The University of Texas at Dallas

School of Management

Working Papers

A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

By Mike W. Peng, Denis Y. L. Wang, Sunny Li Sun, and Erin Pleggenkuhle-Miles

Abstract

International business (IB) is known for its diversity and consequently its lack of central frameworks unifying the discipline. At AIB50/JIBS40, it is time to "stand and deliver." In this spirit, we argue that a unified framework has emerged. Our proposed fundamental question is: What determines the success and failure of firms around the globe? To address this question, IB literature can be broadly organized along two core perspectives: (1) the institution-based view and (2) the resource-based view. We suggest that this framework helps clarify the direction of our discipline, acknowledges its intellectual roots, and moves the discipline ahead. PDF

FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN LARGE FIRMS:
THE GOOD, THE BAD, THE IRRELEVANT -- AND WHY

By Mike W. Peng (University of Texas at Dallas) and Yi Jiang (California State University, East Bay)

Abstract

There is a major debate regarding the role of concentrated family ownership and control in large firms, with three positions suggesting that such concentration is (1) good, (2) bad, or (3) irrelevant for firm performance. This article reports two studies to shed further light on this debate. Study 1 uses 744 publicly listed large firms in eight Asian countries to test competing hypotheses on the impact of the combination of family ownership and control on firm performance. On a country-by-country basis, our findings support all three positions. On an aggregate, pooled sample basis, the results support the "irrelevant" position. Study 2, based on a sample of 688 firms from the same eight Asian countries, endeavors to answer why Study 1 obtains different results for different countries. We theorize and document that Study 1 findings may be systematically associated with the level of shareholder protection embodied in legal and regulatory institutions. Study 2 thus sketches the contours of a cross-country, institution-based theory of corporate governance. Overall, our two studies lead to a finer-grained and more cumulative understanding of the crucial debate on family ownership and control in large firms. PDF.