, but in 1997 there are three other sources: MSNBC, Money Magazine, and Travel and Leisure Magazine, all of whom surveyed their audience. Since they were all based on surveys you might expect them to be largely in agreement with one another, but as the chart below indicates, this is not the case. The most blatant difference is in the ranking of Southwest Airline, the firm that wins most of the other ratings (excluding these three sources) in most years. It wins with MSNBC and Money Magazine, but comes in last with the Travel and Leisure audience. Southwest has low prices, a good on-time record, good baggage service, and a friendly crew. It does not, however, have a great selection of destinations, or gourmet meals. Apparently, individuals that read Travel and Leisure magazine do not find Southwest to their liking, and perhaps for good reason, given their tastes.

More troubling yet, the correlation between Travel and Leisure rankings and the Money Magazine rankings is -.76.\(^8\) Obviously, the readers responding to these surveys either have very different views of quality, or some of the surveys are very bad instruments. In my analysis I try to use ratings that appear reasonably consistent with other evidence, and ratings that appear to be based on a cross section of consumers that reflects the center of the market for the product, where possible. Thus, the readers of Travel and Leisure Magazine are judged to be atypical in their tastes, and their rankings are discounted.

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\(^8\) The correlation between MSNBC ratings and the Money ratings is .29 and between MSNBC and T&L is .48.
Methodologies

The original McKinsey Evergreen classification procedure looked at industries to determine which industries had firms with sufficient variation in stock market performance that a stark enough contrast could be drawn between firms to allow the analyst the highest probability of detecting other factors associated with stock market performance. After these industries and firms were chosen, researchers could focus their efforts on the primary question of finding the causes of the differential performance, which for the purposes of this report means finding the influence of quality.

I have already explained the basic idea behind the methodology being used. My team of research assistants attempted to find sources of quality measurements for the leading products of the firms in the McKinsey markets. I then try to assess the relative quality of the firm's products over different periods of time, and then compare the pattern of product quality with the financial success of the firm as measured by the McKinsey classification (although I occasionally examine accounting profits for some additional insights). For those industries that were not in the original Evergreen universe, I attempted to classify firm performance, using both stock returns and accounting data, in the hopes of finding firms that varied significantly from one another. The classifications of sharpbender and never-had-it were often deemed inappropriate in these markets, and instead I tried to use terminology that was more descriptive of the findings in those markets.
Before turning to the method of handling quality measurements, I should mention that I view the Evergreen Categories as providing two levels of tests. The more stringent test (which I refer to as the primary test) involves comparisons of sharpbenders with never-had-its. This is the strongest performance differential, and thus provides that greatest variation over which to examine the role of quality differentials. Because the performance differentials are continuous across two time periods, there is less of a chance that expectations might cause mismatches in the measured relationship between quality and performance, unlike the more exacting test (secondary test) based upon the lost-it and found-it categories. As will be seen below, however, sometimes the classification of sharpbender or never-had-it depended crucially on exactly which year was used to start the period, and so these classifications are not always as robust as might have been hoped.

With the lost-it and found-it categories, finding a relationship between quality and performance is less likely, even if such a relationship exists. In part this is due to the fact that I was not able to obtain quality measurements in every year. If product quality affects the performance of firms, then changes in quality should change measured performance. By using 5-year returns, however, it is possible that a jump in quality at the end of the period, or the expectation of a jump in quality that will occur after the period has ended, might lead to a stock market reaction prior to actual changes in quality. In this case the change in stock return will likely not be linked to measured quality, particularly if the quality measurement occurs in the middle of the period, as happens with many of the firms in this sample.

As already mentioned, many of the original industries chosen by the Evergreen methodology did not have data allowing us to measure the quality of the products of the firms in the sample. In fact, after examining many industries and running into many dead-ends, only fourteen of the Evergreen industries proved to be usable. My procedure to generate additional markets was the inverse of the McKinsey procedure. I began by looking for industries with measurable quality dimensions of the products, and then to look at firms to determine whether they could be classified using the McKinsey methodology, or some variant of it.
For these industries, I tended to classify firms slightly differently than McKinsey had those in the Evergreen universe. As before, the question to be answered was whether firms that had a better economic performance also had superior quality. Instead of using two time frames, à la McKinsey, all available data were combined into one time period. Firms tended to be categorized as above or below average in economic performance, and then quality comparisons were made to see whether there was a relationship between the two. Since accounting profits played a large role in this analysis, the trends of quality measurements and accounting returns became an object of analysis.

Five of the nineteen markets in this study are not in the original Evergreen universe: Car Rental Agencies, Cruise Lines, Airlines, Cosmetics, and Discount Brokerage Firms. The analysis from these markets generated results on the relationship between quality and performance that were consistent with the results generated from the Evergreen markets.

As I discuss in the next section, there was very strong support for concluding that economic performance is related to quality. On the other hand, in the few instances where I was able to test, there was at best very weak support for the linkage between changes in quality and changes in economic performance.

In a world where there are many different levels of quality and many different prices, it might be sufficient to compare the quality of products competing in the same general price range without any specific attention to prices *per se*. On the other hand, if the price differences between brands in a particular category seem large relative to price differences between categories, it would be necessary to control for price. Thus, I attempt to determine the role of price, and whether we need to control for price, on a case-by-case basis.

Assessing the quality of a firm’s products can be very difficult, particularly when firms produce a range of the products in the same category at different price points. Paints are a good case in point. In the following chart each point represents the price and quality of a particular item from a manufacturer of paint for the year 1989. These data come from Consumer Reports, and represent their estimate of quality relative to some...
model of quality that they use. Assuming that their measure of quality is correct (and that their measure of price is correct), and that their measure of quality has cardinal properties, how does one go about determining, say, whether Sherwin Williams produces paints of high or low quality when it obviously produces paints of both high and low quality?

The method I have chosen in these cases, although I would be the first to admit that it is far from perfect, is to run a regression with a dummy variable for the vendors of interest, such as Sherwin Williams. I then chart the coefficients of these dummy variables for different time periods to determine the trend of a manufacturer’s quality relative to price. Since I do not know the sales of the various types of paint for each manufacturer, there would be no way to properly measure the average raw quality of paint produced, even if I wanted to do so.

Some of the markets consist of retailers, who do not provide final consumer products but instead provide an environment to help convince consumers to purchase their wares. The measures of quality in this case include the helpfulness and friendliness of the sales staff, the ambiance of the surroundings (the layout, looks, and utility of the store), the taste of the buyers responsible for stocking the store, and other such measures. I was only able to get values of these attributes from surveys of consumers that were available in several publications. Price was listed as a separate attribute, and I thought it best to keep it as a separate variable in this case. For one thing, prices reflect both the wholesale prices and the retailer’s markup, but it is only the latter that should play a role.
in the measurements although it seems unlikely that the former would not play a large role in the rankings. Second, these retailers sell thousands of items and it is difficult to gauge the average prices, to say nothing of average markups, with any precision. Third, it isn’t clear what the precise nature of the relationship between price and quality is, so it is not possible to accurately adjust quality by price to determine ‘bang-for-the-buck’.

Measuring the quality of a firm’s products is also difficult when a firm produces many different products that cater to consumers in different markets. In the (Evergreen) Personal Care and Cleaning 'market', for example, there are companies that produce many products for very different markets. Gillette, which is best known for its non-electric razors, also owns Braun, which makes a whole array of electronic products, as well as Duracell brand batteries, Parker pens, and Right Guard antiperspirants. In this case I try to determine which products generate the greatest share of revenues and get as much quality information on them as possible, and then generalize the results to the entire firm.

Finally, there are firms, such as Sony, that produce a whole host of products in one or more industries. In these cases, I take quality measurements for the sample of products reviewed, and hope that this measured quality is a good proxy for the firms total portfolio of products.

**Findings**

The hypothesis to be tested is whether, for a firm, high product quality is related to superior economic performance, as measured in total return to stockholders. The results are unambiguously positive. Table 1 provides a heuristic categorization of the results.
### Table 1: Qualitative Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quad</th>
<th>Support for Primary Hypothesis?</th>
<th>Support for Secondary Hypothesis?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount Retailers:</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department stores</td>
<td>inconclusive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grocery Stores</td>
<td>strong yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletic Apparel</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>very weak yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paints and Coatings</td>
<td>very weak no</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Care and Cleaning</td>
<td>strong yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desktop applications</td>
<td>strong yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desktop Computers</td>
<td>strong yes</td>
<td>neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Aggregators</td>
<td>strong yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>weak to moderate yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Database:</td>
<td>weak yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Drives:</td>
<td>moderate yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Electronics</td>
<td>moderate yes</td>
<td>neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car Rental Agencies</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruise Lines</td>
<td>medium-strong yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlines</td>
<td>strong yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmetics</td>
<td>inconclusive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount Brokerage Firms</td>
<td>quite strong yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone and Voice Carriers</td>
<td>weak no</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first column lists the name of the industry or market. The second column provides a general conclusion about whether, in that market, strong economic performers also have high quality. The third column examines whether there is a relationship between changes in economic performance and changes in quality, for the relatively small number of markets where such a test was viable. In some cases there was no clear winner/loser contrast to allow this form of test, and those industries have the results straddling columns 2 and 3. In those cases, I looked at whatever variation did exist and tried to determine whether it was consistent with the variations in quality.

It is also possible to provide a somewhat more quantitative slant on these results, and these are provided in the Table 2. First, note that 15 of the 19 markets provide either a weak or strong positive answer to the question of whether there is a linkage between quality and economic performance. If we treat the results from each industry as an independent event and assume that the evidence will either be positive or negative, we can treat these results as if they were coin tosses and see what the likelihood would be of generating these results if there were no positive relationship between these variables.
The logic is as follows. If there were no positive relationship between performance and quality, then the likelihood of a no would be the same as a yes (50% chance of heads or tails). To get 15 out of 19 "yes" verdicts would be like getting 15 heads out of 19 tosses. This would randomly happen less than 2% of the time, so we can conclude, on this basis, that the evidence in favor of a linkage is strongly statistically significant (this is found in the last row of Table 2, which provides results from the cumulative binomial distribution).

I should note that I have tilted the results against the hypothesis when there was uncertainty in measurements or outcomes, and there was some in a majority of the markets, so that these results are actually very conservative and understate the strength of the linkage between quality and economic performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quad</th>
<th>Number of quality measurements for high and low performers</th>
<th>Number of measurements consistent with quality/perform ance linkage</th>
<th>Probability of getting these numbers if there is no positive linkage of quality and economic performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount Retailers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.900%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department stores</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>negative linkage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grocery Stores</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.125%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletic Apparel</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.969%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paints and Coatings</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>negative linkage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Care and Cleaning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desktop applications</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.297%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desktop Computers</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Aggregators</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42.395%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75.391%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Database:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50.781%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Drives:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45.313%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Electronics</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45.313%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car Rental Agencies</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.091%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruise Lines</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37.500%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlines</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.098%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmetics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>negative linkage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount Brokerage Firms</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.500%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone and Voice Carriers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>negative linkage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregating all observations</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industries one at a time</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.920%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is also possible to count in each market the observations that are consistent or inconsistent with a positive linkage between quality and performance. The details can be found in the discussions for each market. The total number of such quality comparisons is found in column 2 of the chart and the number of comparisons consistent with a positive linkage of quality and performance is found in column 3.

Treating each of these observations like the toss of a coin, as before, allows a calculation of the likelihood that the results in a particular market might have arisen if there were no linkage between quality and economic performance. For most of these industries, the results are inconsistent with a hypothesis of no linkage between quality and performance. The small number of quality observations for most industries makes it hard to rule out the possibility of no positive linkage, but for 6 industries the likelihood of generating the results we have without an underlying positive linkage are less than 1 in 20.

Finally, we can add all of these comparisons together as if each one was an individual coin toss and determine the likelihood of getting 158 confirming comparisons and only 59 detracting comparisons if there were in fact no positive linkage. The likelihood is so close to zero that it couldn't be conveniently calculated. To give some idea of how strong these results are, if only 129 instances had been found (instead of the 158 that were actually found), the likelihood of so many consistent observations would still have been less than 1% if in fact no positive linkage existed. If 145 instances had been found, the likelihood would have been only .0001%.

It seems safe to say, therefore, that these results are very strongly indicative of a positive relationship between quality of product and the firm's economic performance.

The rest of this report provides the details, industry by industry and firm by firm, that led to the creation of the two tables of results.

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9 The particulars of how these comparisons were made are discussed at the end of the material for each market, but in general we looked to see if sharpbenders had above average quality, never-had-its had below average quality, and so forth.
I. Discount Retailers

Summary: Quality and performance seem linked for Ross and Kmart. With additional effort, the performance-quality relationship for Wal-Mart and Dayton Hudson becomes apparent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ross</th>
<th>K Mart</th>
<th>Dayton Hudson</th>
<th>Wal-Mart</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharpbender</td>
<td>Never Had It</td>
<td>Found It</td>
<td>Lost It changed to Above average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These companies are in the discount retail business. Dayton Hudson is primarily known for its Target stores. Ross provides discounted clothing and other brand-name soft goods, although the merchandise availability is unpredictable. Wal-Mart and Kmart both are large retailers selling a wide assortment of discounted merchandise.

Figure 1.1 measures quality as perceived by consumers, and normalizes the average score to 1, with no adjustment for the standard deviation.\(^\text{10}\) Information on the sharpbender (Ross) exists, unfortunately, for only two periods. Still, the primary test gives unambiguous results. Kmart, the never-had-it, is the lowest in quality and, as will

\(^{10}\) These results are taken from Chain Store Age, Stores, and Consumer Reports.
be seen in a moment, also last in price. Ross, for the two periods in which it is scored, does well, although there is very little useful information in the last period because the scores are all so similar.

There is little support for the secondary tests on found-it (Dayton-Hudson) and lost-it (Wal-Mart). Wal-Mart does very well over the entire period, a result seemingly at odds with its classification as a lost-it. Since there is no information on Dayton-Hudson in 1987, it is difficult to know how much, if any, improvement there was in its quality. There is no indication of increasing quality for Dayton Hudson in the mid 1990s.

The second chart (Figure 1.2) presents data on prices, with high scores meaning low prices and vice versa. The findings demonstrate that Wal-Mart had the best prices until Ross began to be measured during the last two periods, during which time Ross had very attractive prices. Kmart and Dayton-Hudson were far behind but fairly close to one another in their scores.

As noted, Wal-Mart is categorized as a 'lost-it' despite the fact that its quality did not fall below average. On the price front, Wal-Mart generally remained far better than average with no real trend. And this is the case in more than just the discount retailer category. In 1997, according to the Best and the Worst Stores and Products, Wal-Mart

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was considered the second best value supermarket (second to Lucky), far ahead of Kroger and Albertsons, and the second best value drugstore (second to Drug Emporium).

The only deviation here from a strict linkage between quality and performance is Wal-Mart, and it turns out that its classification as a lost-it is questionable, based on both stock market returns with more recent data, and accounting returns.

First, I examined Wal-Mart's stock performance.\textsuperscript{12} From 1990 to 1999 (the first stock chart\textsuperscript{13}) it clearly was the leader, followed by Dayton-Hudson and then Ross.\textsuperscript{14} If one begins the period in 1991 (the second stock chart), however, a very different result emerges.\textsuperscript{15} Now the leading firm is Ross, followed by Dayton-Hudson and Wal-Mart, which are neck-and-neck. Kmart's trails the pack in both periods, befitting its lost-it categorization.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{stock_charts.png}
\caption{Stock performance charts for various years.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{12} I should note that this performance is only based on stock price whereas the McKinsey measures include dividends.
\textsuperscript{13} On these charts, ROST is Ross, WMT Wal-Mart, DH Dayton Hudson, and KM Kmart.
\textsuperscript{14} This is also true for the years between 1986 and 1990.
\textsuperscript{15} Similar results hold for different starting periods. If we begin in 1986, Wal-Mart is clearly number one and Ross number 2, but if we begin in 1987

20
Accounting returns tell a similar but somewhat less variable story. Wal-Mart has earned above normal accounting returns although they have fallen over time. Nevertheless, even with this decline, its accounting returns still represent a good performance. Ross, on the other hand, has had a large increase in its returns, consistent with its increasing stock price, moving from well below to well above average. Kmart has the worst returns, and Dayton-Hudson generally somewhere in the middle, although not very much better than Kmart on average.

16 These returns are defined as the sum of net income after taxes plus interest paid divided by the assets of the firm averaged over beginning and end of year values.
It seems inappropriate, then, to classify Wal-Mart as a lost-it based on economic performance. Once we reclassify Wal-Mart as either a sharpbender or merely a winner, the quality findings become more consistent with the performance rankings. Overall, the linkage between quality and performance seems strong in this market. In Figure 1.1, Kmart is below Wal-Mart in 6 of 7 instances, and below Ross in 2 of 2 instances. I conclude, for quantitative purposes, that in 8 of 9 comparisons, quality is linked to economic performance. If I had counted the number of times that Wal-Mart and Ross were above average and Kmart below average, a stronger result would have emerged. However, I want to handicap somewhat the hypothesis linking quality and economic performance to reduce the chances of incorrectly claiming that a link exists between the two if no such link actually exists.
II. Department stores

Summary: Seems at first a bad fit, but after reexamining idiosyncrasies and actual performance, I conclude that there are idiosyncratic factors at work distorting the results. Also, there is no evidence on the 'never-had-it' firm, Mercantile.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sharpbender</th>
<th>Never-Had-It</th>
<th>Found-It</th>
<th>Lost-It</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kohls</td>
<td>Mercantile</td>
<td>Sears</td>
<td>Nordstrom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following chart (Fig 2.1) rates three of the department store companies on quality. The average score is 1. This chart reveals that Nordstrom has the highest quality, Sears is in the middle but falling, and Kohl's has the lowest quality.

![Fig 2.1: Department Store Quality](image)

The second chart, Figure 2.2, represents the price, or value consumers ascribe to the store. Unfortunately, I was only able to get two years of such data. Kohl's and

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17 Data for 1994 and 1998 come from Consumer Reports. Data for the other years come from Chain Store Age. Data from the latter source are based on measurements from a few major metropolitan areas.

18 This chart is based on data from Consumer Reports.
Nordstroms receive equal scores here, making it hard to separate their values on the graph.

Kohls, which is supposed to be the sharpbender, does poorly in quality, although it performs well in terms of price. This may reflect that fact that Kohls has tried to position itself as intermediate between a discounter and department store. A trade journal refers to Kohls' strategy as follows: "The company's formula is simple: sell brand name department store merchandise at discount store prices. Kohl's stores resemble traditional department stores...Although analysts liken it more to a department store than a discounter, Kohl's strategy for selling brand name merchandise at promotional prices puts it in competition with retailers on both ends of the value spectrum." Thus Kohl's poor performance on quality may reflect the fact that discounters normally have lower quality service than the traditional department stores with which they are compared here. It does not explain why its price/value is no better than Nordstroms, the store known for preeminant service.

![Fig 2.2: Department Store Prices or Value](image)

Nordstrom, classified as having lost-it, has the highest quality, and generally good value, according to the survey's upon which the results are based. According to industry trade journals, Nordstrom's recent problems stem from a poor choice of inventory which has alienated somewhat its fashion concious customers, an unwillingnes to use computers, and no centralization of functions after the chain went national. The last two

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of these factors should tend to increase its cost structure but do not directly alter the quality of Nordstrom stores. Nordstrom's weakness in spotting new fashion trends would be expected to have been particularly punishing since its customers are among the most fashion conscious of any store.\textsuperscript{21} This appears to be a case where quality of service made the company a success but has not been sufficient to overcome other problems that have crept into the company after its ambitious expansion from its West Coast base.

Sears, which is categorized as a found-it, does poorly in the ratings. Its quality falls from above average to below average and its attractiveness of price falls from average to below average. On these charts Sears would appear to fall somewhere between a lost it and a never-had-it with respect to quality or price. Sears position as a found-it, however, is not very robust, and depends importantly on the timing of its stock price. Additionally, it appears that its improved fortunes in the mid 1990s was based on misleading information.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Fig2.3.png}
\caption{Department Stores}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{21} See Chain Store Age, October 1996, page 28B, which reports the results of the Chicago Female Fashion Research Project. Regarding Nordstrom's customers, this report states: "This chain's shoppers are by far the most fashion-conscious, with dressing fashionably being a very important part of their lifestyles and an important way of expressing their individuality. The customers at Kohl's and Sears, on the other hand, are reported to be not very fashion conscious."

\textsuperscript{22} See “Sears's Growing Credit Business May Have Masked Retailing Woes,” by Joseph B. Cahill, Wall Street Journal, July 6, 1999. This article claims that Sears inflated its results with reckless credit card lending. This claim is repeated in "Sears Cuts Forecasts, Realigns Staff As Firm's Merchandise Chief Quits," By Calmetta Y. Coleman, Wall Street Journal, September 3, 1999.
In Fig 2.3 I have graphed the return on assets for these three companies. This seems to better measure their fortunes. Kohls does the best, as befits a sharpbender. Nordstroms's does fall over time, but not necessarily into lost-it territory. Sears performs quite badly, although at the end of the period appears to have improved, although this improvement, in hindsight appears ephemeral, due instead to its willingness to take on extra risk. In each of the last two cases, there were other factors besides quality were altering the financial prospects of these stores.

From this, if there were a linkage between quality and performance, and ignoring idiosyncratic factors, we would expect Sears to be at the bottom, Kohl’s at the top, and Nordstrom in the middle. The fact that Kohl’s is at the bottom in three of three cases, implies that in 3 comparisons, there are 0 confirmations for the hypothesis.

In reality, however, I conclude that firms in this market suffer from too many idiosyncrasies and mischaracterizations to really provide any useful information on the overall hypothesis. Nevertheless, in the spirit of stacking the deck slightly against the linkage hypothesis, I report the 0 of 3 statistics.
III. Grocery Stores

Summary: Excellent fit on the primary test, insufficient data to test secondary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHARPBENDER</th>
<th>NEVER HAD IT</th>
<th>FOUND IT</th>
<th>LOST IT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kroger</td>
<td>A&amp;P</td>
<td>American Stores</td>
<td>Food Lion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertson's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is very strong evidence here that quality is related to stock market performance, at least in the primary test. Figure 3.1 reports the results on quality. The measure of quality in Figure 3.1 is Z-scores, so that above average performance has a positive score, below average a negative score.

![Fig 3.1: Grocery Quality](image)

A&P, the never-had-it, is well below average in terms of quality. From Figure 3.2, it is also clear that A&P is generally near or at the bottom of this group in terms of price/value. Both of these results are in conformance with its classification as a never-had-it.\(^{23}\) Kroger and Albertson's, on the other hand, are just slightly above average in

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\(^{23}\) Data for the first two observations come from Consumer Reports, 1993 and 1997. The last observation comes from "The Best and Worst Stores & Products of 1997", The Consumer Network. The Consumer Reports articles rate each store on cleanliness, courtesy and checkout experience and the quality measure used is the average of these values. A separate variable is included for price. The Consumer Network ranks supermarkets by value and separately by quality.
terms of quality, and almost exactly average in price. The sharpbenders do appear far better than the never-had-it.

Because I was only able to generate data beginning in 1993, it is not possible to test the lost-it or found-it categories. Presumably the found-it (American Stores) should be above average in the measurements (although rising from far below average to average might be sufficient to cause the classification), and the evidence is not very strong here. American Stores is slightly below average in quality but slightly above average in price performance (i.e., low price).

The corollary of this is that the lost-it should have fallen in quality, perhaps below average. Food Lion’s quality is average to below average. It has good prices, however, but is accorded low value. There is, however, an important exogenous event that took place in 1992 that hurt Food Lion. The ABC television network broadcasted a prime-time story claiming that the company had unsanitary conditions in its stores. This severely

24 It is worth keeping in mind that averages are calculated over a much larger number of supermarket chains than the five examined here which is how it can happen that almost none of them are above average.
25 American Stores are based on reviews of Lucky’s and Jewel’s, the grocery chains it operates. Although it also operates drug stores, grocery chains comprise 73% of its sales. American Stores was purchased by Albertson's in 1999.
26 Consumer Reports ranks stores by price, but the Consumer Network measures ‘value’.
27 This story was on ABC’s Prime Time Live in November of 1992.
damaged Food Lion's reputation and it is possible that Food Lion's stock performance is
due, at least in part, to this story.

Examining the return on assets, we see confirmation of the general stock market
ratings, with a few surprises. In the period of time covered by our quality rankings,
Kroger and Albertson’s dominate the economic performance. A&P has consistently bad
performance. Food Lion’s performance drops from the late 1980s, but not to the level that
one might expect from a lost-it. The surprise is the poor performance of American Stores
-- no evidence here of it being a found-it. Yet American Stores does not do terribly well
on quality measures.

What, then, are the results from this market? First, the sharpbenders have much
better quality than the never-had-it. The sharpbenders are above average, the never-had-it
below average. With only four years of quality data, there is no test possible for the
found-it and lost-it, which may not even be properly categorized. Nevertheless, Food
Lion and American Stores have quality levels between the sharpbenders and never-had-it.
If we eliminate ties, all 12 data points in Figure 3.1 are properly lined up to support the
hypothesis that quality and performance are related. Limiting the observations to just
sharpenders and the never-had-it, 6 out of 6 observations are consistent with this hypothesis, and this more modest result is reported in the table of results.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{28} This is counted as the three data points from Consumer reports in 1993 and again in 1997. Since there are no results for A&P in 1997\textsuperscript{bw}, that is excluded, even though its poor performance in the value rankings in that data source strongly indicate that it would have done poorly in the quality rankings as well, had it been listed.
IV. Athletic Apparel

Summary: Support for primary hypothesis. Data begin in 1990, making it hard to test the found-it and lost-it tests although there is some very weak evidence consistent with the lost-it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sharpbender</th>
<th>Never-had-it</th>
<th>Found-it</th>
<th>Lost-it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nike</td>
<td>LA GEAR</td>
<td>Adidas</td>
<td>Reebok</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.1 presents results on the quality of athletic apparel, in the form of sneakers, or athletic shoes, the leading product of these companies.\textsuperscript{29} The average score is a "1" on this chart.\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig4_1.png}
\caption{Athletic Apparel Quality}
\end{figure}

There appears to be reasonable support for the claim that quality influences results in this market. In the primary test, Nike unambiguously beats LA Gear. This is clearly seen in Figure 4.1 where LA Gear clearly trails the pack. Nike does not, however, appear to differ distinctly from Adidas or Reebok, but Nike is just about always above average, even if not the highest. Still, it appears that the firm with the best economic performance

\textsuperscript{29} Quality assessments and prices came from Consumer Reports, Popular Mechanics and Tennis Magazine.\textsuperscript{30} Averages are based on a larger number of shoes than just those from these manufacturers.
also has above average quality, and the firm with the worst performance has the lowest quality.

In the secondary test, Reebok might appear to start out above average and fall below average, befitting its categorization as having lost-it, but if the 1991 observation were removed there would be no real change at all. Adidas is slightly above average in each measurement, but since there are no measurements prior to this era it is impossible to know if Adidas was below average and then rose in the rankings in conformance with its classification as a found-it, although the quality results for Adidas are not inconsistent with its performance. Thus there is very weak evidence consistent with the secondary hypothesis.

Measuring the quality of output in this market suffers from one of the difficulties encountered elsewhere as well, that being due to the large number of offerings by each manufacturer covering various price and quality ranges. The ratings, however, are usually based on only one or two shoes from a given manufacturer, and thus I merely use the average values for each manufacturer to generate that manufacturer's score.
As far as pricing, LA Gear is the most attractive, with Reebok and Adidas the most expensive. From these observations it would appear that LA gear is going for the bottom of the market -- low prices and low quality. From its position as a never-had-it, this was not a winning strategy. Pricing does not seem to have much of an independent role in this market.

How many observations are consistent with the hypothesis that quality affects economic performance? Both LA Gear quality observations, and 5 of the 7 Nike quality observations are consistent with this hypothesis.

31 Positive numbers indicate below average prices and vice-versa.
V. Paints and Coatings

Summary: Results appear inconsistent, but it isn't clear that there is a primary test here. Missing data for important components of company sales, so this is at most a weak contradiction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sharpbender</th>
<th>Found-it</th>
<th>Lost-it</th>
<th>Never had it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valspar</td>
<td>PPG</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sherwin Williams</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The primary test is also not as clean here as I would like. The never-had-it does not appear to be properly classified according to the McKinsey methodology. According to the McKinsey listing, Sherwin-Williams stock generated average or above average returns in each of the two time periods, which implies that its classification is a mistake.\(^{32}\) My examination of stock market returns (not shown) indicated that while Sherwin Williams did not perform as well as Valspar, it performed almost identically to PPG, the supposed found-it. Accounting returns on assets shown in Figure 5.1, however, indicate that Sherwin Williams deserves its never-had-it classification.\(^{33}\)

\[\text{Fig 5.1: Return on Assets}\]

\(^{32}\) McKinsey lists Sherwin Williams 5 year returns as 20% above comparable firms in the first five year period and even with comparable firms in the second period, whereas Valspar is 50% above in both comparisons and PPG is 10% below and 20% above comparables in the two periods.

\(^{33}\) Defined as operating income before taxes divided by total assets.
This is a difficult market to measure quality. There are many types of paint and many different quality gradations. I focus on consumer coatings, otherwise known as 'architectural coatings', since that is the market for which quality ratings were found. For some of these companies, however, architectural coatings are not a very important part of their business.

Sherwin Williams is one company where architectural coatings are important. It makes paints and sells them largely through its own stores to consumers. However, its success depends not only on its paints, but also in part on how well it manages its stores. Valspar, on the other hand, while making consumer paints, also has many industrial products in the coatings market. Consumer coatings are only 34% of its business. PPG produces many glass products and chemicals in addition to its coatings business which is about half of its sales. PPG's coating business, however, has only a small component devoted to consumer paints. Since the measurement for PPG's product quality only represents a small portion of its business, it is not clear how representative that would be of its entire product line and even Valspar has a minority of its revenues generated in this market.

We would need to assume that consumer paints and coatings are indicative of these firms' quality of products in order to calculate average quality (price adjusted) of product. Various manufacturers produce and sell paints, but the data do not distinguish between retailers that put their name on paints produced by others and those paints for which the producer can be easily identified.

Since there was usually a range of paints for each producer for each quality review, I performed a regression for each review using the quality of the product as the dependent variable and price and firm dummies as independent variables. The coefficient for each firm then represented the fixed effect of that firm on the quality-price relationship. That is

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34 From Valspar's 1998 annual report.
35 From the company’s website.
36 The lost-it in this industry, RPM, is not included because we could not find any of its products reviewed. Most of its consumer products are more in the line of sealants or corrosion fix-its, such as RustOleum.
37 Since we are only interested in relative positions by year, each coefficient was scaled by the average absolute value of coefficients in that year’s regression in order to reduce the variation in the measured coefficients between years.
to say, if a firm generated a positive value, then its quality was above normal for the prices charged.

The results, found in Figure 5.2, represents price adjusted quality, and indicate that Sherwin Williams produces better paint than Valspar in 6 of 7 instances, including 2 where it is a virtual tie.\(^{38}\) PPG and Sherwin Williams, on the other hand, are quite close. Whether this is to be taken as evidence against the hypothesis, or not, depends on whether the quality of architectural paints is to be taken as a measure of the quality of other products for the firms that specialize in other products and whether this technique properly captures product quality. If we do not adjust by price, for example, we get a somewhat different result found in Figure 5.3.\(^{39}\) Here, Sherwin Williams wins 4 of 7 comparisons, including 2 close calls.

\(^{38}\) The results are measured as Z-scores so that positive values are above average and the values on the horizontal axis measure the number of standard deviations above or below the mean.

\(^{39}\) Since price appears to play a very small role in some markets, it might not be all that surprising if it were to play a small role here. Theory, however, would argue that price should play an important role.
Overall, I don't think we can have great confidence in these results. Taking them on their face, however, and following my policy of handicapping somewhat the hypothesis that holds a positive relationship to exist between quality and economic performance, I count, from Figure 5.2, 2 of 7 instances where the never-had-it is below average and 1 of 7 instances where the sharpbender is above average, providing 3 of 14 observations consistent with the hypothesis.
VI. Desktop applications

Summary: Excellent Fit both primary and secondary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHARPBENDER</th>
<th>NEVER HAD IT</th>
<th>FOUND IT</th>
<th>LOST IT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft</td>
<td>Borland</td>
<td>Lotus</td>
<td>WordPerfect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This market consists of desktop computer programs, the most important of which are wordprocessors and spreadsheets. Each of the four firms above produced products in one or both of these categories.

One finding in software markets is that they tend toward winner-take-all results. In such circumstances, firms with good but not the best products will not necessarily do any better than firms with weak products. Therefore, being just above or below average in terms of quality or performance will not necessarily translate into above or below average performance.

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This is more fully established in my book with Stephen Margolis, “Winners, Losers, and Microsoft: Competition and Antitrust in High Technology” Independent Institute, 1999. The book contains a much more detailed discussion of these markets and a more complete listing of markets than is provided here. Microsoft did well in most of those markets also.
Microsoft produced superior quality products in these, its major markets, as shown first, in Figure 6.1 representing spreadsheet performance, and then in Figure 6.2 representing word processing performance. Its dominance in spreadsheets is quite overwhelming.\(^{41}\) In word processing, it is only in the Windows word processor market that Microsoft had a clear advantage. Microsoft’s prices were also somewhat on the low side, and in fact there is strong evidence that Microsoft played the role of price cutter in these markets.\(^{42}\)

Borland's spreadsheet product was not bad, but its good-but-not-great performance did not lead to either much market share or profitability, thus its poor stock market performance is consistent with its quality ranking.

WordPerfect produced high quality products in the mid to late 1980s as reflected in its very good performance in the DOS word processor market. But its Windows wordprocessor was not of high quality. Perfect Office, a product combining Borland's products with WordPerfect's was not well reviewed compared to Microsoft's offerings. Thus WordPerfect’s categorization as a lost-it is fully in keeping with the quality changes in its products.

\(^{41}\) In these charts the top product is given a score of 10 and all other products are scaled accordingly.

\(^{42}\) The complete listing of prices is available in my book. Microsoft tends to be in the middle of the pack in any single year, but prices did not start to decline until Microsoft began to dominate these markets.
Lotus, in the 1980s and early 1990s derived most of its revenue from its ‘1-2-3’-spreadsheet product. The chart on spreadsheet quality indicates that 1-2-3 was not a high quality product. Stock market performance in this period was in line with the poor quality of Lotus’ main product. Lotus’ word processor, Ami Pro, was quite good, but not as good as Microsoft Word, and given the winner-take-all characteristics of these markets, Lotus did not benefit from its second place quality showing. Lotus’ fortunes turned around when it introduced an entirely new product, Lotus Notes. This is a category of program, essentially started by Lotus that allows individuals working together on a project to collaborate and communicate with one another. In nine product reviews that I was able to find between 1993 and 1998, Lotus won eight of them.43

To count the observations consistent with the hypothesis, I will focus on spreadsheets and wordprocessors and count Microsoft wins out of the total of all tests. Microsoft won 11 out of 13 spreadsheet comparisons and 12 of 16 word-processing comparisons for a total of 23 out of 29.

43 June 93, PC magazine; Nov 95, InfoWorld; Sept 96, ComputerWorld; Oct 96, PC magazine; Dec 96, Byte; Dec 96, InfoWorld; Apr 97, InfoWorld; May 97, PC magazine; May 98, PC magazine.
VII. Personal Care and Cleaning

Summary: Strong support of the primary test. Insufficient data to test secondary hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHARPBENDER</th>
<th>NEVER HAD IT</th>
<th>FOUND IT</th>
<th>LOST IT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gillette</td>
<td>Church &amp; Dwight</td>
<td>Clorox</td>
<td>Carter-Wallace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These firms are not in the same economic markets. In order to examine the quality of products I had to estimate the quality of each firm’s products in the markets where it competes.

Gillette

Gillette produces non-electric razors under its name, Duracell batteries, antiperspirants (Right Guard), various products under the Braun brand including electric razors, coffee makers, food processors, and electric toothbrushes, pens (Parker, Papermate) and Oral B toothbrushes. Gillette is best known for its razor blades, its largest moneymaker, which generated about one third of profits in 1988, and about half of its profits in 1998. The introduction of the Sensor cartridge razor in 1990 is a textbook case of how to do things right, and includes much anecdotal evidence that the razor was far superior to the competition. In fact, there seems not to have been any serious competition by the mid 1990s.

In fact, it has been the subject of a Harvard Business School case study by Pankaj Ghemawat
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 provide information about these products. First, disposable razors were of lower quality than cartridge razors. Further, in both the disposable and cartridge realms, Gillette was on the expensive side, with a very small quality advantage that seemed hardly able to justify the higher price.

By 1995, after the Sensor came out, an important shift in consumer preference from disposables to cartridge based systems had largely been completed. Disposables remained inferior to cartridge razors, but there seemed to be far fewer disposables. Now, however, Gillette had the highest quality in each category. In fact, it practically owned the cartridge category because its main competitor, Shick, felt obliged to license Gillette's technology to stay competitive.\footnote{Forbes, 2/4/91, by Subrata Chakravarty, page 82.}
Braun products, another major category for Gillette, do not do quite so well but still perform adequately in the quality dimension. In a 1992 test of electric toothbrushes, Braun was first of eight, with one of the highest prices.\(^{46}\) In a 1994 test of food processors, it was slightly below average with a price in line with its performance.\(^{47}\) In a 1995 test of coffee makers, it was third of six for basic models, with the highest price, and second of six for programmable models, with the highest price.\(^{48}\) In a 1988 coffee maker test, it had the highest quality and a middling price.\(^{49}\) In a 1995 test of electric razors, it came in slightly above average with a price that was slightly above average.\(^{50}\)

Duracell, a recent acquisition, appears to be another ‘best-in-class’ product. In a 1997 set of tests in Consumer’s Reports it performed very well in tests, coming out first (out of eight) in two tests and third in another. Duracell also has high prices, coming in second highest in each of these tests.\(^{51}\) Popular Electronics, in its 1998 tests, found Duracell to be the best product.\(^{52}\)

Overall, it seems fair to say the Gillette produces high quality products, although whether they are the best value is unclear. This has allowed Gillette to price its products at a premium level without handicapping its market share. I caution that this may not apply to all products equally. The price differential between the high-end razors and low-end razors is in the vicinity of a few dollars. Even though the razors would be purchased every few weeks, the dollar amount of this quality differential remains quite small. Whether this strategy would work in industries where the cost of quality is far higher in absolute terms is unclear although prices have played a smaller role than we might have expected in several industries.\(^{53}\)

\(^{46}\) Consumer Reports, Dec. 1992, Electric Toothbrushes, pg. 171
\(^{47}\) Consumer Reports, Dec. 1994, Food Processors, pg. 134
\(^{48}\) Consumer Reports, Dec. 15, 1995, Coffee Makers, pg. 104
\(^{49}\) Consumer Reports, Dec. 1988, Coffee Makers, pg. 56
\(^{50}\) Consumer Reports, Oct. 1995, Electric Shavers, pg. 650
\(^{51}\) Consumers Reports actually suggests that the differences in longevity are small enough that consumers should buy batteries based on price and ignore the quality ratings altogether.
\(^{52}\) Popular Electronics, January 1998, by Stephen Booth, pg. 12
\(^{53}\) Buzzell and Gale, in the PIMS Principles argue that products with high prices are generally sold in more competitive markets.
Since Gillette is a sharpbender, and produces high quality products, this is consistent with a hypothesized positive linkage.

**Church and Dwight**

Church and Dwight (C&D) produces several baking-soda based products under the Arm and Hammer brand. Examples are antiperspirant, toothpaste, laundry detergent, cat litter, carpet deodorizer, and air freshener.

The reviews of C&D's products indicate that they are quite weak in the quality dimension. For example, in 1992 its toothpaste product was ranked 25th out of 29th in terms of quality and was more expensive than most of the superior alternative products.\(^{54}\) In 1991, C&D's entry in the laundry detergent market ranked 25th out of 29th, although it was less expensive than most.\(^ {55}\) In a 1995 review of powdered laundry detergents, C&D's entry came in 13th out of 18, although its liquid product came in 5th out of 17.\(^ {56}\)

This relatively poor quality on the part of the never-had-it is consistent with the hypothesized positive link between performance and quality.

**Clorox**

The data on Clorox cleansers begin in the early 1990s. They indicate that Clorox’s quality was somewhat above average, as were its prices. In a 1991 comparison, Clorox laundry detergent was rated 10th out of 13, and was more expensive than most.\(^ {57}\) The laundry detergent was discontinued within two years. In a 1991 test of bathroom cleansers the Clorox product was 7th out of twenty four, and the second most expensive.\(^ {58}\) A 1993 test of all-purpose cleansers found the Clorox products to be better than average, scoring fifth and tenth out of 21 products, with prices slightly below average. Clorox’s drain opener, Liquid-Plumr, was in the middle of the pack in 1994 in terms of quality and

\(^{54}\) Consumer Reports, Dec. 15, 1992, Toothpaste, pg. 177  
\(^{55}\) Consumer Reports, Feb. 1991, Laundry Detergents, pg. 100  
\(^{56}\) Consumer Reports, Feb. 1995, Laundry Detergents, pg. 92  
\(^{57}\) Consumers Reports, February 1991.  
\(^{58}\) Clorox bleach, which was not specifically made as a bathroom cleanser, came in fifth, with the lowest price by far. Tilex, the product Clorox created specifically for this job, was the second most expensive.
was slightly more expensive than most. In an August 1996 test of scouring cleansers, Clorox Soft Scrub was in the middle of the pack.

In late 1998 Clorox acquired First Brands, a maker of (Glad) storage bags and cat litter. In late 1996 it acquired Armor All, the maker of car care products.

Clorox appears to be a firm that has produced somewhat above average products at above average prices. Whether this performance was consistent with an increase in quality requires information from an earlier period, and I have been unable to unearth information sufficient to answer this question.

**Carter-Wallace**

This company is classified as a lost-it. The company’s primary products are Arrid antiperspirant, Trojans condoms, Pearl Drops toothpaste, Nair hair remover and Answer home pregnancy test. In the late 80’s and early 90’s, C-W also derived a fair percentage of sales from prescription medications -- Felbamate, an epilepsy drug, and Organidin, a cough syrup. At one time, C-W also manufactured Miltown tranquilizers.

Although I looked at the quality rankings for condoms, toothpaste and home pregnancy test, there were no definitive conclusions on the quality of those products, or, more importantly for a lost-it, changes in quality. And it became clear early on that it would be fruitless to try to explain Carter-Wallace’s fortunes based on these factors. Exogenous factors, explained below, were the dominant factors in Carter-Wallace’s vicissitudes.

C-W’s decline can be attributed quite easily to several important problems with its drug business that caused it to essentially leave that business altogether in 1994.\(^59\) In April of 1993 the FDA ordered Carter-Wallace to stop marketing its Organidin prescription drug (a cough suppressant) due to possible cancer causing effects. At the

\(^{59}\) According to an article in the October 5, 1994 Wall Street Journal, by Molly Baker, pg B6, Carter-Wallace was to take a $49 million second-quarter charge to cut its workforce by 23%, eliminating most pharmaceutical research and closing some plants. The actions were prompted by the production halt of Organidin and FDA restrictions on Felbamate. Carter-Wallace said it would take another charge of as much as $70 million to write-off costs related to Felbamate.
time, Organidin contributed $75m in revenues (11% of total sales) and 37% operating profit. In August of 1993 the FDA approved Felbamate, the first new anti-epilepsy drug in over a decade, and a prime mover in Carter-Wallace’s stock price rise that occurred in 1991. However, in August of 1994 the FDA and Carter-Wallace urged doctors to immediately withdraw patients from taking Felbamate, and eventually a class-action suit ensued. The FDA in April of 1993 ordered C-W to stop marketing and eventually take off the market Organidin, which was found to cause cancer in lab tests on animals. In 1994, C-W also ended production of Deprol, an antidepressant, after the FDA withdrew its approval because it lacked evidence of efficacy.

It is possible to claim that these difficulties were due to the quality of the products, since they had important negative side effects. However, I think that this would be stretching the definition of quality. It is best that we should treat these as exogenous events independent of the quality of the products. Carter-Wallace, therefore, can not be used to test main hypothesis.

Although the evidence in this industry is strongly consistent with the hypothesized link between quality and performance, the fact that the firms are in different industries, and that there are some many different products precludes a simple quantitative test.

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60 According to an article by Thomas Jaffe in the September 16, 1991 issue of Forbes (pg.209) a recent 30% stock gain was due to expectations that Carter-Wallace would file a drug application for Felbamate, which could eventually rack up sales of $100 to $200 million annually.
VIII. Desktop Computers

Summary: strong support for primary; cannot really test secondary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHARPBENDER</th>
<th>NEVER HAD IT</th>
<th>FOUND IT</th>
<th>LOST IT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dell</td>
<td>Packard Bell</td>
<td>HP</td>
<td>AST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is a McKinsey industry, but I limited the analysis to desktop PCs although the original list of firms included some who had a minor presence in the PC market. Removing these firms left a hole in the never-had-it category, which I filled with Packard Bell.

Some explanation of Packard Bell as a never-had-it is obviously in order. Packard Bell has not been publicly traded, so there are no stock market returns to measure. It has not released financial data thus accounting returns are unavailable. It is possible, however, to piece together its performance through bits and pieces of information reported in the press.

Packard Bell took its name from an old radio/television manufacturer in the late 1980s and became one of the largest producers of low priced PCs in the early and mid 1990s, sold largely through mass merchant retailers. A flattering article in early 1992 discussed its rapid rise in market share and also mentioned, surprisingly in the face of other evidence I report on below, that Packard Bell received high quality ratings. The facts appear to be quite to the contrary.

An article in 1993 reports:

“Still, Packard Bell's title as king of the retailers is getting a lot harder to hang on to. For the five years ended in 1991, it had a net loss of $10

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61 Packard Bell Demystifies Computer Buying, by Patrice Apodaca, Los Angeles Times, January 7, 1992, Part D; Page 9A. “According to a couple of recent surveys, Packard Bell's customers also give the computer maker high marks. Verity Group, a market research firm in Diamond Bar, found in a nationwide survey of more than 5,000 desktop computer owners conducted from November 1990, to November 1991, that Packard Bell ranked the highest in customer satisfaction. The common theme among those responding, Verity President Bill Matthies said, was that a Packard Bell computer "doesn't break and it's easy to use." Another survey, released last year by J. D. Power & Associates in Agoura Hills, found that Packard Bell ranked second among home-business computer users in terms of overall customer satisfaction”.

millions, which threatened to stall future growth… Packard Bell's sales spurted 37%, to $925 million, last year, and it expects revenues to pass $1.2 billion this year. That kind of selling pace . has also led to a huge headache -- a high rate of returns. The cost of those returns even cost it an initial public offering, planned and then withdrawn last year. According to its IPO filing with the SEC, more than $140 million worth of shipments in 1991 -- about 17% -- were returned to the factory.”

By 1996, after two outside infusions of cash, things were deteriorating:

Long known as a maker of discount computers, Packard Bell often teeters on the edge when it comes to the bottom line. Company officials admit that in recent years the firm had no earnings or slim margins at best. ... Tight margins prompted Packard Bell to seek NEC and Groupe Bull of France, which sold it Zenith Data, as partners. Each company now owns 19.9% of Packard Bell and each holds two of the company's nine board seats.

Finally after selling a majority share to NEC of Japan and laying off over 40% of its workers:

Packard Bell NEC has literally bled market share and red ink -- $1.5 billion over the past three years. Packard Bell, with which the Japanese electronics giant merged its U.S. PC operations in a $300 million deal in 1996, has been in free fall.

With this, I think, it is safe to label Packard Bell as a never-had-it.

There are two dimensions involved in the quality of personal computers. First, there is the performance of the computer itself. Performance differences usually are measured in terms of speed – how fast a calculation is performed, how quickly the screen can draw a complex diagram. Performance differences in similarly configured PCs, however, might be thought to have less variation than is the case for products in many other industries since PCs are almost always made from off the shelf parts, tending to decrease quality differences across brands using the same components.

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64 Packard Bell NEC Hits The Restart Button, by Peter Burrows, June 28, 1999, Pg. 38, Business Week.
The second element of quality is the reliability and service performance of vendors. Computers are more complicated products than many others and often require repairs, or at least some serious consumer handholding, since problems can arise with either the hardware or software, often caused by the behavior of befuddled consumers. Although all products have this repair and service component, it is probably of far greater importance for computers, because consumers have less experience and the product is far more complicated.

Reliability and Service measurements are reported in Figure 8.1 for the four firms. They are ranked by Z-scores, so that any positive score represents an above average performance. It is clear that Dell and HP are both considerably above average and AST is close to average. Packard Bell is considerably below average, even in the early 1990s, contrary to the article mentioned above that lauded Packard Bells quality.

The difference between the sharpbender and the never-had-it is very large. Again, it is difficult to check the lost-it and found-it categories since the time periods do not mesh, but HP looks like it could be a found-it, although AST does show much evidence of a lost-it.

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65 Reported in PC Magazine from reader surveys. Averages are based on a large number of computer brands.
The results for actual computer performance (bang-for-the-buck, so it includes price) provide similar confirmation of the importance of quality. Again, it is not clear that price plays an important separate role.⁶⁶

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PCW</th>
<th>PCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1992.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>1996.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig 8.2: PC 'Bang for buck'**

Dell computer is clearly the best computer in terms of performance, in line with its classification as a sharpbender. Its superiority is more apparent here than in Figure 8.1. Packard Bell does badly in the few reviews in which it is rated. AST seems to fall slightly, but so does hp. Overall, between both sets of measurements, there is little evidence here of HP as a found-it or AST as a lost-it.

To test our main hypothesis I compare Dell and Packard Bell to the average score in both of these charts. In terms of reliability (8.1) Dell is above average in 8 of 8 instances, Packard Bell below average in 7 of 7 instances. In chart 8.2, Dell is above average 17 of 20 times, and Packard Bell below average in 3 of 3 instances. In total 32 out of 35 measurements are consistent with a positive linkage between quality and economic performance.

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⁶⁶ Packard Bell does not show up in most of these rankings, apparently, because it didn’t want to be tested. These magazines ask manufacturers to send them machines for testing and Packard Bell did not often send in machines and so was not included.
IX. Consumer Electronics

Summary: Good fit on primary. No support for secondary tests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sharpbender</th>
<th>Never-had-it</th>
<th>Found-it</th>
<th>Lost-it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sony</td>
<td>Zenith</td>
<td>Matsushita</td>
<td>Pioneer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The very large number of products made by firms in the consumer electronics industry, defined as products largely used for entertainment – television, radio, stereos – makes the task of determining quality a difficult one. Although the focus is on consumer electronics, some of these firms do a considerable business in other industries. Sony, for example, has moved into computers. Matsushita is a large conglomerate that is involved with many businesses including automation controls, wiring and building products. Still, each firm is heavily involved in consumer electronics.

The primary test will compare Sony, the sharpbender, with Zenith, the never-had-it. The measure of quality comes from Consumer Reports reviews of home electronics products – televisions, VCRs, camcorders, receivers, speakers, integrated stereo systems, CDs, and cassette players. In each year several of these products are reviewed. But in each year there is a portfolio of such products reviewed that, hopefully, provides sufficient information to allow correct generalizations in making quality judgments.

Figure 9.1 illustrates the overall finding on quality. Quality scores were calculated by averaging the Z-scores for each producers reviewed products. Positive values are above average and negative values indicate below average performance.
Since the data go back to 1986, the time periods mesh fairly closely with the McKinsey time period, except that two additional years are included. Figure 9.1 reveals that through 1996 Sony produced the highest quality and above average products, consistent with its role as a sharpbender. Zenith is below average for the early observations but rises above average from 1992 through 1997. Zenith’s position as a never-had-it has not changed in the later years since Zenith has essentially gone bankrupt.\textsuperscript{67} The primary hypothesis is only partially supported, therefore.

Pioneer, the lost-it, does as badly or worse than Zenith, according to the quality results and never appears to have ‘had it’ so as to later have lost it. Matsushita, the found-it, does not provide any evidence of an increase in quality over the period. Thus there is no evidence here to support the secondary hypotheses. Neither however, is there any evidence to support the contrary position of a negative relationship between quality and economic performance.

\textsuperscript{67} According to a company data report on Zenith by FIS (owned by Moody’s until sold to Mergent in 1998) “The company has incurred losses in all but one of the years since 1985, and is currently experiencing severe financial difficulties. The company's projected cash flows for 1998 and future years were insufficient to meet all of the company's working capital requirements, cash debt service obligations and capital expenditures. As a result, during the first quarter of fiscal 1998, management developed and began implementing an operational restructuring to enhance the long-term viability of the company by reducing production costs and concentrating on areas in which the company believes it can operate profitably.”
To quantify these results for the primary hypothesis, we count the number of times Sony is above average and the number of time Zenith is below average. This works out to 11 out of 14, which might seem overly strong. Alternatively, we can count the number of times Sony surpasses Zenith, which is 5 of 7. In keeping with the conservative nature of this analysis, the 5 of 7 will be used.
**X.  Hard Drives (Systems components)**

Summary: Moderate support, in that the poorest performer in terms of profitability also had the lowest quality scores, and the firm was an outlier in each dimension. The difference between the other firms during the time period for which quality data were found was too small to classify them separately from one another.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sharpbender</th>
<th>Never-had-it</th>
<th>Found-it (reclassified as Moderate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quantum (reclassified as “Moderate”)</td>
<td>Maxtor</td>
<td>Seagate, Western Digital</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is a McKinsey ‘industry’, but the firms were not all in the same market, and it was not possible to obtain useful quality data for several of the firms. One market where it was possible to generate quality data was the hard drive market, which included three firms in the original McKinsey grouping (Quantum, Seagate, Western Digital). A fourth company (Maxtor) appeared in many of the product quality comparisons, and since Maxtor also specialized in hard drive production, I included it in the sample.

The quality data cover the period 1993 to 1998, which does not mesh very well with the McKinsey years. At best, part of the second period used in the McKinsey study overlaps with this data, and several years in this data extend beyond the McKinsey data. In addition, Maxtor only has stock market data for the last two years and thus could not be categorized using stock market returns.
Instead, it is useful to turn to an accounting measure, the return on assets.\(^{68}\) Figure 10.1 portrays the return on assets for the four firms.\(^{69}\)

Only one firm differs from the others by any significant margin in the 1993 to 1998 period, and that is Maxtor, which performs very poorly relative to the other firms.\(^{70}\) The test then, in this industry, will have to be Maxtor’s quality relative the others, which are not expected to differ greatly from one another.

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\(^{68}\) Return on assets is measured as the sum of net income after taxes plus interest paid divided by total assets. For 1990-1992 we could not determine interest paid and so for those years the return is measured using only net income and total assets. The difference was slight relative to the variation in returns over time and across firms.

\(^{69}\) These figures are taken from the reports filled with the SEC as reported in Edgar Online.

\(^{70}\) Maxtor’s average return on assets over this period was –21%, compared to 6% for Quantum and Western Digital, and 3% for Seagate.
Figure 10.2 provides the quality measurements. These are Z-scores, so values above zero mean that the product was above average and vice versa. Maxtor trails the pack but it is somewhat difficult to distinguish between the others, although Seagate appears to be superior to the others. To simplify comparisons, the average Z-score is reported below, and it is clear that Maxtor is last, Seagate first, and Quantum and Western Digital virtually tied.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Seagate</th>
<th>Quantum</th>
<th>Western Digital</th>
<th>Maxtor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.471816244</td>
<td>-0.20028644</td>
<td>-0.142761634</td>
<td>-1.09540377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What then to conclude? Maxtor, having by far the lowest quality product also had by far the poorest returns. The variation in economic performance between the other three firms was quite small, and this is consistent with the small variation in quality of this period. I take this as moderate evidence in favor the hypothesis linking quality and performance.

The quantitative measurement is centered on Quantum, the never-had-it. In seven quality observations, it was both below average and below the other firms in the chart in 5 cases.

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71 Many of these reviews explicitly took value into account, but others appeared not to include price or value as a separate factor.
**XI. Networking**

Summary: General support, but some inconsistencies, thus weak to middling support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sharpbender</th>
<th>Middling or lower</th>
<th>Middling</th>
<th>Middling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cisco (Fl)</td>
<td>Bay Networks (NHI)</td>
<td>Newbridge (SB)</td>
<td>3-Com (LI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is a McKinsey market, but one of the firms (Cabletron) is not in the same business as the others. A networking firm that was not included in the Evergreen project was Bay Networks and I decided to include it in the comparisons.\(^{72}\) This was convenient because Bay seems the closest in this group to a never-had-it, although its performance is not quite different enough to warrant that classification.

The stock chart above shows the stock performance of these firms starting in mid 1991 (when Bay’s data begins) for a period of time consistent with the quality measurements.\(^{73}\) Cisco is the sharpbender since 1990 (although Newbridge was so classified in the original McKinsey data).\(^{74}\) Both Newbridge and 3com have small run-ups in their stock prices (the latter in 1997 and the former in 1994) but neither comes

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\(^{72}\) In 1998 Bay Networks was taken over by Nortel in a friendly acquisition.

\(^{73}\) A chart similar to the one shown, but beginning in 1990 has Cisco dominant from the very beginning but the dominance is so great that it makes it difficult to tell the other firms apart, they are grouped so closely at the bottom.

\(^{74}\) In the classification table above, the original McKinsey ranking is listed next to the name of the firm.
close to Cisco’s overall performance. The firms other than Cisco are not markedly
different from one another, although Bay trails the others virtually all of the time.\textsuperscript{75}

The accounting data tell a similar though not totally consistent story.\textsuperscript{76} Figure 11.1
reveals that Cisco earned the highest rate of return. Newbridge is fairly clearly second in
terms of the accounting data, with 3Com and Bay trailing.\textsuperscript{77}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig111.png}
\caption{Networking Accounting Returns}
\end{figure}

Both performance measures, therefore, agree that Cisco is clearly the leader.
Whether there is enough of a difference between the other three firms for us to declare,
for example, that Newbridge performed better than 3Com and Bay, or that Bay is at the
bottom of the pack, is hard to state with any confidence. We do not, therefore, have a
sharp test between a winner and a single loser although it is possible to compare Cisco’s
quality with that of the other three firms.

The quality results are found in Figure 11.2, measured as Z-scores.\textsuperscript{78} Cisco, in
seven comparison rankings, comes in above average in all cases but one. 3Com is about

\textsuperscript{75} The symbols for the firms are: Bay – Bay Networks, NN – Newbridge, COMS – 3Com, CSCO – Cisco Systems.
\textsuperscript{76} Measured as operating income divided by total assets.
\textsuperscript{77} The average return for Cisco was 39\%, for Newbridge, 25\%, for 3Com, 9\% and for Bay, 10\%.
\textsuperscript{78} CW stands for Computer World, Dc stands for Data Communications, PCM for PC Magazine, and VB for VarBusiness.
as good. Newbridge and Bay do not fare as well, generally coming in with below average scores.

Cisco’s above average quality performance is consistent with its superior economic results, but its failure to surpass 3Com in terms of quality is not consistent with the prime hypothesis, although its superiority over Bay and Newbridge is consistent with this hypothesis. Overall, I conclude that there is weak to middling support for the hypothesis here.

Putting a quantitative value on these results, it is obvious that the number of observations where Cisco is above normal should be included (5 out of 6 with one neutral observation). In keeping with my conservative assessment of the hypothesized linkage of quality and performance, counting the number of times Newbridge is above average also seems reasonable, since it was classified as a sharpbender and also earned fairly high accounting returns. It only scores above average in 1 of 4 instances, so that the evidence here is 6 out of 10 cases support the linkage.
XII. Database:

Summary: The better economic performers had higher quality, but the differences in economic performance were far greater than would be suggested by the differences in quality. Software has a characteristic of ‘winner-take-all’, however, amplifying such differences in quality. Therefore, this can be taken as evidence in support of the general hypothesis. No test of secondary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong Performers (Sharpbender)</th>
<th>Found-It</th>
<th>Weak Performer (lost-it)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oracle, Microsoft</td>
<td>Computer Associates</td>
<td>Sybase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Databases come in two flavors: desktop databases (both flat and relational) for individual or small business use, and the heavy-duty ‘server’ version that interacts with large organizations. The major market consists of the heavy-duty version and that will be the focus here.

The never-had-it in the McKinsey classification is Adobe, a company better known for its font controlling technology, drawing programs, and now Internet document processing technology, than for any database software, so it will be dropped. The remaining firms in this market are Oracle, Microsoft, Sybase and Computer Associates. Microsoft, of course, has many other products and this product does not represent anything close to a majority of its revenues, so the economic performance of Microsoft is not likely to be strongly influenced by the quality of its database product. Oracle and Sybase have their fortunes closely tied to their database products and will be, therefore, the focus of this analysis.

The McKinsey classification indicates that Oracle outperforms Sybase, at least in the later years. The stock chart below confirms that classification.
Similar results are found with accounting profits, as revealed in Figure 12.1.\textsuperscript{79} There it is seen that Oracle has a far better economic performance on average over the last decade than Sybase, consistent with the stock market results, averaging a 21% return over the period to Sybase’s 3% return.

![Figure 12.1: Accounting Returns for Oracle and Sybase](image)

Our test here, then, will focus on the quality differential between Oracle and Sybase. Although it has been common to examine price as well, the complex pricing arrangements of these database products (server products that depend on the number of licenses to determine the price) makes the latter analysis somewhat difficult. One product may be less expensive for 5 user licenses, while a second product may be less expensive for 500 users.

\textsuperscript{79} Measured as operating income divided by total assets.
Figure 12.2 provides the results of the compilation of product reviews. The scores on the vertical axis are Z-scores, so that a value above zero indicates an above average product, and a value below zero indicates a below average product. The dates and magazines providing the reviews from which these scores were taken are indicated on the horizontal axis.\(^{80}\)

Just glancing at Figure 12.2 does not make clear an obvious ‘winner’ or ‘loser’. These scores bounce around a great deal from review to review and the rankings of the products also bounce around. Oracle has an average Z-score of .128 compared to Sybase’s average score of -.115, not a terribly large difference. As already noted, however, the nature of software markets is that leading firms have performance differentials far out of line with the quality differentials due to the winner-take-all nature of these markets. Note as well that in several instances only one of the firms gets ranked (the lines are interpolated through missing values).

In the head to head encounters between the two company’s products Oracle wins 6 times, Sybase wins 2, and there is 1 tie. Because of the nature of the market, counting the

number of times Oracle is above average and the number of times Sybase is below average seems inappropriate (it would have made little difference, with 15 of 24 cases consistent with the hypothesized linkage). This will be reported as 6 out of 9 in the overall chart. I conclude, therefore, that there is weak to moderate evidence in support of the main hypothesis of a link between quality and economic performance.
XIII. Airlines

Summary: Strong support for primary hypothesis. Secondary hypothesis is not tested.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excellent (SB)</th>
<th>Poor (NHI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southwest [1.6, 2, 1.8]</td>
<td>Continental [.02, 37, .7]; TWA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because the airline industry is not one of the original McKinsey markets, there were no original sharpbenders, never-had-its, lost-its or found-its. My classification of firms, then, bears some discussion.

Identifying the sharpbender is, fortunately, quite easy. Although both Southwest and United would be classified as sharpbender using the original McKinsey methodology (using 1995 as the ending year), Southwest slightly outperformed United, and in the years following 1995 only Southwest continued to outperform the industry.\(^81\) The accounting profit measures found in Figure 13.1 also show Southwest to be the best performer. This chart is somewhat busy looking but Southwest has by far the highest average return.\(^82\) Southwest, therefore, is classified as the sharpbender.

Finding a never-had-it proved somewhat more difficult. TWA had less than complete data for the period in terms of stock market performance. Two airlines, Pan American and Eastern disappeared after poor financial performance, so that they might be considered to qualify as never-had-its while they continued to operate. Continental airline’s stock went on a roller-coaster ride, falling by 98% of its value relative to other airlines in the first period, rising 3700% in the next period, but generating only 73% of the performance of its rivals during the 96-97 years.

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\(^81\) The numbers in parentheses in the classification table represents the 5 year market returns for each firm in the two McKinsey periods and a third period that goes through 1998.

\(^82\) Southwest averaged 7.31% compared to 3.70% for United, .81% for TWA, 3% for US Air, 3.51% for Delta, -2.44% for Continental, and 4.24% for American.
The accounting returns can clarify this seeming mélange of results, although there is no clear year-by-year never-had-it. However, on average, Continental averages by far the worst in the group with TWA also considerably below average. These accounting returns also make it clear how hard it is to find serious candidates here for the found-it or lost-it monikers. I will not even attempt to do so in this market.

The airline industry has one of the richest data sets of quality measurements of any industry that we have encountered. Not only is the number of comparisons numerous, the comparisons are based on different criteria. One set is based on numerical scores measured by the government, in this case the Department of Transportation. Such rankings, based on ‘objective’ measurements as opposed to subjective ‘perceptions’ are purported to measure ‘true’ quality, as would the rankings from Consumer Reports, as I have already discussed. The other component of quality rankings for airlines come from travel and general sources, such as Conde Nast, MSNBC, Money Magazine, Travel and Leisure Magazine, and so forth.

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83 The returns are: American Airlines Inc: 4.24%; US Airways: 3.00%; Continental: -2.44%; Delta: 3.51%; Southwest: 7.31%; Trans World Airlines: 0.81%; United: 3.70%.
84 The DOT data has been analyzed by researchers from the University of Nebraska, who provide yearly rankings on airlines.
Figure 13.2 represents the quality performance of airlines by their Z-scores, so that positive scores represent firms above the mean and negative scores represent firms whose products are below average in quality. The data on quality reveal that Southwest had far higher quality than the contrasting putative never-had-it group, and although I have tried to eliminate clutter and so have not included the quality data on all airlines, Southwest also has the highest overall quality of any other airline, with an average Z-score of 1.64, meaning that it was more than one and a half standard deviations above the industry mean.  

![Fig 13.2: Airline Quality](image)

Results from the two types of quality rankings are fairly similar. The surveys (Consumer Reports, Money, Conde Nast, MSNBC, Family Fun) provide similar scores to the conformance measures from the Department of Transportation. Southwest is almost always reported to be one of the highest quality airlines while Continental and TWA are among the worst (as were two defunct airlines, Pan American and Eastern, which were

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85 The average Z scores for the other national airlines were: Delta .448; American .224; Northwest -.570; USAir -.327; United .074; Continental -.641; TWA -.804.
86 One survey ranking (Travel and Leisure Magazine) was not included because it provided results at variance with the others. It appears that readers of this magazine are far more upscale than typical airline passengers and thus their choices are not representative of the population of airline consumers. This is discussed earlier in the report.
included to show that airlines that are doing really poorly also score badly on these ratings).

Some of these ratings attempt to adjust for price, while most do not. It appears not to make a great deal of difference.

Based upon these results, I conclude that there is strong support here for the view that quality leads to superior economic performance on the part of the competing firms, measured either by stock market performance or by accounting returns.

The quantitative measures are based on the share of above average scores for Southwest (14 of 15) and the share of below average scores for TWA (14 of 15) and Continental (14 of 15). This could be listed as 42 of 45 observations in favor of a positive linkage, but in keeping with the conservative bent of the study, I will report the results as 14 out of 15.
XIV. Car Rental Firms

Summary: Best performing firms also have the highest quality. Fairly strong support for basic hypothesis. No attempt to test secondary hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hertz</td>
<td>Dollar/Thrifty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is not an original McKinsey industry group. It is an industry, however, where quality rankings were available and where the major companies specialized fairly closely in the specific industry. Unfortunately, the firms in this industry have gone through major transformations in the last few years and virtually none of them had stock market returns available for more than a handful of years. I used accounting profits to detect successful versus unsuccessful firms.

Hertz is the largest automobile rental company. Avis, as its advertisements used to say, is the perennial number two in size. Dollar and Thrifty are both owned by Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group (DTG). AutoNation only entered the car rental business in 1996 and 1997 with the acquisition of Alamo and National car rental units, but I couldn’t get useful measures of profitability for rental units alone.87
Figure 14.1 represents the return on assets for the five leading car rental companies. The most successful firms are Hertz and Avis, with Budget being more variable and somewhat lower. Dollar/Thrifty is the laggard of the group.\textsuperscript{88}

Next I investigate the quality of the products of these firms. Figure 14.2, which represents Z-scores for these brands, reveals that Hertz and Avis are the two leading brands in terms of quality.\textsuperscript{89} Budget, Dollar and Thrifty all provide below average performance.

All in all, the agreement between financial performance and quality is reasonably strong. The measures of quality, illustrated in Figure 14.1, reveal that Hertz and Avis provide the best service. The other firms are all fairly closely grouped and quite low. The Dollar/Thrifty brands are always below average, consistent with their poor performance in measured accounting returns. Budget’s poor quality is not completely consistent with its mediocre financial performance as measured by accounting returns.

Since the quality observations of the firms with strongest and weakest economic performance all match the above/below classification, quantitative measurements could

\textsuperscript{87} Recently AutoNation has announced that it is going to spin off its car rental units.
\textsuperscript{88} The returns are: Hertz 7.32\%, Avis 7.19\%, Budget 6.10\%, and DTG 2.03\%.
\textsuperscript{89} Quality is determined by reviews in Conde Nast, Zagat, and Family Fun magazines.
overstate the true strength somewhat – 7 of 7 for the below average and 12 of 12 for the above average. Since Budget does as poorly as Dollar/Thrifty in quality, but has an economic performance closer to Hertz and Avis, I will include it as a ‘winner’ to lower these quantitative scores, in keeping with the extremely conservative methodology I am using to test for a positive relationship. This then alters the score to 21 of 25 instead of 19 of 19.
**XV. Internet Aggregators**

Summary: Strong support for primary hypothesis. No test of secondary hypothesis possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sharpbender</th>
<th>Never-had-it</th>
<th>Middling</th>
<th>Middling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yahoo</td>
<td>Infoseek</td>
<td>Lycos</td>
<td>Excite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is a very new category since the Internet did not start becoming an important presence until 1995. The firms in this category began life generally as search engines, intended to help users of the Internet find material from the enormous number of web sites. These search engines then evolved a strategy of generating advertising revenues, leading them to try to induce users to remain at the site as long as possible so as to maximize potential audience size and advertising revenues.

The major players are Excite, Infoseek, Lycos, and Yahoo. The time period is far too short to use the McKinsey methodology of never-had-it and sharpbenders, but that is more than compensated for by the fact that we get a chance to discover the importance of quality at the embryonic stage of an industry. Will quality have the same impact for immature companies and industries that it has for more seasoned firms? This is one industry that may provide the beginnings of an answer.

Before discussing the issue of quality, it is necessary to explain the categorization of the firms. In almost any dimension, Yahoo is the success story of this group. It has by far the largest market capitalization, is the only firm to be generating profits, has the largest sales, and the greatest stock appreciation.

Relative stock appreciation can be gleaned from the following chart, which illustrates stock market appreciation. Yahoo is the top line, followed a considerable distance below by Excite and Lycos with very similar paths to each other, and with Infoseek a clear trailer. All of these firms have achieved excellent stock market appreciation, since these measurements occurred during the great Internet stock run-up of
1998-99. Even Infoseek, the laggard of the group, beat the overall market returns over this period.

Because of this, I have classified Yahoo as the short term sharpbender and Infoseek as the never-had-it. As already mentioned, the time period is too short to be able to discuss found-its or lost-its.

How does the quality of the product compare with these stock market performances? The sharpbender, Yahoo, clearly dominates the field, as well as the never-had-it, Infoseek, in the quality dimension. Infoseek does poorly in quality, but is not necessarily the worst although it did come in last in four of the seven comparison rankings below. Lycos may actually be as bad, coming in last in two of five occasions.
It is worth noting that Yahoo is even more highly regarded than indicated in the above chart. There were a good number of reviews that were not amenable to charting because they did not provide scores. These reviews almost always found Yahoo to be the leading product. Of these reviews, two in 1996 found Yahoo to be the best,\textsuperscript{90} two in 1997 split between Excite and Yahoo,\textsuperscript{91} and three in 1998 list Yahoo as the best.\textsuperscript{92} In the chart above, Infoseek comes in last four of five times, and second on the other occurrence.

These results are quite consistent with the hypothesized positive link between quality and performance. It is interesting that quality seems to be important in this embryonic industry just as it is in the more mature industries.

In quantitative terms, we could count the number of times that Yahoo is above average (6 of 6) and Infoseek below average (3 of 7), or we could count the number of

\textsuperscript{90} USA Today, 9/21/96, The Best Ways to Navigate the Net, by Bruce Haring, pg. D10; Business Week, 2/12/96; What Hath Yahoo Wrought? by John Verity, pg. 88; Fortune, Dec 9, 1996; Yahoo! Still Searching for Profits on the Internet, by Janice Maloney, pg. 174.


times that Yahoo surpasses Infoseek in quality (5 of 5, one tie). To be consistent with the conservative strategy throughout, I will report 9 of 14 in Table 2.\textsuperscript{93}  

\textsuperscript{93} Reporting 5 of 5 provides a higher level of statistical significance than does 9 of 14.
XVI. Cruise Lines

Summary: Best performing firm also has the highest quality. Medium-strong support for the basic hypothesis. No test of secondary hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carnival</td>
<td>Royal Caribbean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This market was not an original McKinsey market. The cruise line market was chosen because there were several sources of ratings, and because several of the major players had their business focused on this market. In the end there are only two useful firms in the market, Carnival and Royal Caribbean. Princess is an important line, but it is owned by P&O, a British firm with many other interests that dwarf its cruise business. American Classic Voyages owns the American Hawaii cruise ship, but its major business consists of river cruises on paddlewheel steamboats and data on quality are unavailable for these boats and is very sparse for the Hawaii ocean cruiser.

The terms 'Sharpbender' and 'never-had-it' are of limited value here, since there is little reason to believe that the companies would fit into these categories if there were a long enough period of stock market returns to calculate meaningful categories, which there is not. Instead, I set a more modest goal--measuring the relative economic performance of these companies and then comparing their performance to the quality of their products.

Figure 16.1 charts the return on assets for the two companies. Carnival clearly has better performance, according to accounting figures. The cumulative stock market returns for the two companies provide results very similar to those derived using return on assets.

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94 The period for which we have data for Royal Caribbean extends from April 1993 to April 1999.
95 Return on Assets is defined as (gross) operating income divided by assets.
96 Carnival stock outperforms Royal Caribbean (including dividends) by a factor of 1.24
The quality of the cruise line is taken as the average value of its ships as provided by several sources, but mainly Conde Nast.\textsuperscript{97} The average quality, measured by Z-scores, can be found in Figure 16.2 (there are many ships not owned by either Carnival or Royal Caribbean that were used to create these Z-Scores).

Unfortunately, there are no data for Royal Caribbean for 1995 and 1996. Still, Carnival is above average in each year but one, and then only very slightly below

\textsuperscript{97} The Center for Disease Control also provides data on the cleanliness of individual ships, but variations between ships seemed to small to make this a worthwhile measurement of quality.
average. Royal Caribbean is significantly below average in three years and slightly above average in three years. Certainly, the evidence indicates that Carnival was of higher overall quality, particularly in the early to mid 1990s.

The evidence is not totally unambiguous here, but it clearly favors the hypothesis that quality leads to better performance.

Since we do not have economic performance where these firms can be compared with some form of industry average, the appropriate comparison is to compare the two firms to one another. The firm with the superior economic performance also wins 4 of 6 head to head comparisons.
XVII. Telephone and Voice carriers

Summary: No primary test since there is no never-had-it to compare with sharpbender. Still, mixed evidence regarding quality differentials and economic performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sharpbender?</th>
<th>Never-had-it</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCI &amp; WorldCom</td>
<td>Sprint (was Fl), AT&amp;T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is an original McKinsey industry and thus has firms classified by stock market performance, although the two sharpbenders, MCI and WorldCom, have since merged. Data on quality could only be found for four (three after the merger) of the firms in the industry, and then only for the time period since 1991.

![Fig 17.1: Return on Assets for Long Distance Providers](image)

Using return on assets, found in Figure 17.1, it would appear that AT&T and Sprint and the original MCI are the leading firms, with average rates of return well above the level of WorldCom (MCI-WorldCom). There is here something of a conundrum, however: WorldCom was classified as sharpbender based on stock market returns, yet it does not perform as well as the other firms in terms of rates of return on assets. It is

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98 The average return for WorldCom is 3.8%, compared to AT&T’s 9.4%, Sprint’s 10% and MCI’s 9.1%.
99 This is calculated as operating income divided by total assets.
possible that the different time periods are responsible for this, or perhaps that WorldCom stock price has performed far ahead of anticipated profits.

How, should these firms be classified relative to one another in terms of economic performance? WorldCom accounting performance is at the bottom of the pack, with little to distinguish the other firms from one another. Yet the stock performance of WorldCom is the most spectacular of the group, achieved during a period of remarkable growth. This inconsistency makes it very hard to use WorldCom in rank these firms based on economic performance. MCI, on the other hand, was classified as a sharpbender, and also earned high accounting returns, particularly in the early 1990s. We should expect its quality to be high during this period of time.

What is the evidence on quality? Figure 17.2 presents this evidence. Most of the data come from Data Communication Magazine, which survey’s its readers, but some of it also comes from JD Powers (represented by a JD in the chart). The survey’s in Data Communication, in the later years, includes separate measures for overall quality and overall value (the latter measures are represented by a V next to the year). In the former case, the evidence includes a measure of quality and a measure of value.
From 1991 through 1993, Sprint has the worst quality, but from 1995 until 1998 MCI has lowest quality. AT&T is the best during the first half of the decade. There are only a few instances when the quality of WorldCom is measured, but it does very well in those instances.

Regarding the linkage hypotheses, the evidence here is mixed. There is no ‘never-had-it’ to compare with a sharpbender. WorldCom cannot be used to test the hypotheses because it is unclear whether WorldCom is a high or low economic performer. MCI, however, has below average quality. Because of this, I view this industry as a very weak negative due to MCI’s lack of consistency in its economic and quality performance.

Taking MCI as a sharpbender, and examining its quality reveals that it was above average only 2 of 10 times prior to its merging with WorldCom.\(^{100}\) This would seem to overstate the confidence we can have in the result, but following the conservative pattern of the study, I will use this value.

\(^{100}\) The merger began in late 1997 so I will use the statistics through 1997.
XVIII. Discount Brokerage Firms

Summary: There is a strong correspondence between the economic performance of these companies and the quality of their product. There is some uncertainty about the measures of economic performance, however, so I classify this as medium level support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Middling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charles Schwab</td>
<td>J.B. Oxford, E*Trade</td>
<td>National Discount Broker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is another non-McKinsey industry chosen because quality rankings were available. Although there are many discount brokerage firms, there are not many that are also publicly traded. Examining the universe of publicly traded discount brokers where the brokerage service is the major activity of the firm provided four firms: Schwab, J. B. Oxford, E*Trade, and National Discount Brokers.

The first question concerns the economic performance of these firms as measured, first, by stock market returns. Of the two firms in existence since 1990, Schwab does much better than JB Oxford (approximately 7:1).\(^{101}\) Unfortunately, E*Trade and National Discount Brokers do not have stock returns for such a lengthy period of time.\(^{102}\)

\(^{101}\) This is based on pure price appreciation and does not include dividends, which would affect Schwab but not J.B. Oxford.

\(^{102}\) SCH is Schwab, NDB is National Discount Broker, EGRP is E*Trade and JBOH is J. B. Oxford.
In recent years, the firms vary as to which one performs the best, except that National Discount Brokers performs poorly in this later period.

It is useful to turn, once again, to accounting magnitudes to measure performance. Because these firms are financial in nature, however, using return on assets is a questionable choice. Instead, the return on sales can be used.\(^\text{103}\) The results are found in Figure 18.1. The data in this chart indicate that Schwab is the leader (although it might be somewhat difficult to discern by eye), and since it avoids any very severe slumps, it might be classified as a sharpbender.\(^\text{104}\) National Discount Brokers is second, except for a very poor showing in 1990. The worst performance is J.B. Oxford. E*Trade does relatively badly in four of the six years for which data exist.

![Figure 18.1: Economic Performance of Discount Brokers](image)

The performance data, therefore, are somewhat mixed. Both stock returns and accounting returns indicate that Schwab is the best. National Discount Brokers, however, fares far more poorly in the stock market than it does with the accounting data. Because there is so little stock market information for these firms, however, I am going to rely on the accounting data. I will classify the firms as Schwab best, National Discount Brokers second, followed by E*Trade and J.B. Oxford trailing.

\(^\text{103}\) Measured as profit before taxes divided by total revenue.
\(^\text{104}\) Schwab has an average return of 18\%, whereas National Discount Brokers averages about 9\%, E*Trade earns only 6\% and J. B. Oxford average just about a zero return.
I turn now to the investigation of quality. The results can be found in Figure 18.2.\textsuperscript{105}

![Quality of Discount Brokers](image)

The reader might well note that there is no data for J. B. Oxford. I will return to that in a moment. First, however, note that Charles Schwab is ranked first, National Discount Broker second, and E*Trade last. Thus, immediately, there is a strong correspondence between the quality rankings and the accounting performance data. This would be very strong evidence in support of the hypothesis linking quality and performance, except that there is some question about the strength of the performance measures.

J. B. Oxford is another story altogether, but one that is consistent with its poor economic performance. The history of J. B. Oxford is not pretty - it engaged in or at least flirted with fraudulent and deceptive practices. In 1991, when it was called the Otra Securities Group, a Glendale, California trade-processing company, it was accused of defrauding tens of thousands of investors at 25 brokerage firms of as much as $5 million in allegedly excessive fees.\textsuperscript{106} Then in 1992 the Otra Securities Group changed its name to RKS Financial Group Inc.\textsuperscript{107} In 1993 it became a target of suit alleging some 100,000

\textsuperscript{105} In this chart, SM stands for Smart Money and K for Kiplinger, the sources of the quality estimates. The scores represent Z-Scores based on rankings of a large number of discount brokers, so that scores above zero indicate above average performance and vice-versa.

\textsuperscript{106} Wall Street journal, 7/16/91, Investors’ Suit Cites ‘Excessive’ Account Fees, by Michael Siconolfi, pg C1.

\textsuperscript{107} Wall Street journal, 6/2/92, Business briefs, no author, pg B6
dormant accounts were sold off without the owners’ authorizations to pay brokerage maintenance fees, with illegal short selling to boot.\textsuperscript{108} In the spring of 1993, a group of investors led by Irving Kott acquired a controlling interest in RKS Financial. Kott had a lengthy criminal history in the securities industries dating back to the 1960s. A March 1994 expose in Business Week highlighted Kott’s “consulting” role. Shortly after that story appeared, RKS announced that is was pulling out of the full-service brokerage business.

In September 1994, RKS changed its name to J. B. Oxford and took on new top managers and a new business strategy. However, it kept Irving Kott as a consultant. Oxford maintained that Kott was a brilliant marketer, while industry officials said that because Kott was only a ‘consultant’, and his felony conviction had occurred more than five years earlier, there were essentially no restrictions on his working for a licensed brokerage firm.\textsuperscript{109}

An article in Time Magazine highlighting fraudulent brokerage firms described Kott in these terms: “No one has been a better practitioner of the craft than Irving Kott, a sharp operator who has played a powerful, behind the scenes role at brokerage firms in his native Canada, Continental Europe, Britain and the U.S. In his biggest caper, Kott’s brokerage customers lost as much as $400 million…. Kott is a powerful figure behind the scenes at JB Oxford & Co., a small discount brokerage with big pretensions whose parent company, JB Oxford Holdings, has become a darling of a group of online investors.”\textsuperscript{110}

Kott’s name did not appear in any of JB Oxford’s SEC filings, because, the company said, Kott was nothing more than a consultant. Says Time: “In reality, he wields so much influence that several former employees told Time they regarded him as the de facto CEO.”

\textsuperscript{108} The National Law Journal, 12/13/93, Stock fees suit a class action; more allegations added, by Gail Cox, pg. 3.
In 1996, the NASD fined the firm’s former broker-dealer, RKS, $50,000 for failing to disclose to investors negative information about a stock the firm sold to customers in 1992. In 1997 Federal agents raided the offices of JB Oxford Holdings. Oxford’s offices in Basel, Switzerland were also raided. In 1997, JB Oxford said it severed its controversial relationship with Irving Kott, although his son was then running the company. Finally, in May of 1998 a Tennessee investor group paid $6 million to buy a 47% interest in JB Oxford and claimed to remove Kott’s influence.

Even though we do not have direct information on the quality of Oxford’s performance, it seems very unlikely that the quality could have been very high considering that the firm was putting so much of its efforts into circumventing the law.

The evidence relating quality to performance is, therefore, consistent for all the firms in this industry.

Quantitative measurements will not provide the full impact of the findings in this industry. Schwab is above average in 6 of 7 instances, and that is the measurement that shall be used.

111 WSJ, 8/20/97, FBI Agents raid JB Oxford’s offices in California, by Andy Pasztor, pg A4 Also, The Los Angeles Times, 8/20/97, FBI Agents raid Beverly Hills Brokerage Firm, by Debora Vrana, pg D1
112 WSJ, 9/18/97, JB Oxford Holdings says it has severed ties with Consultant, no author, no page cited.
XIX. Cosmetics

Summary: Moderate to weak evidence against the hypothesis linking quality and performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Best</th>
<th>Terrible but then found it</th>
<th>Middling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estee Lauder</td>
<td>Avon</td>
<td>Revlon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is not an original McKinsey industry. Some product reviews were available, however, as well as information on several firms specializing in this industry. Some of the major firms are Avon, Estee Lauder, Revlon, L’Oreal, Mary Kay, and Proctor and Gamble. Performance data could only be found for three of these firms, however. Stock market data were too sketchy to calculate the McKinsey classifications, except for Avon, which appeared as a never-had-it, although its performance in 1997-1999 was above average. It seems more informative to use accounting measures of performance here and Figure 19.1 provides data on rates of return on assets.

![Fig 19.1: Cosmetics Return on Assets](image)

Avon is seen to have a remarkably poor performance until 1997, Revlon's performance is middling, but Estee Lauder performs consistently well.

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114 Measured as operating income divided by total assets.
How do these economic performances contrast with the quality of products? It is important to be somewhat careful here because the quality of cosmetics is difficult to gauge, with much of the appeal of these products having to do with marketing and the creation of that difficult to define concept, glamour.

The measure of quality used, in part because it is the only measure available, comes from Consumers Reports. Being the hardnosed, anti-fluff type of organization that they are, they judge these products based on very practical considerations that may not be of utmost, or even moderate concern to most shoppers.

Nevertheless, the results are presented in Figure 19.2. There are only four years of data, and for each year the results are based only on a single product. The lettering next to the year indicates the product examined. Scores are Z-scores. The average scores for each company are very close to one another, with no apparent pattern to the scores.

Comparing these two charts, there is no support for the view that quality bears any relationship to the economic performance of the firm. Avon might have been expected to perform poorly, but it is above average (positive scores) in 3 of the 4 comparisons. The evidence is not entirely negative for the hypothesis, however. Estee Lauder, which might have been expected to be above average, is above average in three of the four

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115 LS is lipstick, EMU is eye make-up, NP is nail polish, and MS is mascara.
comparisons but it only beats Avon 1 of 3 times. Given the weakness and dearth of quality measures, I do not believe that much can be made of this.

In keeping with my policy of stacking the deck somewhat against the hypothesis of positive linkage, I will take the 1 of 3 as the quantitative result.