Ludwig
Lachmann (1906-1990): Life and Work
by Peter Lewin (University of Texas at Dallas)
"The theory of capital lacks a
simple dimension for the measurement of its subject matter. To some minds
this makes it all the more attractive."
Introduction: his life
and work
Ludwig Lachmann was a
very unusual man. If you ever met him you would never forget him. He left a
lasting impression. He was unfailingly gracious and considerate, a man of
impeccable integrity and of awe inspiring learning, an old world European
gentleman. I knew him only for a small part of his life, when he was already
somewhat advanced in years. He was my teacher, my most important teacher, and
though I later knew him as an older colleague I never stopped thinking of him
as my teacher. But, as I will explain, he was also a most unusual teacher.
Lachmann received his
graduate education in Germany at the University of Berlin between 1924 and
1933 where he got his doctorate. He apparently first became interested in
Austrian economics, in particular the economics of Carl Menger, during a
summer that he spent at the University of Zurich in 1926. In 1933 he left
Germany and settled in England, where he spent some considerable time at the
London School of Economics. The LSE was then at the peak of its influence in
the world of economics and had attracted a number of very talented rising
stars among whom was the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek, a future Nobel
prize winner, who became Lachmann’s mentor and later colleague. It was during
the 1930’s and 1940’s that Lachmann formed his ideas on Austrian economics.
In 1948 he left England to become Professor of Economics and Economic History
at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa, where
he remained for the rest of his life. After retiring, he spent a semester of
each year teaching at New York University in their Austrian economics program
until a few years before his death in December 1990 at the age of 84.
He had a long and
productive professional life and retained his keen mind until the end. He was
not, however, a very prolific writer. Don Lavoie, who has edited a book of
his articles has described his intellectual legacy as "a large message
in small packages" (Lavoie 1994, p. 19). He published three books, a
monograph and (by my count) 68 articles. During his life he was not very
influential as an economist although he was quite widely known around the
world. Nevertheless, he always remained something of an outsider. His most
remarkable quality as a scholar was his consistency over a long period of
time. It seems that his central ideas were formed during the LSE years when
he wrestled with Hayek’s work on capital and published a half dozen articles on
the subject. And through his work on capital he began to think about the
methodology of the social sciences, which was to become the focus of his work
in later years. By the time he moved to South Africa he had already formed
most of the opinions that were to characterize his work for the rest of his
life. Reading his articles from 1943 through to the 1980’s, one is struck by
the single minded consistency of the message, the flavor of which I will try
to convey below.
In considering his
legacy, what it is he has left behind, I will consider both his influence as
a teacher and as a writer.
Lachmann as teacher
As I have said Lachmann
was a most unusual teacher. I was a student of his from 1966 to 1971. My
introduction to him was as a second year undergraduate who had decided to
major in economics. Lachmann taught all of the basic courses for second and
third year economics. He was my teacher, as far as I can remember, for
employment theory (which was essentially the economics of John Maynard
Keynes), the economics of imperfect competition (popular at the time),
international economics, monetary economics, welfare economics, growth theory
and of course capital theory. This gives some idea of his breadth of
knowledge. I was also fortunate to have attended his Thursday evening honors
seminar where faculty, students and interested lay people met for in depth
discussion of important texts. By the time I first arrived in his classes he
had been teaching for about seventeen years and continued for about another ten
or so. So a quarter century’s worth of South Africa’s economics students
passed through his classes and some of these ascended to prominent positions.
He was widely known and respected in South Africa, at the time probably its
most illustrious economist in company with professors William Hutt and J. D.
Graaf. Yet unfortunately, though all of his students are likely to remember
him, I would be surprised if any but a very small minority of them remember
much of what he taught them. This is in part a result of his teaching style
and in part a result of the environment in which he was teaching.
To the average student
Lachmann would have seemed a formidable figure, intimidating and highly
inaccessible. This impression was created primarily by his way of lecturing.
His lectures inevitably followed a set form. He would sit in front of the
class and deliver his lecture in perfectly punctuated prose, (for the most
part) without notes. He would cite journal references by year and month from
memory. Only very occasionally would he rise to use the board. His manner of
articulation was very eccentric. He spoke with a deep, guttural German accent
and lingered on particular words for emphasis. He also used an unusual
intonation for emphasis; he would frequently interrupt his sentences with
something like "eh eh" followed by short pregnant silences and
quick intakes of breath. When students first heard him their immediate
inclination was to laugh.
They soon found out,
however, that he was deadly serious. He would tolerate no disruptions. He
always began right on time and finished just before the sound of the final
bell. Each lecture, though apparently spontaneous, was perfectly crafted.
Each sentence was connected to the previous one and the succeeding one in
such a way that a logical progression was created from beginning to end. If
one were able to follow every nuance, one would find his remarks replete with
subtle references and allusions as well as numerous, but frequently missed,
examples of dry humor.
It is probably true
that most of his students were ill prepared for his classes. The material he
chose and the level at which he presented it was beyond them. They were, as a
rule, too immature and unsophisticated to comprehend the full meaning of much
of his discourse. His concerns were remote from theirs. They were often
preoccupied with the always threatening and frustrating South African
political dilemmas. Most of his students were part of the white, politically
liberal establishment (which in a U.S. or U.K. context would today be in the
center of the political spectrum). If Lachmann had any political opinions
they never showed in his economics classes. He left it to the students to
draw whatever political implications they could, and most did not see any.
It is clear, though
most of his students did not share his feelings, that Lachmann thought his
subject matter was vital and compelling. For him the important issues in the
world concerned rival schools of thought. He frequently employed metaphors of
combat to describe his mission to advance the cause of Austrian economics. He
was intensely concerned about resisting the dangers posed by what he called
"classical formalism" to the integrity of economics and this
concern permeated all of his courses. For him a course was more than the
teaching of concepts and techniques. He was concerned to convey the
historical context of the subject and the alternative ways of looking at
things.
Most of his students
came to his courses to learn about economics, which they were required to
take and which they understood to mean a body of received doctrine much like
a course on physics. There was something profoundly unsettling about finding
‘mere opinion’ where one expected to find formulas for truth. Where they
succeeded in his courses it was usually by taking careful notes and
memorizing the key ideas without understanding, or caring to understand,
their full significance. There were notable exceptions, students whose
sophistication and interest were sufficient for them to relate to the
material. They were the select few who seemed able actually to communicate
with Professor Lachmann.
Ironically, it was
probably only after he retired and became a visiting professor at NYU, with
periodic visits to George Mason University, that his influence through his
teaching was at its greatest and where his legacy is to be most clearly seen.
In 1974 at a conference in South Royalton Vermont, at which Lachmann was a
key speaker, the revival of the Austrian school of economics began. At last,
after decades in the wilderness, Lachmann found himself among kindred
spirits, people who shared his life long interest in the cause of Austrian
economics, who were eager to receive and to understand his message. He spent
the next decade teaching, writing and debating with them. Today a generation
of students exists, perhaps a few dozen in number, including some who have
passed on their approach to their students, who are the beneficiaries of that
period in Lachmann’s life. Scholars who have been inspired by Lachmann’s
particular brand of Austrian economics, which has been called market process
economics, are in university departments across America and in other
countries. His influence as a teacher was greatest in the last decade of his
life. Until that time he had been trying, mostly in vain, to influence his
students and his colleagues. It must have taken an extraordinary amount of
conviction and faith in his particular viewpoint not to have given up in the
face of such stubborn indifference. What then was the nature of this approach
to economics?
Lachmann as capital
theorist
Lachmann’s first and,
in some ways only, notable contribution to economics per se is to the
theory of capital. In order to understand this I need to digress briefly to
fill in some background information.
When the label Austrian
economics is used most economists think of the Austrian theory of capital.
Carl Menger’s illustrious disciple, Eugene von Böhm-Bawerk, specialized in
this area and ended up writing a three volume work over a period of some
thirty years (Böhm-Bawerk 1959). Following Menger’s lead Böhm-Bawerk was one
of the first theorists to carefully analyze the role of time in production.
Capitalistic economies use capitalistic methods of production, what
Böhm-Bawerk referred to as ‘roundabout’ methods of production. In other
words, more productive methods of production are more indirect, they don’t
just use the inheritance of nature to produce final goods, rather they
produce instruments of production like machines, buildings, raw materials,
etc., what economists call capital goods, in order to produce what we need.
Robinson Crusoe on a dessert island eats better if he takes time out to make
a fishing net rather than attempting to catch fish with his hands. The
fishing net is a capital good. Capitalist economies are manifestations of
this resort to roundabout methods in a very high degree.
Böhm-Bawerk brilliantly
analyzed and illustrated the importance of understanding that capitalist
economies are characterized by a time structure. Final consumption goods are
the result of a long sequence of steps that characterize production processes
taking place over time. These processes depend on the market system to supply
values for their orientation and in other work he mounted one of the first
and most successful attacks on Marxist economics ever written. He also
provided a penetrating account of the nature of interest and interest rates.
In a nutshell,
Böhm-Bawerk’s contribution was profound and widely influential and modern
capital theory was built on his foundation. At the LSE in the thirties the
question of capital came up in the context of the problem of unemployment.
Hayek in a number of contributions (for example Hayek 1931 and 1939)
attempted to incorporate the theory of capital as involving production plans
over time along the lines indicated by Böhm-Bawerk. He was building also on
the work of Ludwig von Mises, a student of Böhm-Bawerk’s, a giant intellect
and the leading Austrian economist of the time who had written extensively on
money and inflation. Mises originated what is now called Austrian Business
Cycle theory. The business cycle is explained in terms of inflationary policies
that distort the time structure of productive processes. Hayek built on this
work, which incorporated a simplified version of Böhm-Bawerk’s vision of the
capital stock of the economy as a time structure where goods get produced by
passing through successive stages at which value is added. Inflation by
stimulating production takes resources away from the later stages and causes
a lengthening in the productive structure which cannot be sustained. In the
final phases of the cycle resources flow back into the later stages of
production causes half completed projects to be abandoned, and so on. The
details of this theory need not detain us. The important point is that it
contains a radically simplified view of capital that left a number of
theorists dissatisfied. Hayek attempted to flesh out the necessary details
for a more complete theory and it was one of these contributions (published in 1937) that fired Lachmann’s imagination and
provided the spark for his own theory of capital.
It should be realized
that Böhm-Bawerk’s work provided the raw material for many different, and
sometimes contradictory, approaches to capital and that the modern Austrians,
most notably Mises and Hayek, were in some important ways dissatisfied with
Böhm-Bawerk’s treatment. In particular, they resisted Böhm-Bawerk’s attempt
to provide an aggregate measure of the capital stock in terms of time units,
whereas it is precisely this element that was most influential in and
congenial to mainstream economic theory. Hayek agonized over how to deal with
the concept of capital, which is a stock of diverse, heterogeneous items,
without being able to combine these elements into a measurable aggregate.
This was where Lachmann branched out. Lachmann argued that Böhm-Bawerk’s
attempt to provide an aggregate measure of the capital stock was misguided,
because the assumptions one had to make in the process obscured its very
nature and the way the market process worked. In place of the idea of a
capital stock he proposed the concept of a capital structure composed of a
bewildering variety of productive elements. This bewildering variety, though
not reducible to any single measure in terms of value or in terms of units of
labor time, was nevertheless not a random or arbitrary collection. Rather it
was an ordered structure, ordered in terms of the purposes which the
individual items served.
The generic concept of capital without which economists
cannot do their work has no measurable counterpart among material objects; it
reflects the entrepreneurial appraisal of such objects. Beer barrels and
blast furnaces, harbor installations and hotel room furniture are capital not
by virtue of their physical properties but by virtue of their economic
functions. Something is capital because the market, the consensus of
entrepreneurial minds, regards it as capable of yielding an income ....[But]
the stock of capital used by society does not present a picture of chaos. Its
arrangement is not arbitrary. There is some order to it (Lachmann 1956: xv).
The impossibility of aggregation
is a result of the fact that the value of any capital item was a matter of
speculation, a matter of individual, subjective expectation on the part of
its owner. Capital owners formed capital combinations in order to earn
profits. Capital combinations are part of production plans. Plans may succeed
or fail. It is only in the most unlikely situation of perfect plan
equilibrium, where all plans are consistent with one another, that all plans
can succeed. As Lachmann was to emphasize again and again, if different plans
were based on different expectations, as must be the case, for example,
between competitors, then at most one of the plans can succeed. Thus
individual capital valuations are always inconsistent to some extent and
cannot be used as the basis for deriving an aggregate measure of capital.
Nevertheless out of the market process there does emerge an order to the
capital stock which is traceable to these individual plans. The existence of
any capital item can only be understood in terms of the purposes for which it
was constructed, irrespective of whether the original plan of which it was a
part was successful or not. Unsuccessful plans lead to the revision of plans
and the employment of capital items (and labor) for purposes other than those
for which they were originally intended. But if we understand the plan and
its revision we will understand the role played by capital. An opera house
turned into a movie theater is a perfectly intelligible state of affairs
arising out of the market process.
Capital combinations
are composed of capital goods that serve complementary purposes, they help
jointly to fulfill a production plan. When the plan fails, in whole or in
part, substitutions must be made. Lachmann builds his theory of the capital
structure around the notions of complementarity, which is a phenomenon
of stability, and substitutability which is a phenomenon of change.
Unexpected change causes the entrepreneur to substitute one plan for another
and to reshuffle capital combinations. Lachmann calls this capital
regrouping. But while there is a consistent internal logic to the plans
of a single entrepreneur or single organization, there is no such consistent
logic to the relationship between the multitude of different plans that exist
in the economy as a whole. The market process, through the awarding of
profits and losses as determined by the consumers’ pattern of expenditures,
validates some plans and invalidates others. Only in retrospect, when we
resort to the writing of history in some form or another, is this seen as an
intelligible process. The market process as it unfolds is not intelligible to
any single human mind. If it were we wouldn’t need the market. And only if it
were would an aggregate capital stock have any meaning.
Thus, Böhm-Bawerk’s
story in which capital was a form of congealed time was seriously misleading.
Nevertheless Lachmann felt that Böhm-Bawerk was on to something when he
described the uniqueness of capitalistic economic progress in terms of the
productivity of roundabout production methods. So Lachmann attempted to
reinterpret Böhm-Bawerk’s assertion of the superior productivity of
roundabout methods in terms of the increasing complexity of modern economies.
Whereas Böhm-Bawerk’s treatment of the role of technological change was
rather ambiguous, Lachmann placed this at the center of any explanation of
economic development. According to Lachmann an outstanding feature of a
capitalist economy is the fact that it is confronted, one may almost say
bombarded, with change. The capitalistic era is the era of rapid and
accelerating change. This change is not accidental however; it is the result
of the superior ability of market economies to deal with change. Market
economies precipitate and benefit from unexpected change. The benefit arises
out of the experimental nature of the market process. The competitive process
is an experimental one at many different levels including the level of
technology. So technological change is not an autonomous, external force. It
is intrinsic to the market process and to economic development. The
increasing complexity that results, in which economic agents learn by a
process of implicit experimentation, is analogous to Böhm-Bawerk’s vision of
production becoming more and more roundabout as the economy develops.
This vision of
increasing complexity in a changing world, in which the capital structure was
in a process of unconscious but ceaseless mutation, was first presented by
Lachmann in a series of articles between 1938 and 1948. By the time he moved
to Johannesburg around 1949 the attention of the economics community was
moving away from interest in capital theory. He refined his argument and
published it in his first book, Capital and its Structure in 1956, by
which stage capital theory was quite passé. It must have been a considerable
disappointment to him to have the book roundly ignored. So it is not perhaps
surprising that he turned his efforts to an examination of the most
fundamental foundations of economic science, to a radical reexamination of
the way in which economic theory was developing. The rest of his professional
life was, for the most part, taken up with this project.
Lachmann as radical
subjectivist
The 1930’s was a time
of severe hardship and of resulting torment in the world of economic theory.
John Maynard Keynes mounted a massive and largely successful attack on the
established body of neoclassical economic theory which emphasized the self
adjusting nature of the market economy. Keynes suggested that the "dark
forces of time and ignorance" rendered the market unreliable if left to
itself and that the government should provide a firm and active backdrop to
private investment activity. Lachmann was led by his own work on capital to
emphatically condemn Keynes’s policy recommendations. It was not the size of
investment spending, but the nature of the capital combinations it created,
that mattered in the long run for employment. In this regard Keynes’s
policies were simple minded. Nevertheless, with regard to the influence of
the nature of time and uncertainty on economic events, Lachmann was much less
inclined to dismiss Keynes.
From Hayek he had
learned about the importance of subjectivism, the importance of the fact that
economic value was in the final analysis a matter of individual appraisal.
This idea, of the subjectivity of value, was the key contribution of the
Austrian School’s founder, Carl Menger. It is the basis of today’s economics
in which all value is ultimately traceable to the utility which the consumer
derives or expects to derive. The discovery of the subjectivity of value (in
1871 independently by Menger, Jevons and Walras) was a monumental advance
over the classical economics of Smith and Ricardo, and indeed over the embryo
economics of most of their predecessors. It was the unifying principle around
which all of modern economics could be built. Thus Lachmann is fond of
quoting Hayek’s remark that "every important advance in economic theory
during the last hundred years was a further step in the consistent
application of subjectivism" (Hayek 1955 p. 31, see Lachmann 1969,
p.155). Yet he felt that among economists in general, and even among Austrian
economists, the lessons of subjectivism were being lost. Having recognized
the implications of the subjectivity of value, economists, for the most part,
had chosen to ignore the subjectivity of expectations. It was this that he
thought was valuable in Keynes.
Though Hayek examined
expectations at length, he tended to take it for granted that the market
process was characterized by some sort of equilibrating tendency in which
expectations, and the plans to which they gave rise, were somehow rendered
more and more consistent. Lachmann’s consideration of the nature of
expectations led him to deny this. Expectations are bound to differ and
differences in expectations preclude the emergence of equilibrium. The reason
why expectations differ across individuals is because the future is unknown
and unknowable. To know the future we would have to know the actions of
individuals in the future. But all action is based on knowledge and
individuals’ future actions will be based on their future knowledge.
Therefore to have knowledge of the future we would have to have knowledge of
future knowledge, which is a contradiction in terms. In fact, according to
Lachmann, the nature of our experience of time is such that the pattern of
knowledge is continually changing. It is inconceivable that our knowledge
should be left unchanged with the elapse of time. Time and knowledge belong
together. I have called this Lachmann’s axiom
His work on knowledge
and expectations was very similar to that of his friend and colleague, also a
former Hayek student, George Shackle. It is clear that Lachmann’s work
predated Shackle’s, though their contributions moved very closely together
over a long period. Lachmann’s views were summarized concisely in a seminal
article he wrote for the Journal of Economic Literature published in 1976
entitled, "From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the
Kaleidic Society" (Lachmann 1976). The kaleidic society (Shackle’s term)
is one which is characterized by incessant and rapid change. And it is one in
which there is no necessary tendency toward equilibrium, toward a consistency
of production plans.
In a kaleidic society the equilibrating forces,
operating slowly, especially where much of the capital equipment is durable
and specific, are always overtaken by unexpected change before they have done
their work....What emerges from out reflections is an image of the market as
a particular kind of process, a continuous process without beginning or end,
propelled by the interaction between the forces of equilibrium and the forces
of change (Lachmann 1976: 61).
By denying the existing
of overriding equilibrating forces, Lachmann did not endear himself to his
colleagues. Equilibrium is the centerpiece of much economic reasoning.
Lachmann seemed to be pulling the rug out from under the economics
discipline. To the mainstream of economic thought he was considered largely
irrelevant while to some of his Austrian colleagues he seemed a dangerous
radical. The latter were concerned that his radical subjectivism was
subversive of the viability of the free market. As I have explained it was
not until his arrival on the scene in America and his participation in the
revival of Austrian economics that he began to attract a significant and
impressive following.
In the last years he
began to investigate the compatibility of his approach to the principles of
hermeneutics. There is a large and diverse literature on the application of
hermeneutics to the social sciences and a group of Lachmann’s followers have
seen in his work a reflection of its main implications. I personally
seriously doubt, however, that this will prove to be an enduring aspect of
his work. In this and many other respects the adherents to his general
position are still debating among themselves and with those who feel his
position is too extreme.
Assessment
In my continuing
reexamination of Lachmann’s work (for example, Lewin 1994, 1996, 1997) I have
wondered about its implications and what its enduring features will be. Its
seems to me that although he was uncompromising in his pursuit of the
implications of subjectivism, his work is in no way inimical to the defense
of free markets. Lachmann himself, though philosophically less committed than
his colleagues, Mises, Hayek or Kirzner, was, nevertheless, a defender of
free markets for practical reasons. He fully accepted Mises’s argument that
the market process could not be centrally planned and he was vehemently
against inflationary policies. The radical ignorance which the unknowability
of the future implies, applies as much to policy makers as to any one else,
in fact moreso. And in his work on institutions, which was the subject of his
second book, The Legacy of Max Weber, published in 1971, he explained
how the market as an institution, functions with other institutions, like the
legal framework, to cope with unexpected change. At the same time, I think it
is important to note Lachmann’s keen insight that the benefits of a market
economy depend on its ability to generate as well as cope with change. Far
from the market being threatened by the presence of unpredictable change and
the absence of equilibrating tendencies, it thrives on it. Change is rapid
and is accelerating in a way that Lachmann could never have foreseen when he
began his long walk along the slippery slopes of radical subjectivism.
Lachmann’s theoretical approach is quite at home in this ‘information age’.
In his analysis of the
implications of subjectivism, Lachmann uncompromisingly articulated what he
saw to be the differences between his vision of a progressive society and
that of the vast majority doing generally accepted economics. In the process
he may have appeared more radical than necessary. For example, he was fond of
claiming that ‘prediction is impossible’ when what he really meant was that
accurate prediction of everything was impossible. Surely it is impossible to
deny that prediction is not only possible but is necessary for our survival.
In numerous everyday actions and decisions we make successful predictions.
His articulations in terms of uncompromising absolutes sometimes gave the
impression that his ideas led to a sort of theoretical nihilism. I think that
this impression is wrong and his theories could certainly have used a fuller
fleshing out by way of applications and examples. But, even though this will
have to be left to others, Lachmann has clearly pointed the way.
In the final analysis,
if I were asked what I thought what was his most valuable legacy I would have
to answer, his principle of subjective individualism. By reminding us that
individuals are different and have different tastes and expectations, he has
reminded us not only to respect those differences in our everyday lives, but
also to respect them in our scientific investigations. For it is only by
acknowledging and referring to these differences that we will be able to
understand how the market process really works. Recent developments in the
mainstream of economics emphasizing the importance of technological change,
product innovation and similar phenomena, suggest that there is much work to
be done in extending the remarkable vision of Ludwig M. Lachmann.
References:
Böhm-Bawerk, E. von.
1959. [1884, 1889, 1921]. Capital and Interest. South Holland:
Libertarian Press.
Hayek, F. A., 1931. Prices
and Production London: Routledge (Second edition, 1935), reprinted New
York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1967.
________, 1937.
"Investment that raises the Demand for Capital," Review of
Economic Statistics November, reprinted in Hayek 1939, pp. 73-82.
________, 1939. Profit
Interest and Investment reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1969.
________, 1955. The
Counter Revolution of Science New York: Free Press.
Lachmann, L. M. 1956. Capital
and its Structure. Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel (second edition
1978).
________, 1969.
"Methodological Individualism and the Market Economy," in Roads
to Freedom: Essays in Honor of Friedrich A. Hayek, ed. Erich Streisler
et. al. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 88-104. Reprinted in Lachmann
1977, pp. 149-165.
________, 1971. The
Legacy of Max Weber Berkeley: The Glendessary Press.
________, 1976.
"From Mises to Shackle: An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic
Society," Journal of Economic Literature March, pp. 54-62.
________, 1977. W. E.
Grinder ed. Capital Expectations and the Market Process: Essays in the
Theory of the Market Economy. Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel.
________, 1994. Expectations
and The Meaning of Institutions: Essays in Economics by Ludwig Lachmann. Edited
by Don Lavoie.
Lavoie D. 1994.
"Introduction: Expectations and the Meaning of Institutions." In
Lachmann 1994: 1-19.
Lewin, P. 1994.
"Knowledge, Expectations and Capital: The Economics of Ludwig M.
Lachmann" Advances in Austrian Economics vol. 1, pp. 233-256.
________, 1996.
"Time Complexity and Change: Ludwig M. Lachmann’s Contributions to the
Theory of Capital" Advances in Austrian Economics vol. 3, pp.
107-165.
________, 1997.
"Capital in Disequilibrium: A Reexamination of the Capital Theory of
Ludwig M. Lachmann" History of Political Economy, Winter
(forthcoming).
Menger, C. 1871. Principles
of Economics, translated by James Dingwall and Bert F. Hoselitz. New
York: New York University Press, 1976.
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