Common Identity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: An Experimental Investigation

By Sherry Xin Li, Angela C. M. de Oliveira and Catherine Eckel*

We conduct a framed field experiment in two Dallas neighborhoods to examine how common identity affects individual contributions to local public goods. The participants’ common identity is primed to make neighborhood membership salient before individuals make donations to local non-profit organizations. We find that the effect of the identity prime is sensitive to community context, increasing the likelihood of giving in the mid-income neighborhood, but decreasing giving in the poor neighborhood. The impact is statistically significant for women, but not for men, and is partially mediated by individuals’ beliefs about whether others in their neighborhoods give. (JEL codes: H2, D64, C91)

* Li: School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, GR31, 800 W. Campbell Rd. Richardson, TX 75080, Phone: 972-883-4987, (email: sherry.xin.li@utdallas.edu); de Oliveira: School of Behavioral Sciences, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 203 Stockbridge Hall, 80 Campus Center Way, Amherst, MA 01060, Phone: 413-545-5716, (email: adeolive@resecon.umass.edu); Eckel: Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, 4228 TAMU, College Station, TX 77845-4228, Phone: 979-845-8506, (email: ceckel@tamu.edu). We would like to thank Rachel Croson, Tammy Leonard, and Cathleen Johnson for assistance in design and implementation. In addition, we would like to thank seminar participants at the University of Texas at Dallas, Southern Methodist University, and conference participants at the ESA North American meetings. Funding was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-0752855, SES-0827350) and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Any errors remain our own.
Since Akerlof and Kranton (2000) first incorporated the concept of social identity into economic modeling, a growing volume of empirical and experimental research has investigated the impact of identity on behavior. This research has focused primarily either on artificially-created group identity in the laboratory (Eckel and Grossman 2005; Chen and Li 2009; Chen and Chen 2011), or on naturally-occurring aspects of identity; the latter can be further distinguished by whether identity is static – that is, tied to individual characteristics such as race (Benjamin, Choi and Strickland, 2010), gender (Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini 2007) and caste (Hoff and Pandey 2006) or changeable, as is the case with membership in social groups. While considerable research has addressed artificially-induced or fixed identity, less attention has been given to the class of naturally existing identities associated with social groups such as corporations, churches or communities. Different from race, gender and caste groups, these social groups exist in large numbers in society, and their cultures and norms are more fluid and dynamic.

Within a group, cooperation can be promoted and the free rider problem mitigated by reinforcing a common identity. In corporations, for example, various team-building exercises are used to create a common identity among employees from different backgrounds, to promote more effective teamwork and higher overall productivity (e.g. Ball 1999). In religious environments strong group identity may lead to greater participation in religious activities and greater adherence to religious prescriptions in day-to-day life. For example, strong religious identity increases Protestants’ contributions to public goods (Benjamin, Choi and Fisher 2012).\(^1\)

\(^1\) Even without self-selection of members, social groups can increase cooperation: for example, in a study using Swiss Army officer trainees, Goette, Hoffman and Meier (2006) show that random assignment significantly increases willingness to cooperate with fellow platoon members.
carry positive connotations. Morale may be depressed after layoffs, and clashes of corporate cultures may make mergers ineffective (as demonstrated by Weber and Camerer 2003). Changes in religious leadership or changes in how services are conducted may alienate portions of the faithful. Communities may be high in crime or gang activity, alienating some group members. Sometimes individuals may choose to withdraw from these groups or communities, but in many cases they may have few alternatives. In poor economic conditions it is difficult to change jobs; family and social networks make it costly to change religious organizations; and those in unsavory neighborhoods may not have the resources necessary to move. Our society comprises many of these social groups, and their associated common identities carry widely different connotations. Moreover, the impact of negative connotations on individual economic decisions is understudied in the literature (with few exceptions such as Benjamin, Choi and Fisher 2012). Our study fills in this gap.

Specifically, we investigate whether and how common community identity (being a member of their neighborhood) influences individual contributions to local charitable organizations that serve their communities. We focus on two neighborhoods in Dallas, TX: Fair Park, a low-income, predominantly African-American neighbourhood, and East Plano, a middle-income neighbourhood with a more mixed ethnic representation. In each neighbourhood, we randomly select about half of our participants and introduce a common identity prime, a method widely used in psychology, which enhances the salience of these local residents’ shared community identity. We then compare their choices in a series of real donation experiments with those in the control treatment from the same neighborhood. We study how the salience of common identity affects contributions to local public goods and how this effect may depend upon the social image associated with the community identity of that neighborhood.

We find that women’s likelihood of contributing to local public goods is
significantly influenced by the community prime, but that the direction of the impact is sensitive to the community context. In particular, we demonstrate that when the primed common identity has positive connotations (confirmed via surveys), the likelihood of giving is increased compared to the control treatment, which is consistent with much of the previous literature (reviewed in section I). However, if the primed common identity has negative connotations, the likelihood of contributing decreases compared to the control treatment.

This study extends the literature by illustrating how common identity works in different social environments, presenting a direct contrast between one community with positive connotations (an up-and-coming middle-income community) and another with negative connotations (a struggling lower-income community). Compared to other studies in economics and psychology which highlight the positive influence of common identity, this study provides a more balanced and comprehensive perspective to understanding the influence of common identity. It also underscores the importance of understanding the broader context before implementing a policy to enhance common identity in organizations or communities.

As part of a large-scale field study, we (and others) have examined several aspects of giving in the Fair Park community, including: the prevalence of an underlying giving type (de Oliveira, Croson and Eckel 2011); the stability of giving across charitable domains (de Oliveira, Eckel and Croson 2012); the role that social capital and social networks play in voluntary contributions (Leonard, Croson and de Oliveira 2010); and investigate the impact of self-reported identity and social exclusion on contributions to local public goods among Hispanic participants (Candelo-Londono, Croson and Li 2013). In contrast to these studies, this paper examines the impact of common community identity when it is made salient through experimental manipulation. We focus on heterogeneous effects by gender. Importantly, we identify social image as an important determinant of how...
the community identity may influence individuals’ willingness to give.

We now turn to a discussion of the previous literature in Section I. Section II introduces a theoretical framework to demonstrate how the identity prime and beliefs may affect behavior. Section III presents the experimental design. Section IV presents data analysis and the results. Section V summarizes the results and concludes with an emphasis on the implications of how a common social identity can be leveraged to increase the voluntary provision of public goods.

I. Literature

While a number of common identities exist and significantly impact economic behavior, the full literature, intersecting economics and psychology, is too vast to survey here. We therefore focus on the subset of the literature related to how common identity – being part of a community – may affect an individual’s contributions to local charitable organizations. Broadly, we address charitable and public goods contributions, specifically focusing on the role of shared social identity on decisions in social dilemma situations.

A number of factors have been shown to impact voluntary contributions to individuals or organizations, or to the provision of public goods. Giving in these settings is partially determined by strategic considerations or monetary incentives (e.g., List and Lucking-Reiley 2002; Eckel and Grossman 2003; Karlan and List 2007 and many of the papers reviewed in Ledyard 1995). In addition several non-pecuniary factors also have been shown to influence giving, including: beliefs about others’ giving (e.g., de Oliveira, Eckel and Croson, 2012; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010; Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram 1996), social preferences or value orientations (e.g., de Oliveira, Croson and Eckel 2013; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010; Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram 1996), social information (Croson and Shang 2008; Frey and Meier 2004; Shang and Croson 2009; Chen,
Harper, Kanstan and Li 2010), and selection of group members (e.g., Page, Puterman and Unel 2005). Chaudhuri (2011) surveys many of these issues in laboratory public goods experiments post-Ledyard (1995).

In psychology, social identity theory was developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) to understand the psychological basis for intergroup discrimination (also see reviews in Brewer, 1991). More recent studies show that activating the salience of shared common social identity among individuals can reduce intergroup bias (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2009), increase cooperative behavior in prisoner’s dilemma games (e.g., Dion 1973; Miller, Downs, and Prentice 1998) and public goods games (e.g., de Cremer and van Vugt 1999; Wit and Kerr 2002; Buchan, Brewer, Grimalda, Wilson, Fatas and Foddy 2011). Levels of cooperation are significantly higher when a shared group identity is made salient than when there is no shared identity.

In economics studies find that a shared group identity increases cooperation in public goods games (Eckel and Grossman 2005) and prisoner’s dilemma games (Goette, Huffman and Meier 2006), even though the dominant strategy is to free ride or to defect. A shared group identity also improves coordination in the battle of sexes game (Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini 2007), and the minimum-effort game (Chen and Chen 2011), suggesting that a salient common identity leads to the selection of a more efficient equilibrium.

One’s social identity is multi-dimensional, and is attached to a whole host of associated traits, stereotypes, social expectations and schemas (Deaux 1996). Therefore, to study the impact of a specific aspect of social identity, a method called priming is commonly used in social psychology to expose participants to certain stimuli (called “primes” which can be text, image or audio) in order to exogenously and temporarily activate the social knowledge structures associated with the identity of research interest (Bargh 2006). Studies show that priming social identities may temporarily induce study participants to act consistently with
the stereotypes associated with the primed identity. For example, Shih, Pittinsky and Ambady (1999), Asian-American female students perform better on a mathematics test when their ethnic identity is primed, but perform worse when their gender identity is primed, consistent with stereotypes that women have inferior and Asians superior quantitative skills. Further, they show that the impact of identity priming exhibits the reverse pattern for Asian American female students in a verbal test, which is again consistent with stereotypes that women are verbally talented while Asians are not. Further, priming may activate intergroup bias (e.g. Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman and Tyler 1990).  

Priming techniques have been adopted in economics research to study how institutionally-imposed identities (e.g., caste identity in Hoff and Pandey 2006, and migrant identity in Afridi, Li and Ren 2013) influence individual responses to incentives under different payment regimes, how race and gender identities affect time and risk preferences (Benjamin, Choi and Strickland 2010). Additional studies have focused on how religious identity affects economic decisions such as contribution to public goods, financial risk taking and capital accumulation (Benjamin, Choi and Fisher 2012), and how race and organizational identities affect cooperation and coordination (Chen, Li, Liu and Shih 2013).

II. Incorporating Priming into an Economic Framework

We now turn to the theoretical framework, which extends the model of Benjamin, Choi and Strickland (2010, henceforth BCS), and which in turn builds on Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Following BCS, we consider the identity prime as a temporary, exogenous perturbation of the strength of one’s identity. Our framework departs from BCS in two aspects. First, instead of assuming, as in BCS, that a category prime increases the strength of an individual’s identification,

---

our model allows the change of identity strength to be contingent upon identity membership esteem associated with the social identity to be made salient (Tajfel and Turner 1986, Snyder, Lassegard and Ford 1986, Luhtanen and Crocker 1992, Shang, Reed and Croson 2008; discussions are deferred below when we introduce the model). Our model also departs from BCS by incorporating conditional cooperation to allow the collective identity prime to influence decision making through its impact on beliefs about others’ choices (see Chaudhuri 2011 for a survey of conditional cooperation in public goods provision in the lab).

Using BCS’s notation, let \( C \) denote a social category, \( s \) the strength of the individual’s identification with \( C \), and \( x \) the individual’s action, e.g., voluntary contribution to a local public good. Let \( x_0 \) be the utility-maximizing choice in the absence of identity considerations, and \( x_C \) the social norm prescribed for the members of social category \( C \). Since the BCS model considers individuals trying to minimize the negative impact of deviating both from their own preferred choice and from the social norm, the individual’s decision in the presence of identity considerations is to choose \( x \) to minimize her disutility, which is now the weighted average of disutility due to deviations from \( x_0 \) and \( x_C \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Max } U &= -(1 - w(b(s), s))(x - x_0)^2 - w(b(s), s)(x - x_C)^2 \\
(1)
\end{align*}
\]

The term \( w(b(s), s) \) is the weight placed on social norm. It depends on the individual’s belief \( b(\cdot) \) about how closely others’ behavior follows the social norm \( x_C \), and her own strength of identification \( s \) with \( C \). We assume \( s \) affects \( w \) both directly and indirectly through beliefs. Specifically, we introduce the following assumptions. First, an individual’s belief that others follow the social norm \( x_C \) will (weakly) increase the weight she assigns to the norm prescribed behavior \( x_C \), i.e.,

\[
\frac{\partial w}{\partial b} \geq 0.
\]

Second, the stronger her identification is with \( C \), the higher the weight \( w \),
i.e., \( \frac{\partial w}{\partial s} \geq 0 \). Third, an increase in her strength of identification may increase her belief that others will follow the norm-prescribed behavior \( x_C \) (i.e., \( b'(s) \geq 0 \)), since she may believe that others like herself strongly identify with \( C \) as well (Ross, Greene and House 1977). Lastly, failure to believe that others act in the way prescribed by the norm, or failure to identify with \( C \), will result in a zero weight on \( x_C \), i.e., \( w(0,0) = w(0,0) = 0 \).

The first order condition produces the following condition:

\[
(2) \quad x^*(s) = (1 - w(b(s), s))x_0 + w(b(s), s)x_C
\]

I.e., \( x^* \) is a weighted average of the preferred action in the absence of identity considerations and the norm-prescribed action for the social category \( C \). The logistic model for the likelihood of contributing is given by:

\[
(3) \quad \text{Prob}(x^*(s) > 0) = \frac{e^{x^*(s)}}{1 + e^{x^*(s)}}
\]

In BCS an identity prime (denoted by \( \epsilon \)) is modeled as a temporary perturbation of identity strength (i.e., \( s' = s + \epsilon \)), and it is assumed that \( \epsilon > 0 \). Our model extends BCS by considering two social categories \( C = \{ \text{High}, \text{Low} \} \) in a hierarchical society, where the \( H \) category has high status and social identity esteem, while the \( L \) category has low status and social identity esteem. This extension incorporates both positive and negative identity posited by Tajfel and Turner (1986) in social identity theory. They argue that collective identity may be positive or negative according to the evaluations of one’s social groups – a concept that is later formalized as collective identity esteem in Luhtanen and Crocker (1992).² Tajfel and Turner (1986) also outline strategies that individuals

³ Collective identity esteem is defined as “individual’s judgment of how good or worthy they are as members of their social groups” (Luhtanen and Crocker 1992, p. 305).
use to protect their social identities, such as social competition (through which group members try to enhance their position in the society) and individual mobility (i.e., individuals with negative social identity may leave or dissociate themselves from a social group).

To differentiate the asymmetric impact of positive vs. negative identity primes, our model allows the sign of $\varepsilon_C$ to depend on $C$: a category prime increases the identity strength $s$ for $H$ but decreases $s$ for $L$, i.e., $s' = s + \varepsilon_C$ where $\varepsilon_H > 0$ and $\varepsilon_L < 0$. These assumptions are consistent with early findings in the social psychology literature. For example, Snyder, Lassegard and Ford (1986) show in a lab experiment that, compared to those who are given no feedback, participants are more inclined to associate with their group after being told that their group has succeeded in a group task (i.e., a “basking in reflected glory” phenomenon); they are more prone to distance themselves from their group after being told that their group has failed (i.e., a “cutting off reflected failure” phenomenon).

The comparative statics of Equations (2) and (3) then become:

\begin{align}
\Delta x^* &= x^*(s'_i) - x^*(s_i) \\
&= \frac{\partial w}{\partial b} \cdot b'(s)(x_c - x_o)\varepsilon_c + \frac{\partial w}{\partial s} \cdot (x_c - x_o)\varepsilon_c
\end{align}

\begin{align}
\Delta \text{Prob}(x^*(s_i) > 0) &= \frac{\Delta x^*}{2 + e^{x^*(s)} + e^{-x^*(s)}}
\end{align}

Equations (4) and (5) indicate that the prime may affect the contribution level $x^*$ and the likelihood of contributing $\text{Prob}(x^*(s_i) > 0)$ directly (represented by the second term), and indirectly through its impact on beliefs (represented by the first term). For pro-social behaviors such as voluntary contributions to local public goods, it is reasonable to assume $x_c \geq x_o$; The behavior prescribed by the social norm $x_c$ does not fall below the private-utility-maximizing level $x_o$. Therefore, if...
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial w}{\partial b} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial w}{\partial s} > 0 \text{ and } b'(s) > 0, \text{ then } \Delta x^* \text{ and } \Delta \text{Prob}(x^*(s_i) > 0) \text{ as the result of the category prime depends on the sign of } \varepsilon_c. \text{ If the primed social category is associated with high social esteem } (C = H \text{ and } \varepsilon_H > 0) \text{ then } x^* \text{ increases. If it is associated with low social esteem } (C = L \text{ and } \varepsilon_L < 0), \text{ then } x^* \text{ decreases, as the individual moves to distance herself from the low-esteeem behavior. A special case may exist in which } x^* \text{ does not respond to the category prime. Equation (3) shows that } \Delta x^* \text{ is zero if } \frac{\partial w}{\partial b} \text{ (or } b'(s) \text{) and } \frac{\partial w}{\partial s} \text{ are zero.}
\end{align*}

III. Design and Implementation

The experiment was conducted in two neighborhoods in the Dallas, TX, metroplex: one in the Fair Park neighborhood in South Dallas in June 2007; and the other in East Plano in June-August 2008. Fair Park is a low-income urban neighborhood, which has long been home to a largely African American community. East Plano is a mid-income suburban area with diverse ethnic groups in north Dallas. The median per capita income in the Fair Park neighborhood is approximately $10,700 and median household income is approximately $19,600 (Williams Institute, 2006), compared to $23,040 and $54,000 in East Plano.

Participants were recruited via flyers distributed to homes and local stores. Half of the sessions were randomly selected to receive the control treatment, and the other half were selected to receive the identity treatment in which participants’ identity as part of the neighborhood was made salient. In both treatments, participants worked through an activity booklet containing a number of incentivized tasks including elicitations of risk and time preferences, a laboratory public goods game (VCM), and three versions of a charity donation game.

Common Identity Priming. We implemented a between-subject design within
each neighborhood. The identity manipulation consisted of a short questionnaire (which we term the “Community Connection Questionnaire”) that was designed to make participants’ common identity salient.\(^4\) In the identity treatment participants completed the questionnaire after the risk and time preferences task and before starting the VCM and donation games. The questionnaire began with a paragraph that stated the shared commonality of the lives of residents in their neighborhood, and was read aloud to the participants. It read, “In the South Dallas/Fair Park (or East Plano) area, people come from many different places. However, you have all chosen to live in the South Dallas/Fair Park (East Plano) neighborhood. As members of the same neighborhood, you share many public facilities: for example, parks, schools, public libraries, museums, roads, public transportation, local stores, and many others. These questions are about how strongly you identify with being a resident of the South Dallas/Fair Park (East Plano) area.” Participants then answered questions individually and in private about how long they had lived in the area, and how strongly they identified themselves as residents of the neighborhood. They were also asked to rate nine statements on a 1-5 scale about their experience in local activities, interactions with other residents, personal attachment, sense of belonging, and pride in being part of their community.

In the control treatment the questionnaire was administered at the end of the experiment, after all decisions were made. By comparing the identity treatment with the control treatment, we study whether and to what extent making the common identity salient influences participants’ contributions to local charities. A sample questionnaire is included in the online Appendix A with accompanying descriptive statistics in the online Appendix B.

\textit{Incentivized Tasks.} In the VCM, participants were randomly assigned into

\(^4\) The questionnaire was inspired by the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM, Phinney 1992), but was adapted by the researchers to focus on community characteristics rather than characteristics of an ethnic group.
anonymous groups of three, and each individual was given an endowment of $60. They were told that they each could allocate their endowment between their individual account (called their “wallet”) and a group account. To avoid confusion, we described participants’ decisions as choosing how much they wanted to “put in their wallet” and how much they wanted to “put in the group account,” rather than using the more abstract language such as “allocate.”

To accommodate the low-education and low-literacy participants in the Fair Park study, all tasks were presented in pictorial form with minimal text in both experiments. Specifically, participants were given four discrete options. They could choose to: (1) keep all $60 in their wallet, (2) keep $40 and put $20 in the group account, (3) keep $20 and put $40 in the group account, or (4) put all $60 in the group account. This allowed us to depict the choices in $20 bills since we displayed the games and decision forms in a visual manner. (We intentionally excluded the option to contribute half of the endowment; this design moves people away from the focal 50/50 split, minimizing the effect of the focal point on decisions.) Money in the individual account was kept by the individual. Money placed in the group account was doubled by the experimenter, and then split evenly between all group members.

For the local charity donation game, the same protocol was followed, except that money placed in the group account was doubled and then donated to a specified organization providing public goods for their neighborhood.

In the Fair Park neighborhood, the three organizations were the Martin Luther King, Jr. Family Clinic (health services), the Dallas Bethlehem Center (educational services for children), and the Inner-City Community Development Corporation (job training services). In the East Plano neighborhood, the three organizations were the Collin County Adult Clinic (medical care for adult residents who have no access to traditional health insurance), Head Start (educational services to preschool children from low-income families), and
Practical Parenting Education (professional training to parent educators). Every effort was made to match the organizations as closely as possible across neighborhoods. An information sheet was provided to the participants on the organizations (see online Appendix C). Experimental instructions are available in online Appendix D.

Each subject made three separate allocation decisions, one for each of the organizations; the order of decisions was randomized. Beliefs about others’ contributions were elicited after the donation decisions were made. Individuals were asked how much they thought each of the other two individuals in their group contributed to the group account in each of the activities, thereby measuring both the average belief and the distribution of beliefs.

Before the donation games (and before the identity prime), each subject was asked to make decisions in a risk task and a series of time preference tasks. Risk preferences were elicited using a simple gamble-choice task (Eckel and Grossman 2008). In the time preference task, subjects made a sequence of choices between a smaller amount sooner and a larger amount later.\(^5\) The number of patient choices, i.e., choices of larger amount at a later time, is used to proxy patience in the empirical analysis below.

At the end of the study, a survey was given to collect demographic information. One of the six incentivized tasks (including the risk, time preferences tasks, the laboratory VCM, and the three donations decisions) was selected for payment for all participants, so at most one of the donations was implemented. If selected, a check was made out payable to the organization, sealed in a stamped and pre-addressed envelope in front of the participants and mailed later.

*Participants.* There were 190 participants in the Fair Park sample (69 women

\(^5\) In the risk task, participants choose which of the six 50/50 gambles ($80/$80, $60/$120, $40/$160, $20/$200, $0/$240, and -$20/$260) to play. The time-preference choices were $64 tomorrow vs. $68 in one (or five) month; $60 tomorrow vs. $61 ($62, $64, $66, $68) in one month; $60 tomorrow vs. $65 ($70, $80, $90, $100) in five months. In the VCM task, the amount contributed to the group account is divided equally among the three participants in the group.
and 33 men in the control; 47 women and 41 men in the treatment), and 97 participants in East Plano (33 women and 16 men in the control; 31 women and 17 men in the treatment).

Sessions lasted on average two hours, and participants were paid a $20 show-up fee plus their earnings from the incentivized tasks. Total average earnings were $79 in Fair Park and $70 in East Plano.

Table 1 reports participant demographics. On average subjects are in their early 40s. Many have children, and are the main wage-earner in their households. Participants in Fair Park are almost all African American, with low levels of income and other financial assets. In East Plano participants are more ethnically diverse, with 57 percent of Hispanics, 27 percent of blacks, and 12 percent of Caucasians. The proportion of participants who were born locally is significantly higher in Fair Park (61 percent born in Dallas; 82 percent born in Texas) than in East Plano (18 percent born in Dallas; 31 percent born in Texas) ($p < 0.01$ in both cases, 2-sided test of proportions). Participants in Fair Park have lived in the community for 17.7 years, significantly higher than 11.4 years by those in East Plano ($p < 0.01$, 2-sided t test of means).

Note that we randomly assigned experimental sessions (rather than individual participants) to the two treatments to ease logistical difficulties. However, significant differences were found in the number of children per family in Fair Park, the number of years of residence and one identity item in East Plano ($p < 0.05$). No systematic differences \textit{a priori} were found otherwise across the two treatments in other aspects of participants’ demographics and their connections to neighborhoods, which implied successful randomization of participants between treatments \textit{ex post}.

---

6 One participant in East Plano did not report gender, and hence is excluded from the analysis.

7 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests are used to test the differences in the responses to the Community Connection questions across the two treatments. A significant difference was found for item B “I am active in organizations or social groups that include mostly residents of [the neighborhood]” in the questionnaire across the two treatments.
In the online appendix (Table B1) we present summary statistics for all items in the Community Connection Questionnaire, which were asked before the incentivized tasks in the identity treatment and after the tasks in the control. We highlight the key findings here. Responses to the questions regarding happiness, sense of belonging, pride, and feeling good about being a member of the neighborhood show significantly more positive attitudes towards their neighborhood among the East Plano than the Fair Park participants \((p < 0.01\) for happiness, sense of belongings, and feeling good, two-sided t test of means; \(p < 0.05\) for sense of belonging after we control for the number of years of residence in the areas). This suggests that East Plano residents have substantially higher social esteem than those in Fair Park, despite the fact that the former engaged in daily activities in their neighborhood as often as the latter. This study takes advantage of these pre-existing differences in social esteem across the two neighborhoods to examine how priming a common identity affects contributions to local public goods. The theoretical framework in section II suggests that priming community identity is likely to trigger a positive self-image among East Plano participants who have high self-esteem, and a negative self-image among Fair Park participants who have low self-esteem. Therefore, we hypothesize that individual contributions to local public goods, i.e., \(x\), will increase (or decrease) in response to the identity prime in East Plano (Fair Park). These hypotheses also apply to an individual’s willingness to contribute.

IV. Results

While the focus of this paper is on the impact of the identity prime on the donation game contributions, a few comments about the VCM are in order. First, behavior in the VCM is within the general bounds for a one-shot game (full details about the game can be found in de Oliveira, Croson and Eckel 2011 and de
Oliveira, Eckel and Croson 2012). Across communities, there are differences in the likelihood of contributing but not differences in the amount contributed conditional on giving (de Oliveira, Eckel and Croson 2010). Most relevant for the present discussion, we do not find any impact of the identity prime on behavior in the VCM, indicating that the prime does not impact general giving preferences or cooperativeness.

We analyze the effect of priming an individual’s connection to the neighborhood on giving to local public goods. We discuss the results for men and women separately due to the heterogeneous impact of the prime across gender. The action choice we focus on, or $x$ in the theoretical section, is the decision of whether or not to contribute to the public good. The analysis considers specifically the likelihood of donating, since we find that the primary impact of the prime is on the probability of giving rather than the amount given.  

Descriptive statistics and results based on aggregate data are presented first, followed by regression analysis using individual data.

Figure 1 presents the likelihood of contributing by category and gender. We find that the identity prime affects women’s likelihood of giving in the same pattern across categories within each neighborhood, but the impact is in the opposite direction across neighborhoods. The common identity prime decreases women’s likelihood of contributing in Fair Park, and increases the likelihood of giving in East Plano, though not always significantly so (Fair Park, $p < 0.05$ for Health and Children, $p < 0.01$ for Job Training, and $p > 0.10$ VCM, one-sided test of proportions; East Plano, $p < 0.05$ for Children and Parental Education, $p > 0.10$

---

8 This is consistent with other work on charitable giving where treatments affect the extensive margin (bringing in new donors), but not the intensive margin (how much a set of donors are giving - e.g., Kessler, 2011), as well as theoretical results indicating that variables can impact the two margins in different manners (e.g., Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986). In this study the impact of the identity prime on the amount given is directionally consistent but not statistically significant in most cases. The identity prime insignificantly increases (decreases) average contributions and the likelihood of contributing in East Plano (Fair Park). Online/Referees’ Appendix Figures 1 and 2 report average contributions and the likelihood of contributing by category, pooling data for men and women, while Appendix Figure 3 presents contribution histograms by category for each neighborhood, pooling data for men and women.
for Health and VCM).\(^9\) In contrast, the prime does not significantly influence men’s likelihood of giving \((p > 0.10)\) in either neighborhood.

Figure 2 presents histograms of the number of charities to which participants contribute. Among women participants in Fair Park, the fraction who contribute to none of the charities increases significantly from 0.23 to 0.40 \((p = 0.047,\) two-side test of proportions) when primed, and the fraction who contribute to all three charities drops sharply from 0.62 to 0.40 \((p = 0.020)\). Among women participants in East Plano, the fraction who contribute to all charities increases from 0.61 to 0.81 \((p = 0.057)\). Overall, the identity prime leads to a leftward shift of the histogram in Fair Park \((p = 0.02,\) two-side Wilcoxon rank-sum test), and a rightward shift of the histogram in East Plano \((p = 0.06)\). In contrast, the distribution changes very little for men in the two neighborhoods \((p > 0.10)\).

The aggregate results in Figures 1 and 2 show that the identity priming encourages (discourages) giving among women in East Plano (Fair Park), but does not affect men’s contribution decisions. On average, women in Fair Park made contributions to 2.1 charities in the control and to 1.5 in the treatment; women in East Plano made contributions to 2.1 charities in the control, compared to 2.6 in the treatment. The number of charities that men contributed to is similar across treatments: 1.8 in the control and 1.6 in the treatment in Fair Park, 2.2 in the control and 2.1 in the treatment in East Plano. This is consistent with the proposition that women are more affected by context than men, as argued by Croson and Gneezy (2009). To further investigate this proposition, we next examine one potential mechanism through which the prime might affect giving: beliefs about the contributions of others. In particular, we investigate the (differential) impact of the common identity prime on beliefs by women and men.

Recall that participants were randomly assigned to groups of 3 in the VCM and

\(^9\) The increase in the proportion of participants giving zero is larger in the three donation games than in the VCM \((p = 0.3\) for VCM, \(p = 0.04\) for Health, \(p = 0.03\) for Children, \(p = 0.01\) for Job Training, one-tailed test, in Fair Park).
donations experiments. All participants were asked about their beliefs about the contribution levels of the two other participants in their group. This design allows us to contrast the distribution of participants’ beliefs across treatments and to study how the distribution is affected by the identity prime. For each charity, there are three possible cases: some participants believe none, one, or both others in their group donate to charity. We pool the data for the three charities and present the histograms of participants’ beliefs about others’ choices in Figure 3. The figures show a leftward shift of the beliefs for women in Fair Park ($p < 0.01$, Wilcoxon rank-sum test) and a rightward shift for women in East Plano ($p < 0.01$) as a result of the identity prime. Although the distribution of beliefs by women is quite similar across the two neighborhoods in the control condition, when identity is primed women in the poor (mid-income) neighborhood are significantly less (more) likely to believe that others are contributing to local charities. Their belief that both other participants in the group will donate decreases from 69% to 53% in Fair Park, and increases from 67% to 85% in East Plano. The identity prime does not affect men’s beliefs in either neighborhood ($p > 0.10$).

We further use an ordered logit regression model to quantify the impact of the identity prime on participants’ belief. The dependent variable in Table 2, $belief$, is a categorical variable coded as 1 if a subject believes that neither of the other participants contributes to a charity, 2 if s/he believes that only one other participant contributes, and 3 if s/he believes that the other participants both contribute. It is regressed against the identity treatment variable and charity fixed effects. Table 2 reports the marginal effects of the identity prime on each categorical value of the $belief$ variable. Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered on the individual level, and estimates of charity fixed effects are suppressed. Consistent with Figure 3, we find that in both neighborhoods the

---

10 The pattern of the histograms is similar for each charity.
identity prime affects women’s belief substantially, but has little impact on men’s. In Fair Park, the identity prime reduces women’s belief that both other participants will contribute to a charity by 14.6% ($p < 0.10$); it increases the likelihood that they believe only one or neither of the other participants will contribute by 1.8% ($p < 0.05$) and 12.8% ($p < 0.10$), respectively.

The impact of the prime is reversed in East Plano. There women are significantly more likely to believe that both other participants will give to charity (the likelihood increases by 17.3%, $p < 0.05$), and significantly less likely to believe that none of the others will give (the likelihood falls by 11.6%, $p < 0.01$). In contrast, men’s beliefs are not influenced by the identity prime. This leads to Result 1.

**Result 1:** When common identity is primed, women are significantly more (less) likely to believe that others will donate to charity in the mid-income (poor) neighborhood. But priming does not affect men’s beliefs.

We next investigate the impact of the identity prime on the likelihood of giving, and how the effect of the prime operates through its impact on individuals’ beliefs. Tables 3 and 4 report the results of a logit model with the dependent variable coded as ‘1’ if the participant contributes to the charity, and ‘0’ otherwise for Fair Park and East Plano respectively. The independent variable of primary interest is “identity treatment”. Recall the belief variable is coded as 1, 2 or 3 if the subject believes none, only one or both other participants will contribute to a charity. The patience variable is the number of patient choices in the time-preference tasks.\(^\text{11}\) We also control for charity fixed effects, with the health charity (the Martin Luther King Jr. Family Clinic in Fair Park and the Collin County Adult Clinic in East Plano) in the omitted category. Standard errors, given in parentheses, are clustered on the individual level. Marginal effects are reported.

\(^\text{11}\) Excluding the Patience variable does not change the estimates of other variables.
For each neighborhood, the first four columns present the results by gender, which are consistent with the pooled results in the next two columns. To study how the identity prime affects behavior through beliefs, we compare results of models with and without including the belief variable.

Tables 3 and 4 show that if belief is not included, the identity prime decreases the likelihood of giving to charity by women by 22.1% \((p < 0.01)\) in Fair Park, but increases the likelihood of giving by 15.3% \((p < 0.05)\) in East Plano. The belief variable significantly affects the likelihood of giving. The marginal effect of belief is 0.203 and 0.194 \((p < 0.01)\) in the two neighborhoods, respectively, indicating that one is more likely to give when she believes other participants in their neighborhoods will give, and suggesting that these participants are by and large conditionally cooperative in making decisions (Chaudhuri 2011). The results also show that including belief in the analysis reduces the direct impact of the identity prime on the likelihood of giving by women from 22.1% \((p < 0.01, \text{column 1})\) to 14.9% \((p < 0.05, \text{column 2})\) in Fair Park, and from 15.3% \((p < 0.05, \text{column 7})\) to 8.8% \((p < 0.10, \text{column 8})\) in East Plano. These results, combined with Result 1, imply that the identity prime affects women’s choice of whether to contribute at least partially through its influence on their beliefs about the behavior of others in their neighborhoods.

For men, beliefs affect behavior similarly: the impact of belief is 20.3% and 22.8% for women and men in Fair Park, 19.4% and 22.9% in East Plano. In addition, belief helps explain 20~30% of the variation in choices about whether to contribute, suggesting that men also act in a conditionally-cooperative manner. However, the identity prime does not have a direct effect on men’s choices to contribute in the two neighborhoods \((p > 0.10)\). Including or excluding controls for belief makes no difference. This finding, along with Result 1, shows that the identity prime has no significant effect on either men’s behavior or beliefs, in a dramatic contrast to the impact for women. The pooled results in columns 5-6 and
11-12 are consistent with the results separated by gender. In Fair Park, the overall marginal effect of the identity prime on the likelihood of giving is -0.157 ($p < 0.05$) and -0.124 ($p < 0.05$) across gender before and after controlling for belief; in East Plano it is 0.074 ($p > 0.10$) in either case.\textsuperscript{12}

Individual time preference also is significantly related to the likelihood of giving. A higher number of patient choices in the time preference elicitation task is associated with a greater likelihood of contributing to local charities ($p < 0.05$ except for men in East Plano). This can be interpreted to mean that patient individuals view their contributions as investments in their neighborhood’s future and hence are more willing to donate. Findings in Tables 3 and 4 thus lead to Results 2 and 3.

\textit{Result 2. The impact of the common identity prime on the likelihood of contributing to local public goods is significant for women and insignificant for men in both neighborhoods. It increases (decreases) women’s likelihood of giving in the mid-income (poor) neighborhood.}

\textit{Result 3. The impact of the common identity prime on women’s donation choices is partially transmitted through its influence on their beliefs about others’ contributions in their neighborhoods.}

Why does the common identity prime have such different effects across neighborhoods? We believe that reminding participants that they are part of their neighborhood may remind them of their perceptions and experiences living in their neighborhood, and in turn trigger the changes in behavior. Some evidence supporting this conjecture comes from data collected from the post-experiment survey. In the survey, participants were asked about how much they trust people from their neighborhoods, how fair or helpful they think people from their neighborhoods are, whether they have ever been a victim of any violent incident

\textsuperscript{12} The aggregate effect of identity prime depends on the gender composition. In our experiment, 39% of participants were men in South Dallas, and 34% of them were men in East Plano.
(been assaulted or robbed), whether they ever witnessed someone else being
involved in a violent incident, and how important it is to them to feel safe from
harm.\textsuperscript{13} Table 5 compares individual perceptions and experiences across
neighborhoods. Overall, participants in East Plano reported significantly higher
ratings on the trust, fairness and helpfulness questions compared to Fair Park
participants ($p < 0.05$). The rate of being victimized in or witnessing violent
incidents in Fair Park is more than double the rate in East Plano ($p < 0.01$); the
need to feel safe from harm is significantly greater in Fair Park than in East Plano
($p < 0.03$). Interestingly, the difference in the perception questions (e.g., trust,
fairness and helpfulness) across neighborhoods is larger for women ($p < 0.05$,\textsuperscript{14}
two-side test of means) than for men ($p > 0.10$ for two out of the three cases).

In sum, we find that the common identity prime affects women’s choices and
beliefs in their decision making on contributions to local public goods, and its
impact on their choices is channeled through beliefs. Men seem to be immune to
the identity prime, however. Although beliefs play an equally important role in
behavior for both men and women, the identity prime does not seem to penetrate
and affect men’s beliefs or behavior. This finding of gender heterogeneous
response to identity priming is consistent with earlier findings in economics
reviewed by Croson and Gneezy (2009), who review of a large body of economic
research on gender differences in other-regarding preferences. They find that “in
some experiments, women are more altruistic, inequality averse, reciprocal, and
cooperative than men, and in others they are less so” (pg. 16). The higher
variability in women’s other-regarding preferences, compared to men’s, is
observed in within- and between-study comparisons. They suggest an explanation

\textsuperscript{13} The trust, fairness, and helpfulness questions were based on 1 to 4 likert scale with a higher number meaning higher
level of trust, fairness and helpfulness; the importance to feel safe is based on 1 to 5 likert scale with a higher number
meaning greater importance. The questions on violent incidents were binary-choice questions.

\textsuperscript{14} There is no significant difference in self-reported perceptions across treatments within each neighborhood, since
these perception questions were asked after the identity prime questions: in the control, perceptions questions came after
the identity prime questions in the post-experiment survey.
that women are more sensitive to environmental cues in determining appropriate behavior than are men, and therefore small differences in experimental design (e.g., identity prime vs. no prime in this study) have larger impact on women’s behavior than on men’s. Similar views have been offered in psychology (e.g., Kahn, Hottes, and Davis 1971; Gilligan 1982).

V. Conclusion

In this study, we design a framed field experiment to investigate the impact of a common identity - being a member of their neighborhood - on individual’s contributions to local public goods. We find that the identity prime influences women’s contributions both directly and indirectly (through beliefs about others’ contributions). When the common community identity is made salient, women are more likely to contribute to local charities in the mid-income neighborhood and less likely to do so in the poor neighborhood, compared to the control treatment. In addition, the impact of the identity prime is moderated through beliefs about others’ willingness to give. In contrast, neither men’s beliefs nor their decisions are affected by the common identity prime in either neighborhood.

Our findings have several important implications. Studies in economics show that ethnically fragmented communities in the U.S. suffer from low spending on public goods or lack of support for welfare spending (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999; Luttmer 2001; also see Alesina and La Ferrara 2005 for a review). Our study suggests a non-pecuniary mechanism to alleviate this problem. Particularly, policy makers may increase the set of contributors and overall contributions to local public goods through promoting common identity among their residents, but only in communities where the common identity is associated with a positive social image. Our findings on gender heterogeneous responses to identity prime further suggest that effective policy interventions through motivating common
identity should be targeted rather than applied generally. Since we find that women are more responsive to the common identity prime than are men, policy interventions through fostering common identity may be more effectively implemented in women-dominant social groups, professions or communities.

Our results also identify an important factor – social image – that constrains the positive influences of a common identity. The sharp contrast of our findings in the two neighborhoods show that an common-identity motivating policy intervention may work well in one community where the residents feel proud and attached to, but may fail to work or even backfire in another community where the residents feel attached to but dislike the connotation associated with it. The finding on the negative impact of common identity in the poor neighborhood may not seem to be surprising ex post, but its importance has been overshadowed by the emphasis on the positive influences of promoting common identity which a disproportionally large volume of literature has focused on. Our findings suggest that equal attention ought to be given to the limitations of the influences of a common identity and the constraining factors.

While we consider neighborhood identity – a special case of common identity – results can be applied to other individual and common identities. The connotations associated with religious identity may affect engagement in religious services and overall commitment to the cause. The way one feels about a company may affect their productivity especially in the case of corporation merger. Since the positive or negative perceptions that an individual holds about their group will affect how they interact with the group, even if they strongly identify with the group, building strength of identification, while necessary, is not always sufficient to reap the rewards of identity as a non-pecuniary mechanism. To policy makers or practitioners, this important finding indicates that both strength of identity and the broader perceptions of the identity must be addressed to successfully promote cooperation through fostering common identity.
REFERENCES


Buchan, Nancy R., Marilynn B. Brewer, Gianluca Grimalda, Rick K. Wilson,


de Oliveira, Angela C. M., Catherine Eckel and Rachel T.A. Croson. 2010. “Ethnicity, Community and Public Good Provision.” http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/14110/angela%5B1%5D.pdf


Kessler, Judd B. 2011. “Signals of Support and Public Good Provision.” https://opimweb.wharton.upenn.edu/linkservid/1BAAD7A5-06D0-1E9F-163D1FD90FF0ABA1/showMeta/0/

A. Roth (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press (Chap. 2).


Figure 1: Likelihood of Giving by Category and Gender

Figure 2: Histogram of the Number of Charities to Which Participants Contributed
Figure 3: Participants’ Beliefs on Other Participants’ Choices
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fair Park</th>
<th></th>
<th>East Plano</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>women</td>
<td>men</td>
<td>women</td>
<td>men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of participants</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasians *</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans *</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanics *</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children per family</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, in years</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years living in current neighborhood</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (at least some college) *</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single *</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married *</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced *</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief household earner *</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend religious service at least once a month *</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Dallas *</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Texas *</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed during the past 12 months *</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a permanent job *</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** One participant in East Plano did not report gender and is excluded from the analysis. Exact wording is given in Online Appendix E.

* Percent of participants

*Source:* Authors' calculations.
### Table 2: Impact of Common Identity Prime on Belief (Ordered Logit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief: none of others give</th>
<th>Fair Park</th>
<th>East Plano</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>women (1)</td>
<td>men (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief: none of others give</td>
<td>0.128*</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief: only one other participant gives</td>
<td>0.018**</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief: both other participants give</td>
<td>-0.146*</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 342 women, 220 men, 187 Women, 99 Men

Log-likelihood: -293.0 Fair Park, -180.2 East Plano, -129.0 Women, -74.9 Men

Pseudo-R^2: 0.016 Fair Park, 0.003 East Plano, 0.034 Women, 0.024 Men

**Notes:** Ordered logit model is used with belief (a categorical) variable as the dependent variable. Belief is coded as 1 if a subject believes that neither of the other two participants contributes to the charity, 2 if she believes that only one other participant contributes, and 3 if she believes that the other two participants both contribute.

The independent variable of interest is identity prime. It is coded as 1 for the identity prime Treatment and 0 otherwise.

Charity fixed effects are included in the analysis but the estimates are omitted.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the individual level. Marginal effects are reported.

*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level

**Source:** Author’s calculations.
### Table 3: Likelihood of Giving (Logit), Fair Park

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>(1) women</th>
<th>(2) women</th>
<th>(3) men</th>
<th>(4) men</th>
<th>(5) pooled</th>
<th>(6) pooled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity Treatment</td>
<td>-0.221***</td>
<td>-0.149**</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>-0.218***</td>
<td>-0.143***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief</td>
<td>0.203***</td>
<td>0.228***</td>
<td>0.049**</td>
<td>0.077**</td>
<td>0.043***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patience</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
<td>0.042***</td>
<td>0.079**</td>
<td>0.049**</td>
<td>0.077***</td>
<td>0.043***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men*Treatment</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children charity</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job training charity</td>
<td>-0.081**</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.053**</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental education charity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-199.7</td>
<td>-151.7</td>
<td>-142.2</td>
<td>-92.0</td>
<td>-342.2</td>
<td>-245.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Logit model is used with the likelihood of giving as the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level and reported in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported. The Health charity (The Martin Luther King Jr. Family Clinic in Fair Park and The Collin County Adult Clinic in East Plano) is in the omitted category. 

Belief is coded as 1 if a subject believes that neither of the other two participants contributes to the charity, 2 if she believes that only one other participant contributes, and 3 if she believes that the other two participants both contribute.

Patience is the number of patient choices one made in the time preference task.

*** significant at the 1% level

** significant at the 5% level,

* significant at the 10% level

Source: Authors’ calculations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
<th>(11)</th>
<th>(12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>identity treatment</td>
<td>0.153**</td>
<td>0.088*</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.157**</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief</td>
<td>0.194***</td>
<td>0.229***</td>
<td>0.203***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patience</td>
<td>0.062***</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.031*</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men*treatment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.243</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children charity</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job training charity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental education charity</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-85.8</td>
<td>-53.3</td>
<td>-59.7</td>
<td>-43.8</td>
<td>-151.4</td>
<td>-108.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Logit model is used with the likelihood of giving as the dependent variable.

Standard errors are clustered on the individual level and reported in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported.

The Health charity (The Martin Luther King Jr. Family Clinic in Fair Park and The Collin County Adult Clinic in East Plano) is in the omitted category.

Belief is coded as 1 if a subject believes that neither of the other two participants contributes to the charity, 2 if she believes that only one other participant contributes, and 3 if she believes that the other two participants both contribute.

Patience is the number of patient choices one made in the time preference task.

*** significant at the 1% level

** significant at the 5% level,

* significant at the 10% level

Source: Authors’ calculations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust (1–4)</th>
<th>Fairness (1–4)</th>
<th>Helpfulness (1–4)</th>
<th>Ever being victim of crime (yes/no)</th>
<th>Witnessed crime (yes/no)</th>
<th>Need to feel safe (1–5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Park</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Plano</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Park</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>4.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Plano</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pooled</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Park</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Plano</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Test of means is used for trust, fairness, helpfulness and importance to feel safe. Test of proportions is used for being victim of or witnessing crime. Two-sided p values are reported. Non-parametric results are consistent.

*Source:* Authors’ calculations
In the East Plano area, people come from many different places. However, you have all chosen to live in the East Plano neighborhood. As member of the same neighborhood, you share many public facilities, for example, parks, schools, public libraries, museums, roads, public transportation, local stores, and many others. These questions are about how strongly you identify with being a resident of the East Plano area.

How long have you lived in the East Plano area? _________ years

How strongly do you identify with being a resident of the East Plano area? (1=not at all, 2=somewhat, 3=very strongly)

Please indicate how much you, as a resident of the East Plano area, agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree)

A. I have spent time trying to know more about the history and traditions of the East Plano area.
B. I am active in organizations or social groups that include mostly residents of the East Plano area.
C. I think a lot about how my life is affected by living in the East Plano area.
D. I am happy that I am a resident of the East Plano area.
E. I have a strong sense of belonging to the East Plano area.
F. In order to learn more about the East Plano area, I have often talked to other people about it.
G. I have a lot of pride in the East Plano area.
H. I participate in neighborhood activities with other members of the East Plano area.
I. I feel good about living in the East Plano area.

Note: “East Plano” was replaced with “South Dallas/ Fair Park” in the South Dallas/ Fair Park” Community Connection questionnaire.
## Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics of the Identity Prime

### Table B1: Summary Statistics from the Community Connection Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>know more about neighborhood</th>
<th>active in local activities</th>
<th>think about how life is affected</th>
<th>talked to others about neighborhood</th>
<th>participate in neighbor-hood activities</th>
<th>happy</th>
<th>strong sense of belonging</th>
<th>pride</th>
<th>feel good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A. Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Park</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Plano</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value: t test</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel B. Men</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Park</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Plano</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value: t test</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel C. Pooled</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Park</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Plano</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p value: t test</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** This table reports the mean response to the questions in the community connection survey (Appendix A), with “strongly disagree” coded as 1 and “strongly agree” coded as 5.

For each pair-wise comparison between the two neighborhoods, we report p value for two-sided t test of means, and p value in a simple OLS regression in which we control for the number of years of residence in the neighborhood.

**Source:** Authors’ calculations.
Appendix C: Information provided on the local non-profit organizations

South Dallas experiment:

_Martin Luther King, Jr. Family Clinic, Inc._

The Martin Luther King Jr. Family Clinic provides medical and dental care to residents of South Dallas / Fair Park. The clinic provides patient access to health care and helps to eliminate racial disparities in health care.

_Dallas Bethlehem Center, Computer Education and Literacy Lab_

The Dallas Bethlehem Center provides the children of South Dallas / Fair Park with educational opportunities. The computer lab includes activities to teach reading and math, spelling, and computer skills.

_Inner-City Community Development Corporation: Business Assistance Center and Youth Entrepreneurship Programs_

The Business Assistance Center supports the growth of new and small businesses in South Dallas / Fair Park. The Youth Entrepreneurship Program teaches students how to start and run a small business.

East Plano experiment:

_Collin County Adult Clinic_

The Collin County Adult Clinic is an all-volunteer community clinic that provides limited primary medical care to Collin County adult residents who have little or no access to traditional medical services. The Collin County Adult Clinic is a non-profit organization that serves 18 years and older on a first come, first serve basis depending on their medical condition.
*Head Start*

Head Start is a non-profit organization that provides an environment for low-income children to explore and experience social, emotional, cognitive, and physical growth. Head Start operates on a policy of non-discrimination and considers families without regard to their race, color, creed, national origin, sex, age, marital status, language or disability.

*Practical Parenting Education*

The Practical Parenting Education is a non-profit training center whose goal is to provide basic education for adults, literacy programs and higher education to the community of Plano.
Appendix D: Experimental Instructions

The experimenter followed the pre-tested script and explained each task on the posters sitting on easels.

Instructions for VCM (Activity 3)

Please open your booklet to the page that says Activity 3. Did everyone find this page?

OK, please turn the page.

You will see a picture explaining the activity. Let’s walk through it together.

In this activity you will be put into groups of three (yourself plus two others from this study). Each person will be given $60, and you can decide how much you want to put in your wallet and how much you want to put to a group account. Every dollar put in the group account will be doubled and then divided evenly among the three group members.

- Let’s look at how this works. Here is a group of three people, you and two others. You are given $60 [point to the $60], and you can decide if you want to put it into your wallet [draw arrow to the wallet] or put it to the group account [draw arrow to the group account].

At the same time you are making your choice, the other two members of your group will make their choices. [Draw arrows for both of the other players]

- Once the money is in the group account, it is doubled [follow the arrow] and
then split evenly between all the group members [DRAW these arrows].

If this activity is the one chosen for payment, we will take all of the booklets in this study, and match you into groups of three. You will not know who is in your group, and no one will know what you chose to do. You will earn the amount you choose to keep, plus your share of what was put to the group and then doubled.

Let’s look at some examples. [Write these on the posters]

- Suppose everyone puts $60 in the group account [write in as you go through the example]. How much did they put in their wallet? $0. So, if each person put in $60, then there is $180 is in the group account. Then, the total donations are doubled to $360 ($180 x 2 = $360). If we split this evenly, then there is $120 each [Write on the arrow]. Let’s look at YOU. How much do you earn? You earn what was in your wallet, $0, plus what was split evenly, $120, which is $120. Does this make sense? OK, let’s look at another example.

- Suppose everyone puts $60 in their wallets [Write in]. So, how much did they put in the group account? $0. Then there is nothing to double or split [write in 0’s]. So how much does everyone earn? [ask them to answer] $60. That’s correct. Does everyone understand why?

Alright, let’s look at one more example. This last one is a little complicated, so please stop me if it is confusing in any way. Okay?

- Suppose one person puts $60 in the group account, one person puts $20 in the group account, and the third person puts $60 in their wallet. What is the total amount in the group account? We have $60 + $20 + $0 = $80. This gets doubled to $160 ($80 x 2 = $160). If we split this between all three people, each person gets $53.33. To be easier, I am just going to write $53. Okay?

So, each person earns what they kept in their wallet, plus $53 ($160 / 3 = $53). Let’s look at each person. So,

- The person who put $60 earns $0 + $53 = $53
- The person who put $20 earns $40 + $53 = $93
- The person who put $0 earns $60 + $53 = $113

Notice that since the amount put doubles, the group as a whole earns more when
everyone puts money in the group account. However, each person earns more when they do not put money in the group account.

Remember our first example? Everyone put all $60 into the group account, and they all made $120 each. But in this last example, the person who put in all $60 only made $53.

Does this make sense?

- If this is the activity picked for payment, then your earnings for this activity will depend on
  - How much money you decide to put in your wallet and how much to put to the group account; and
  - How much money the other group members put to the group account

Are there any questions?

OK, now turn the page. [Turn the posters to the decision form] This is a practice page, and you can mark it up anyway you want. You will make the decision on the next page. The decision form is a little complicated, so let me show you how you mark your choice.

You have four options. You can decide to…

1) Put $60 in the group account and keep $0 in your wallet. If you want to make this choice, you put a checkmark here [mark on poster].

2) Put $40 in the group account and keep $20 in your wallet. If you want to make this choice, you put a checkmark here [mark on poster].

3) Put $20 in the group account and keep $40 in your wallet. If you want to make this choice, you put a checkmark here [mark on poster].

4) Put $0 in the group account and keep $60 in your wallet. If you want to make this choice, you put a checkmark here [mark on poster].

Does this make sense? Are there any questions?

The actual decision you make is up to you. **There is no right or wrong answer.** Just choose the one you like best.

Please turn the page and make your decision now. When you are finished please close your booklet.

**Instructions for the Donations Games (Activities 4, 5 & 6)**
Please open your Activity Booklet to the page that says Instructions, Activities 4, 5 & 6. Right before this page is a loose sheet of paper. Just set it to the side and we will come back to it in just a second. Did everyone find this page? OK, please turn the page.

You will see a picture explaining the next couple of activities. Let’s walk through it together.

[Don’t mark yet]

In these activities you will be put into groups of three (yourself plus two others from this study. As before, each person will be given $60, and you can decide how much you want to put in your wallet and how much you want to put into a group account. This part is different: every dollar put in the group account will be doubled and then donated to an organization that helps Fair Park residents. Let’s look at the organizations on the loose sheet of paper. [Read Through Aloud]

You will make one decision for each of these three separate organizations. There is also a description of the organization on your decision form. These are three separate organizations, and you cannot transfer money from one organization to the other.

- Let’s look at how this works. Here is a group of three people, you and two others.
You are given $60 [point to the $60], and you can decide if you want to put it into your wallet [draw arrow to the wallet] or put it to the group account [draw arrow to the group account].

At the same time you are making your choice, the other two members of your group will make their choices. [Draw arrows for both of the other players]

- Once the money is in the group account, it is doubled [follow the arrow] and donated to the organization [DRAW this arrow].

If this activity is the one chosen for payment, we will take all of the booklets in this study, and randomly match you into groups of three. You will not know who is in your group, and no one will know what you chose to do. You will earn the amount you choose to keep. The organization will earn the amount that was put into the group and then doubled.

Let’s look at some examples. [Write these on the posters]

- Suppose everyone puts $60 in the group account. This means that $180 is in the group account. Then, the total donations are doubled to $360 ($180 x 2 = $360). This means that $360 gets donated to the organization [Write on the arrow]. So, everyone earns what was in their wallet, $0, and the organization earns what was put into the group account and then doubled $360. Does this make sense? OK, Let’s look at another example.

- Suppose everyone puts $0 in the group account. Then there is nothing to double or split [write in 0’s]. So how much does everyone earn? $60. That’s correct. How much does the organization receive? $0. Does everyone understand why? Alright, Let’s look at one more example.

- Suppose one person puts $60 in the group account, one person puts $20 in the group account, and the third person puts $60 in their wallet. What is the total amount in the group account? We have $60 + $20 + $0 = $80. This gets doubled to $160 ($80 x 2 = $160).

Each person earns what they kept in their wallet

The person who put $60 in the group account earns $0
The person who put $20 in the group account earns $40
The person who put $0 in the group account earns $60
The organization receives $160

Notice that since the amount put doubles, the organization earns more when everyone puts money in the group account. However, each person earns more when they do not put money in the group account.

Remember our first example? Everyone put all $60 into the group account, and they all made $0 each, and the organization made $360. But in this last example, the person who put in all $60 made $0 and the organization received $160.

Does this make sense?

- If this is the activity chosen for payment, then your earnings for this activity will be determined by
  - How much money you decide to put in your wallet and how much to put to the group account;
  - Money sent to the group account will be donated to an organization that provides one of the following services for Fair Park residents: Healthcare, Childcare, or Job training.
  - The organization earns the amount donated to the group account, including the amount doubled.

If you want, you can wait until everyone is paid and watch us write the check for the organization. You can even go with us to the mailbox if you like. Are there any questions?

OK, now turn the page. [Turn the posters to the decision form] Let me show you how you mark your choice.

As before, you have four options. You can decide to… [Ask them some]

1) Put $60 in the group account and keep $0 in your wallet. If you want to make this choice, you put a checkmark here [mark on poster].

2) Put $40 in the group account and keep $20 in your wallet. If you want to make this choice, you put a checkmark here [mark on poster].

3) Put $20 in the group account and keep $40 in your wallet. If you want to make this choice, you put a checkmark here [mark on poster].
4) Put $0 in the group account and keep $60 in your wallet. If you want to make this choice, you put a checkmark here [mark on poster].

Does this make sense? Are there any questions?

The actual decision you make is up to you. **There is no right or wrong answer.** Just choose the one you like best.

You will place a checkmark in the box next to your choice. Raise your hand if you have a question and one of our monitors will come to help you.

Before you make your decisions, I need to read out loud the descriptions of the organizations. The 3 organizations are the following: [Read the insert out loud]

Please turn the page to **Activity 4.** You can now make your decision for activities 4, 5 and 6.

When you are finished with activity 6, there are a couple of short questions about what you did in Activities 3 -6. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of our monitors will come by to help you. When you are done with everything, please close your booklet.
Appendix E: Wording of Survey Questions
(to accompany Table 1)

Male/Female: What is your sex?  
☐ 0 Male  ☐ 1 Female

Race/Ethnicity: What is your ethnicity?
☐ 1 White / Caucasian  ☐ 2 African American / Black
☐ 3 Hispanic  ☐ 4 Asian
☐ 5 Other

Children: How many children under the age of 18 are living in your household?  
________

Age: What is your birth date? __________

Years in Neighborhood: How long have you lived in the [Neighborhood] area?  
________ years

Education: What is your level of education?
☐ 1 Some elementary school
☐ 2 Finished elementary school
☐ 3 Some high school
☐ 4 Finished high school
☐ 5 Some college
☐ 6 Finished college
☐ 7 Graduate work

Marital Status: I am
☐ 1 Single/Never married
☐ 2 Married, civil union/domestic partner
☐ 3 Widow/er
☐ 4 Divorced/Separated
Chief Earner: Are you the chief wage earner in your household? □ 1 Yes □ 0 No

Religious: How often do you attend religious services:
□ 1 More than once a week □ 2 Once a week □ 3 At least once a month
□ 4 Less than once a month □ 5 Never

Born: Where were you born? __________________

Unemployed: At any time during the past 12 months, have you been unemployed and looking for work?
□ 1 Yes □ 0 No

Employment: What do you consider to be your current main activity? (Choose all that apply)
I am working at a
□ 1 temporary job
□ 2 permanent job less than 30 hours per week
□ 3 permanent job more than 30 hours per week
I am going to school as a
□ 4 high school student
□ 5 part time college student
□ 6 full time college student
I am not working, but am
□ 7 looking for paid work
□ 8 caring for family and my home
□ 9 on long-term disability or illness
□ 10 retired
□ 11 on parental leave from paid employment
□ 12 Other: ______________
Appendix Figures 1-3: “For Online Publication” or Appendix for Reviewers

**Figure A1: Average Amount of Contribution ($)**
(Men and women pooled)

**Figure A2: Likelihood of Contributing**
(Men and women pooled)
APPENDIX Figure A3: Contribution Histograms by Category
(Men and Women Pooled)