
Cryptographic Hash Functions

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
Based on [Prof. Ninghui Li's](#) Slides

Lecture Outline

- Hash functions
- Security properties
- Iterative Hash Functions
- Merkle-Damgard construction
- SHA1



Data Integrity and Source Authentication



- Encryption does not protect data from modification by another party.
- Need a way to ensure that data arrives at destination in its original form as sent by the sender and it is coming from an authenticated source.

Cryptographic Hash Functions

- A hash function maps a message of an arbitrary length to a m-bit output
 - output known as the fingerprint or the message digest
 - if the message digest is transmitted securely, then changes to the message can be detected
- A hash is a many-to-one function, so collisions can happen.



Requirements for Cryptographic Hash Functions

Given a function $h: X \rightarrow Y$, then we say that h is:

- **preimage resistant (one-way):**
if given $y \in Y$ it is computationally infeasible to find a value $x \in X$ s.t. $h(x) = y$
- **2-nd preimage resistant (weak collision resistant):**
if given $x \in X$ it is computationally infeasible to find a value $x' \in X$, s.t. $x' \neq x$ and $h(x') = h(x)$
- **collision resistant (strong collision resistant):**
if it is computationally infeasible to find two distinct values $x', x \in X$, s.t. $h(x') = h(x)$



Uses of hash functions

- Message authentication
- Software integrity
- One-time Passwords
- Digital signature
- Timestamping
- Certificate revocation management



Brute-force Attacks on Hash Functions

- Attacking one-wayness
 - Goal: given $h: X \rightarrow Y$, $y \in Y$, find x such that $h(x)=y$
 - Algorithm: pick a random set X_0 of q values in X , for each $x \in X_0$, return x if $h(x)=y$, after all q values have been evaluated, return fail
 - A Las Vegas randomized algorithm
 - When h is a random instance of all functions mapping X to Y , the average-case success probability is

$$\varepsilon = 1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{|Y|}\right)^q \approx \frac{q}{|Y|}$$

- Let $|Y|=2^m$, to get ε to be close to 0.5, $q \approx 2^{m-1}$



Las Vegas Randomized Algorithms

- An Las Vegas randomized algorithm may fail to give an answer, but when it does give an answer, the answer is always correct
- Such an algorithm has worst-case success probability ε if the algorithm returns a correct answer with probability at least ε
- Such an algorithm has average-case success probability ε if the probability that the algorithm returns a correct answer, averaged over all problem instances, is at least ε



Brute Force Attacks on Hash Functions

- Attacking collision resistance
 - Goal: given h , find x, x' such that $h(x)=h(x')$
 - Algorithm: pick a random set X_0 of q values in X
for each $x \in X_0$, compute $y_x=h(x)$
if $y_x=y_{x'}$ for some $x' \neq x$ then return (x, x') else fail
 - The average success probability is

$$1 - e^{-\frac{q(q-1)}{2|Y|}}$$

- Let $|Y|=2^m$, to get ϵ to be close to 0.5, $q \approx 2^{m/2}$
- This is the birthday attack.



Choosing the length of Hash outputs

- Because of the birthday attack, the length of hash outputs in general should double the key length of block ciphers
 - SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 to match the new key lengths (128, 192, 256) in AES


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Constructing Hash Function From Compression Functions

- Goal: A hash function h that maps a message of an arbitrary length to a m -bit output
 - $h: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$
- Input: a compression function that takes a fixed-length input string and output a shorter string
 - $f: \{0,1\}^{m+t} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$
- The following properties can be defined for compression functions similar to hash functions
 - preimage resistance (one-way):
 - 2-nd preimage resistance (weak collision resistance):
 - collision resistance (strong collision resistance):

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
Model for Iterated Hash Functions



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The Merkle-Damgard Construction of Hash Functions

- Goal: construct a hash function $h: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ from a compression function $f: \{0,1\}^{m+t+1} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$
- Given message x of arbitrary length



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Example:

- Compression function: $f: \{0,1\}^{128+512+1} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{128}$
- Message x has 1000 bits:
 - y_1 is first 512 bits of x
 - y_2 is last 488 bits of $x \parallel 0^{24}$
 - y_3 is $0^{480} \parallel 32$ -bit binary representation of 24
 - $z_1 = f(0^{129} \parallel y_1)$ z_1 has 128 bits
 - $z_2 = f(z_1 \parallel 1 \parallel y_2)$
 - $z_3 = f(z_2 \parallel 1 \parallel y_3)$ z_3 is the message digest $h(x)$

Example:

- Suppose that message x' has 488 bits and $h(x)=h(x')$:
 - y_1' is $x' \parallel 0^{24}$
 - y_2' is $0^{480} \parallel$ 32-bit binary representation of 24
 - $z_1' = f(0^{129} \parallel y_1')$ z_1 has 128 bits
 - $z_2' = f(z_1' \parallel 1 \parallel y_2')$ z_2' is $h(x)$
- Then $f(z_1' \parallel 1 \parallel y_2') = f(z_2 \parallel 1 \parallel y_3)$ and $y_3=y_2'$
 - if $z_1' \neq z_2$ then a collision is found for f
 - if $z_1' = z_2$ then $f(0^{129} \parallel y_1') = f(z_1 \parallel 1 \parallel y_2)$, there is also a collision for f

Security of the Merkle-Damgard Construction

- If $f: \{0,1\}^{m+t+1} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ is collision resistant, then the Merkle-Damgard construction $h: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ is collision resistant.
- Proof:
 - suppose that we can find $x \neq x'$ such that $h(x)=h(x')$, we show that we can find collision on f
 - let $y(x) = y_1 \parallel y_2 \parallel \dots \parallel y_{k+1}$
 - let z_1, z_2, \dots, z_{k+1} be the intermediate results of $h(x)$, then $h(x) = z_{k+1} = f(z_k \parallel 1 \parallel y_{k+1})$
 - let $y(x') = y_1' \parallel y_2' \parallel \dots \parallel y_{n+1}'$ and $z_1', z_2', \dots, z_{n+1}'$ be the intermediate results of $h(x')$, then

$$f(z_k \parallel 1 \parallel y_{k+1}) = h(x) = z_{n+1}' = f(z_n' \parallel 1 \parallel y_{n+1}')$$



Security of the Merkle-Damgard Construction (Proof continued)

$$f(z_k \parallel 1 \parallel y_{k+1}) = f(z_n' \parallel 1 \parallel y_{n+1}')$$

- Case 1: $|x| \neq |x'| \pmod t$ (the number of padding bits are different), then $y_{k+1} \neq y_{n+1}'$, a collision has been found
- Case 2a: $|x| = |x'|$, then $k=n$, either $z_k \neq z_k'$, in which case a collision has been found, or $z_k = z_k'$, in which case $f(z_{k-1} \parallel 1 \parallel y_k) = z_k = z_k' = f(z_{k-1}' \parallel 1 \parallel y_k')$ if $y_k \neq y_k'$, then a collision has been found; otherwise consider z_{k-1} and z_{k-1}' , if they are different, a collision has been found, otherwise go backwards. There must exist a number j such that $y_j \neq y_j'$.



Security of the Merkle-Damgard Construction (Proof continued)


- Case 2b: $|x| \neq |x'|$. Similar to case (2a), except that we may go all the way back to the beginning of one of the strings and have $f(0^{m+1} \parallel y_1) = f(z_j' \parallel 1 \parallel y_{j+1}')$
A collision has been found.

MD2, MD4 and MD5

- Family of cryptographic hash functions designed by Ron Rivest
- MD2: produces a 128-bit hash value, perceived as slower and less secure than MD4 and MD5
- MD4: produces a 128-bit hash of the message, using bit operations on 32-bit operands for fast implementation, specified as Internet standard RFC1320
- MD5: produces a 128-bit output, specified as Internet standard in RFC1321; till relatively recently was widely used.

MD5 Cryptanalysis

- Known attacks:
 - Berson (1992): for a single-round MD5, he used differential cryptanalysis to find two messages producing the same hash. Attack does not work for 4-round MD5.
 - Boer & Bosselaers(1993): found a pseudo collision (same message, two different IV's)
 - Dobbertin (1996) created collisions on MD5 compression function with a chosen IV
 - Wang, Feng, Lai, Yu found collisions of MD5
 - works on any IV
 - easy to find multiple collisions





SHA1 (Secure Hash Algorithm)


- SHA was designed by NIST and is the US federal standard for hash functions, specified in FIPS-180 (1993).
- SHA-1, revised version of SHA, specified in FIPS-180-1 (1995) use with Secure Hash Algorithm).
- It produces 160-bit hash values.
- NIST have issued a revision FIPS 180-2 that adds 3 additional hash algorithms: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, designed for compatibility with increased security provided by AES.



SHA1 Overview

- As in MD5 message is padded such as its length is a multiple of 512 bits
- Initialize a 5-word (160-bit) buffer
 - Word A: 67 45 23 01
 - Word B: EF CD AB 89
 - Word C: 98 BA DC FE
 - Word D: 10 32 54 76
 - Word E: C3 D2 E1 F0
- Message is processed in 16-word (512-bit) chunks:
 - expand 16 words into 80 words by mixing & shifting
 - use 4 rounds of 20 operations on message block and buffer

SHA-1 Compression Function (Single Step)



SHA-1 Compression Function

- Each round consists of 20 steps, updates the buffer as follows:
 $(A, B, C, D, E) \leftarrow (E + f(t, B, C, D) + (A \ll 5) + W_t + K_t), A, (B \ll 30), C, D)$
- t is the step number
- $f(t, B, C, D)$ is a non-linear function for round
- W_t is derived from the message block
 $W_t = S^1(W_{t-16} \oplus W_{t-14} \oplus W_{t-8} \oplus W_{t-3})$
- K_t is a constant value derived from the sin function
- S^k is circular left shift by k bits

SHA-1 Cryptanalysis

- SHA1 shuffles and mixes them using rotates & XOR's to form a more complex input that makes finding collisions more difficult.
- Brute force attack is harder (160 vs 128 bits for MD5)
- Various attacks against simplified versions of SHA-1
- SHA-1 is still secure as today, but it may fall soon



More Precise Definitions

- A hash function h is (t, ϵ) **one-way** if there exists no t -time probabilistic algorithm A where $h(A(y)) = y$ with probability $> \epsilon$
 - probability taken over random y and internal random
- A hash function h is (t, ϵ) **weak collision** resistant if there exists no t -time probabilistic algorithm A such that when given x , with probability $> \epsilon$, it outputs x' such that $x' \neq x$ and $h(x') = h(x)$

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More Precise Definitions

- A hash function h is (t, ϵ) collision resistant if there exists no t -time probabilistic algorithm that outputs two messages x_1 and x_2 such that $h(x_1) = h(x_2)$ with probability $> \epsilon$

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Reduction among the security properties

- $(t+c, \epsilon)$ collision resistant implies (t, ϵ) weak-collision resistant, where c is a small constant
- Proof idea:
 - Suppose that h is not (t, ϵ) weak-collision resistant, then there exists algorithm A , when given x , outputs $x' = A(x)$ such that $h(x') = h(x)$.
 - Construct B as follows, B picks a random x , feeds it to A , and then outputs $(A(x), x)$.



Reduction among the security properties

- Collision-resistant implies one-way
 - main idea: given an algorithm A that (t, ϵ) breaks one-wayness, construct algorithm B, which picks a random x and gives $h(x)$ to A, then A outputs x' . If $x' \neq x$, then a collision is found.
 - Overall, the probability that B succeeds is close to ϵ assuming that the domain of h is significantly larger than the range of h
- Similarly, weak collision-resistant implies one-way



Summary

- Hash functions produce a fixed-length digest of any message
- Hash functions requirements are being one-way, weak-collision resistant and strong collision resistant
- Brute force attacks, finds a collision in $O(2^{m/2})$

